ROBERT CARDENAS, ASHLEY CARDENAS, SAVANNAH CARDENAS, and BRAYLON CARDENAS, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. SIGIEL J. SWANSON, Appellee (Defendant).
S-22-0223
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
July 5, 2023
2023 WY 67
FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
Representing Appellants: Gary L. Shockey, Gary L. Shockey, PC, Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Shockey.
Representing Appellee: Michael T. Sullivan and Winslow R. Taylor, III, Tucker Holmes, P.C., Centennial, Colorado. Argument by Mr. Taylor.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.
[¶1] Robert (Bob), Ashley, Savannah, and Braylon Cardenas (the Cardenas family) sued to recover damages for emotional distress they suffered when their dogs died after becoming entangled in snares set by Sigiel J. Swanson. Mr. Swanson moved for summary judgment, asserting that emotional distress was not compensable because dogs are property. The district court granted summary judgment and the Cardenas family appeals. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] We restate the issues: 1. Can members of the Cardenas family recover damages for emotional injuries suffered because of the loss of their dogs? 2. Should this Court allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet?1
FACTS
[¶3] The following facts are undisputed. The Cardenas family (Father Robert (Bob), Mother Ashley, and children Savannah and Braylon) owned three St. Bernard dogs, Brooklyn, Barkley, and Jax. The Cardenas home was situated in the foothills of Casper Mountain, adjacent to large tracts of state land. The dogs frequently ran unleashed on the state land and neighboring private land. They would always return home before dark.
[¶4] On the afternoon of November 29, 2014, the dogs were let outside to run. Barkley and Jax returned home that night, but Brooklyn did not. Over the next several days, the family searched for Brooklyn, to no avail.
[¶5] On Tuesday, December 2, while their parents were at work, Savannah and Braylon continued the search. They took Barkley and Jax thinking the dogs might be helpful. As they walked along a ridgeline on the state land, Barkley ran ahead and down a draw. Barkley did not come back, and Savannah and Braylon followed his path. They found Barkley lying in some brush, caught in a snare, with an apparent broken neck. Savannah and Braylon tried unsuccessfully to free Barkley from the snare and in the process, Braylon injured his hands. Savannah, in a highly emotional state, phoned her mother, declaring “he’s dead.” Under the circumstances, Ashley thought something had happened to her son, Braylon.
[¶6] Ashley phoned Bob, and they both left work to look for the children. In the meantime, Jax, who had followed Savannah and Braylon into the draw, was caught in a different snare. Savannah and Braylon tried unsuccessfully to loosen the snare, but Jax, too, died.
[¶8] Sigiel J. Swanson, a trapper, set the snares that caught the Cardenas’ dogs. The Cardenas family sued Mr. Swanson asserting claims of “negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress,” and civil rights violations.2
[¶9] Mr. Swanson filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing the Cardenas’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. The negligence claims—for Braylon’s personal injury, punitive damages for willful and wanton misconduct, property damage for loss of the dogs and emotional distress damages in relation to these claims—remained. After discovery, Mr. Swanson filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the remaining claims failed as a matter of law, and seeking a determination that purely emotional damages are not recoverable. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It found that Mr. Swanson’s conduct was not willful and wanton as a matter of law and that to the extent that the Cardenas’ remaining claims sought emotional damages arising from the loss of the dogs, damages could not be recovered. This left the claims for property damage based on the loss of the dogs, and Braylon’s personal injury unresolved. The parties reached an agreement on the property damage leaving only Braylon’s personal injury claim. The district court found that to the “extent that [Braylon’s] claim continues, it is closely enough related to other claims for emotional traumatic loss . . . [that] all other claims in this case should be appealable” and certified that there is “no just cause for delay for appeal.” The Cardenas family appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶10] Summary judgment is granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
DISCUSSION
I. Can members of the Cardenas family recover damages for emotional injuries suffered because of the loss of their dogs?
[¶11] The Cardenas family argues that Savannah and Braylon have claims for emotional
A. Emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable.
[¶12] In Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 2003 WY 167, ¶¶ 6–7, 81 P.3d 196, 199 (Wyo. 2003), we examined our precedent as it relates to situations in which a plaintiff may make a claim for emotional damages. We noted that “[t]raditionally recovery for mental or emotional injury was only allowed when [the emotional] injury was linked to an actual or threatened physical impact” but noted “[m]any state courts have modified this traditional rule.” Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986). We pointed out that while Wyoming has allowed recovery for purely emotional injury, it has restricted the circumstances where recovery for emotional injury without accompanying physical injury will be allowed: Recovery for purely emotional distress is permitted in Wyoming in certain limited underlying actions. These actions are: “1) some intentional torts, Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 877–878 (Wyo. 1972) (false imprisonment); Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo. 1983) (malicious prosecution); 2) violation of certain constitutional rights, Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo. 1992); and 3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 833 (Wyo. 1994).” Blagrove v. JB Mech., Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275–76 (Wyo. 1997). We have also recognized the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but we have done so only under limited circumstances. Blagrove, 934 P.2d at 1275; Gates, 719 P.2d at 195 (negligent infliction of emotional distress limited by the requirements of a family relationship and observation of serious bodily harm); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Wyo. 1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress limited by the requirements of extreme or outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress). This court has also considered the issue of purely emotional damages in a negligence action involving a car collision. In Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1995), Bone failed to stop the snowmobile he was driving at a stop sign. Bone’s failure to stop caused a collision with Daily’s vehicle. Id. at 1042. Daily was not physically injured in the collision; Bone, however, was killed as a result of the impact. Id. Witnessing Bone’s impact and death caused Daily posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and agoraphobia. Id. We held that recovery in tort for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident should not be denied simply because the plaintiff’s injuries were mental rather than physical, as long as the plaintiff could prove negligence, impact, and damages proximately flowing therefrom. Id. at 1044. Our holding in Daily convinced some that we had established a claim for negligence alleging only mental injury. In Blagrove, however, we explained that our decision in Daily “has the limited scope of allowing recovery for mental injury absent physical injury in an automobile collision case.” Blagrove v. JB Mech., Inc., 934 P.2d at 1276 (holding that as a general rule emotional distress damages in connection with property damage are not compensable). We went on to explain that Daily resulted from the particular facts of that case and “did not generally establish that a claim for negligence alleging only mental injury had been recognized in Wyoming.” Id. However, we note that Blagrove was a case in which the defendant’s negligence resulted in property damage; and we qualified the previous statement by also saying that Daily did not provide “an analysis which would extend its result to a property damage situation.” Larsen, ¶¶ 8–10, 81 P.3d at 199–200.
[¶13] Following our review of the relevant precedent, we considered the situation
presented in Larsen. There a mother and daughter were separated for forty-three years
because a hospital switched two newborn babies at birth. The plaintiffs had filed suit
alleging emotional injury and asking for
[¶14] Appellants argue that the limited exception in Larsen applies to their claims. They focus on language in Larsen which states that “the availability of [emotional distress] damages must be limited to plaintiffs who can prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its authenticity.” Id. ¶ 20, 81 P.3d at 202. They argue that there “should be little doubt that the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Barkley and Jax authenticate” Savannah and Braylon’s emotional injury claims. While we do not doubt the genuineness of the family’s grief, authenticity is not the determinative factor giving rise to a cause of action for emotional harm. Id. ¶ 39, 81 P.3d at 206–07.
[¶15] Here, not only is there is no contractual relationship for services that carry with them deeply emotional responses in the event of breach, there is no contractual relationship between the Cardenas family and Mr. Swanson whatsoever. This case is more akin to Blagrove v. JB Mech., Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997). There, the homeowners sued a plumbing contractor seeking recovery for mental anguish suffered when flooding damaged their home and destroyed personal possessions. The homeowners argued that our precedent suggested that “emotional damages are recoverable for property damage without accompanying physical injury,” and “mental anguish damages are available where a plaintiff shows the existence of a completed tort, namely, negligence.” Blagrove, 934 P.2d at 1275. We held “emotional distress damages in connection with property damages are not compensable.” Blagrove, 934 P.2d at 1277; see also Long-Russell v. Hampe, 2002 WY 16, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Wyo. 2002).
[¶16] Under Wyoming law, dogs are property.
B. Minor injuries suffered by Savannah and Braylon do not give rise to a claim for emotional distress damages.
[¶17] It is undisputed that Braylon incurred minor injuries to his hands when he attempted to free the dogs from the snares. The Cardenas family contends that Savannah also had “physical effects” from trying to free the dogs.3 The question posed is whether these minor physical injuries give Savannah and Braylon a claim for emotional distress damages arising from the loss of the dogs. The answer is no.
[¶18] Savannah and Braylon have no claim for witnessing the deaths of their dogs. Under
what is known as the traditional impact rule, “a plaintiff [can] not recover for mental
injuries unless they [are] linked to an actual or threatened physical impact [to the plaintiff]
caused by the defendant.” Gates, 719 P.2d at 195 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at 362–64 (5th ed. 1984)). See also Long-Russell, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d at 1018–19. See, e.g., Montoya v. Pearson, 2006-NMCA-097, ¶ 19, 142 P.3d 11, 16 (motorcyclist who suffered physical injuries in collision was entitled to compensation
for emotional distress arising from his own injuries, but not for emotional distress arising
from
II. Should this Court allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet?
[¶19] The Cardenas family urges the Court to adopt a “rule that emotional damages are recoverable [for loss of property] when the acts or omissions of the defendant were illegal or unauthorized by law.” We decline to do so.
[¶20] The Cardenas family concedes that most jurisdictions do not allow recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. Where recovery is allowed, jurisdictions have limited the circumstances to those where a pet was killed intentionally or with malice. See Jay M Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5th 545, § 3 (2001 & Supp.); Blagrove, 934 P.2d at 1276 (“[e]motional distress is not usually recoverable as an element of property damages unless an improper motive is involved”) (citing Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 364 P.2d 730, 733 (Colo. 1961))); see also McDougall v. Lamm, 48 A.3d 312, 326 (N.J. 2012) (a dog owner cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress for the loss of a dog); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Neb. 1999) (animals are personal property “and recovery cannot be had for emotional damages resulting from the negligent destruction of that property”).
[¶21] Nevertheless, the Cardenas family urges the Court to embrace the rationale set forth in A Clarion Call for Emotional Damages in Loss of Companion Pet Cases. The article states that there is: anecdotal evidence that some pet owners categorize their animals as something other than tangible, personal property. It then examines U.S. legislation which recognizes and protects the use of emotional support animals. The paper advances the proposition that the recognition of the psychological benefit in such legislation inherently suggests that damages for emotional harm should be recoverable in pet loss cases, whether or not the animal is a trained emotional support dog. It argues that some animals, because of this emotional attachment to some owners, should fall into a property-plus category. As such, in appropriate circumstances, damages for mental distress resulting from either the intentional or negligent destruction of a pet should be recoverable. Debra D. Burke, A Clarion Call for Emotional Damages in Loss of Companion Pet Cases, 15 Tenn. J.L. & Pol’y 250, 251–52 (2021) (emphasis added).
[¶22] The Cardenas family proposes that the Court draw a distinction between animate and inanimate personal property and allow recovery for emotional distress damages when animate property is negligently harmed. This is an argument best made to the legislature, and we decline to expand the reach of emotional damages to property inanimate or animate.
CONCLUSION
[¶23] Members of the Cardenas family cannot recover damages for emotional injuries
GRAY
Justice