Robert C. Hahn v. Francis W. SargentRobert C. Hahn v. Francis W. Sargent
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Coffin
Appellant, a former chairman of the Massachusetts Republican party, filed this action under four sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
The district court granted summary judgment with respect to appellant’s claim under
“ . . . if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . ..”
judgment “shall be rendered forthwith”. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate the court must “look at the record ... in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . ..” Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). Similarly the court must indulge all inferences favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Rogen v. Ilikon, 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966). These rules must be applied with recognition of the fact that it is the function of summary judgment, in the time hallowed phrase, “to pierce formal allegations of facts in the pleadings . Schreffler v. Bowles, 153 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir. 1946), and to determine whether further exploration of the facts is necessary. Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967, 968 (1st Cir. 1970).
The language of
With these standards and objectives in mind, we examine the record which the district court held did not present any genuine issue of material fact as to appellant’s
On March 3, 1972, Rockland’s attorney of record, appellee Miller, went to Ryan’s office, discussed the conditions imposed on Rockland by the decision, and then recounted the story told him by Berman of an unsolicited offer of political assistance and subsequent claim of successful intervention by appellant and another attorney named Kirk. Ryan immediately arranged to take Miller to tell his story to Cowin that afternoon. On March 16, 1972, Berman accompanied by Miller met with Cowin and one of his assistants. Berman said that he had initially been contacted by Kirk, a personal friend of a Rockland staff attorney, appellee Prasinos. Kirk had extended several offers of help to Berman through Prasinos, and finally arranged for Berman to meet with him and appellant the morning of February 28, 1972. At that meeting, Berman told Cowin, appellant and Kirk indicated that they could assure Rockland of favorable action on its application by Ryan. Berman did not, he said, authorize such intervention; nevertheless Kirk called soon after to advise Berman that appellant had been successful in his efforts on behalf of Rockland. A few days later, Berman stated, Kirk had called suggesting that an appropriate fee for the services rendered by him and appellant would be $75,000, and that Berman should in addition purchase several tables at a fund raising dinner. Later, according to Berman, the fee demands were reduced, and then, when Kirk heard that Berman had been summoned to Cowin’s office, withdrawn. 1
Cowin asked Berman to make a written statement rehearsing the story which he had just told. Berman, after several days deliberation, refused to make such a statement. Cowin then asked Ryan to reopen the hearing on Rockland’s application to permit him to put into the record, without revealing the names of Kirk and appellant, a summary of the events surrounding appellant’s involvement with the application. A hearing was held on March 31, 1972, at which
Beginning on March 3, when Miller first reported Berman’s story of appellant’s offer of assistance, Cowin had kept Governor Sargent’s office apprised of significant developments. Contemporaneous with his testimony at the reopened Rockland hearing, Cowin referred the matter to the Attorney General, appellee Quinn, who after further investigation, instructed two of his assistants, appellees Rowe and Irwin, to bring the evidence before a grand jury. Appellant and Kirk were indicted and brought to trial. During the trial testimony of Berman the defense requested that the court examine the prosecution’s records of prior statements given by Berman. The court, after examining the materials in camera, ordered the prosecution to make available to defense counsel several items not revealed in response to previous requests for exculpatory evidence. These materials were available to the defense when Berman was cross-examined. The jury acquitted both defendants. Kirk has since died.
Appellant, in his long narrative complaint, tells a different tale. Berman, he says, solicited his help through Kirk, and thereafter, delighted at the report that Rockland’s license would be granted, offered to make Kirk an officer of Rock-land as compensation, and to purchase $500 worth of tickets to a party fund raiser. The allegation that he volunteered to help and then demanded a huge fee, appellant states, was concocted by Berman at a meeting with Cowin on March 10, 1972, in an effort to secure elimination of the conditions imposed on Rockland by Ryan’s decision. (Cowin’s affidavit denies that such a meeting took place.) Cowin, Ryan and Sargent, according to appellant, availed themselves of Berman’s allegations which they knew to be false, to engineer the destruction of appellant, a political rival, and, to disguise their own misdeeds.
Appellant contends that Quinn, a Democrat, was content to go along with the scheme which promised to spill Republican blood. To this end, appellant says, Quinn, Rowe and Irwin both tolerated perjured testimony by several of the other appellees, and suppressed exculpatory evidence.
The complaint details not only events in which appellant was a participant, but those in which he admittedly was not. It purports to examine not only appellees’ actions, but their thoughts as well.
2
“[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as .provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) .
Appellant responded to appellees’ motions for summary judgment, affidavits and documentary evidence with four affidavits. These, rather than setting forth appellant’s personal knowledge of “such facts_ as would be admissible in evidence,” and showing appellant’s competence to testify to the facts asserted,
“While we believe that the plaintiff is entitled to all favorable inferences, he is not entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsey, speculation and conjecture.” Manganaro v. Delaval Separator Co., 309 F.2d 389, 393 (1st Cir. 1962).
Much of the complaint focuses upon events which occurred in private encounters in appellant’s absence. The alleged participants having denied appellant’s allegations, there can be little utility in permitting appellant to pursue his theories at trial. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952).
The record does establish .that Berman told the grand jury a story different from that which Miller, Ryan and Cowin state that he told them. Appellant contends that Quinn, Rowe and Irwin deliberately suppressed evidence of Berman’s inconsistency, failing to reveal it to the grand jury, or upon pre-trial motions for exculpatory evidence. As we have noted, supra, at appellant’s criminal trial, in response to a defense motion, the court ordered the prosecution to make available to the defense certain materials relating to prior statements by Berman. These facts, however, fail to present a material issue for trial.
The limits of prosecutorial immunity are not yet clear. Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 945, 95 S.Ct. 1324, 43 L.Ed.2d 423 (1975), with Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972), and Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975); see Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, we are convinced that whatever standard of prosecutorial immunity the Supreme Court eventually adopts will require that bad faith or unreasonable action be shown. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Appellant has adduced no evidence of bad faith, knowing misconduct or unreasonable action on the part of Quinn, Rowe or Irwin, in their presentation of evidence to the grand jury. Co win, Ryan, Berman and Prasinos all testified before the grand jury, exposing what inconsistencies there were between their stories. Appellant produced before the district court no specific items of exculpatory evidence which the prosecution failed to lay before the grand jury. 4
The tardy and reluctant disclosure of exculpatory evidence establishes no triable issue, for, even accepting as true the allegations of the complaint, appellant suffered no prejudice as a consequence of the late disclosure. The material was made available in time to aid the defense in its cross-examination of Berman, and appellant was acquitted. See United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. McGovern, 499 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (1st Cir. 1974); Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1974).
Since we find the district court was correct in granting summary judgment with respect to all of the other appellees, whatever disputes may have survived with respect to Berman’s conduct and testimony were immaterial.
We next address appellant’s claim under
Appellant also contends that appellees injured him by conspiring to obstruct justice in violation of
“[Second]. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such part or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; of if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impending, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws; . . ..”
There is a dearth of authority construing
The first part of
Finally, appellant claims a violation of
“[e]very person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned insection 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do
Affirmed.
Notes
. This portion of the tale — the contacts between Berman and appellant and those between Berman and Kirk — we draw from the testimony and affidavits of Miller, Ryan and Cowin. Berman, testifying before the grand jury which subsequently indicted both appellant and Kirk, related a slightly different story, indicating that the request for a $75,000 fee had been made the afternoon of February 28, 1972, when Kirk called Berman to report appellant’s success on behalf of Rockland. This concededly reveals the existence of an issue of fact. Indeed, we are left uncertain as to what in truth transpired between Berman, Kirk and appellant, but the factual issue as to whether the fee request was made on February 28 or a few days later is not material. See infra.
. For example, paragraph 26 of the complaint alleges in part:
“Defendant Cowin, apprehensive about defendant Berman’s mental state and apprehensive that he might reveal defendant Cow-in’s attempt to use his office to gain control over Rockland, saw his false story as an opportunity not only to divert attention from his own improper conduct, but also an opportunity to eliminate plaintiff as a factor in the Republican Party of Massachusetts and a possible political rival
. We express no view as to the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that most of the allegations of the complaint stated no cause of action under
. Appellant pursued none of the avenues open to him through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to develop such evidence, neither taking depositions, nor serving interrogatories.
.
“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”
. See, e. g., Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (firing of employee due to his exercise of First Amendment rights held actionable); Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc. (Richmond), 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (firing of employee because of Ku Klux Klan membership held not actionable); Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated pending rehearing en banc, and then dismissed by stipulation of the parties, 507 F.2d at 215, 5 Cir. (conspiracy to murder environmental activist held actionable); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (denial of promotion and overtime due to religion and national origin held actionable); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (refusal to rent office to lawyer because of race of clients held not actionable); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (black activist organization’s interference with services in predominantly white church held actionable).
. See, e. g., Giasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975) (police destruction of anti-Nixon posters held actionable); Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1975) (wrongful arrest and removal from airline ticket counter held not actionable).