Robert C. Beauchamp v. Paul Murphy, the Superintendent of the Old Colony Correctional Center

er,18 paragraph, and it included a not found dant was charged having with committed 55 counts, in the other which stated: counts of embezzlement in violation of 18 § U.S.C.

Created and caused to be The conduct in created forms of indictment of mortgage assignment mortgage which defendant was con- G, victed expressly alleged Loan was which documents indicated to have run from they 16,1991. duly July Thus, had November 1987 to Regis- been recorded in the try some of the County of Deeds for acts of Plymouth, charged embezzlement in fact, when in as the occurred after defendant then indictment well November 1,1989, knew, such documents amendment had not been re- relevant loss table 2Bl.l(b)(l). in corded; Here, § U.S.S.G. placed by contrast, and the defendant alleged placed last caused to such date of the false and offense of fraudu- convic- lent prior documents in the October lender loan file for the No- 1989— G, vember Loan such amendment to where documents had the loss table 2F1.1(b)(1). capacity [Federal], § U.S.S.G. Plymouth to influence argues Government that the above con- duct, occurring in April 1990, lengthens the III. last date of the offense of conviction until Because the district improperly cal- then. Our problem with argument this banks, culated the loss to the and erroneous- itself, that the Government prefatory ly granted adjustment Bennett a downward indictment, section of alleged merely in his acceptance offense level for respon- obtaining defendant’s illegal loans extend- sibility, we vacate the district court’s sen- ed August 1988 until October 1989. In tencing decision and remand for resentencing determining “the date of last the offense of consistent opinion. with this The district post conviction” purposes for ex and the facto court’s decision to 1,1988, use the November

Application Note, only it is reasonable to Guidelines Manual is affirmed. hold the Government alleged its own So ordered. alleged dates. Count 7 that Bennett know- ingly executed, and knowingly attempted to

execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud

Plymouth Federal “in connection with a loan ” granted on May 12, or about 1989. This

was the illegal focus activity charged in Count 7. While the deceptive activities in Robert BEAUCHAMP, C. April 1990 unquestionably were related to. Petitioner, Appellee, fraud, charged and fit well into the defi- nition of “relevant conduct” set out 1B1.3, § U.S.S.G. the date of relevant con- MURPHY, Paul Superintendent duct controlling is not post pur- ex facto Colony the Old Center, Correctional poses. accept probation officer’s Respondent, Appellant. view, impliedly adopted finding by as a district court, No. 93-2385. April Bennett’s 1990 chi- canery conduct, was relevant rather than an United States of Appeals, integral part of the offense of conviction it- First Circuit. self, the last date of the having latter been October 1989. We find no error in the 3,May Heard 1994. district decision court’s to use the November Sept. Decided 1994. 1, 1988, Guidelines Manual. regard, this the Government’s reliance Regan, (1st United States v. 989 F.2d 44 Cir.1993), misplaced. There, the defen- corresponded The loan that with Count 7 dif- one which Bennett used his real fered charged chart, the other loans that it was supra. name. See

quired such a credit. disagree, and re- verse.

The facts straightforward. On Febru 23, 1973, ary jury found Richard Beau- champ guilty of degree second murder in Massachusetts. He received a life sentence but, law, under Massachusetts was neverthe eligible less parole years. after 14 Scarcely year later, April on Beauchamp was released prison on a 12-hour furlough. He fled from Massachu setts. Beauchamp thereafter lived “in vari ous places under different names with false largely identification and by his wits and deception.” United States ex rel. Beau Elrod, champ v. (N.D.Ill. 1987WL *2 1987). 6, 1981, July

On Beauchamp was arrested on federal charges in California. Shortly thereafter, Massachusetts learned of the ar- rest and notified the federal authorities the Commonwealth’s desire to have Beau- champ returned to prison. Massachusetts serving After a nine-month sentence in Cali- on charges, fornia Beauchamp waived objections to extradition to Illinois where federal mail charges fraud had been lodged against there, him. While he was convicted and sentenced to a brief imprison- term of ment. After expired, that sentence ap- he peared on February 17,1983, in Illinois state on an Illinois misdemeanor charge of William Duensing, Gen., Atty. Asst. with J. practice. deceptive whom Harshbarger, Gen., Scott Atty. Boston, MA,"was brief, Illinois appellant. dismissed its misdemeanor charge 11, 1983, on March anticipating Beauchamp’s Joseph H. Zwicker with whom Massachu- extradition to April In Massachusetts. setts Legal Services, Boston, Correctional governor of Illinois issued a rendition war MA, brief, was on for appellee. rant, but Beauchamp refused to waive extra dition. Instead brought a state "habeas SELYA, Before Judge, Circuit BOWNES, corpus action challenging his extradition on a Judge, Senior Circuit BOUDIN, Circuit variety of grounds. inventive ha- Judge. corpus beas petition was denied on Novem BOUDIN, ber Judge. Circuit but an appeal and then rehearing petition Beauchamp delayed a final appeal presents This question whether disposition until November 1985. Beau Massachusetts was constitutionally obliged, Elrod, champ 137 Ill.App.3d 92 Ill. under the circumstances of this to give Dec. 484 N.E.2d 817 an escaped convict against his Massa- chusetts sentence for time" in an Illinois Beauchamp began then a federal habeas jail resisting extradition back to Massachu- proceeding. Illinois, Beauchamp setts. The district court in a habeas corpus claimed that the Massachusetts murder had proceeding held that the Constitution re- been committed CIA’s behest and court, here, Beauchamp has officials had invoked both prison thereafter process equal Beauchamp’s escape protection concepts. Massa- due

connived held an prison. process underlay district court Beauchamp’s argu- Due chusetts relief, evidentiary hearing then denied ment that the Commonwealth has unconstitu- alleged facts Beau- concluding tionally burdened his of access to the event furnish champ would impermissibly courts and retaliated ex rel. to extradition. States defense equal protection United him. The claims were of Elrod, Beauchamp supra, WL first, provides two kinds: contesting credit for *2. persons to some extradited but not to finally August On second, and escapees; that denial of such pleaded to returned Massachusetts. He. affluent, fugitives credit favors over those escape charge guilty separate who cannot make bail. im- prison, separate sentence was but no Beauchamp began campaign posed. then arguing In a failure to exhaust state credit,' against his Massachusetts obtain remedies, singles the Commonwealth the sentence, second-degree for four- murder equal protection claim that Massachusetts (March 11, 1983, August year period grants persons extradited and 1987) jail spent that he had the Illinois it from withholds others based on irrational resisting to Massachusetts. while Rose Lundy, criteria. Under his Although would not reduce formal credit (1982), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 3.79 sentence, imprisonment, which was for life petition Beauchamp’s federal be dis the wait Beau- credit would reduce before present missed if he failed to the state parole. champ eligible was any courts federal claims the now assert pre The Massachusetts authorities were ed. The district court must dismiss such very pared give Beauchamp for his credit petitions,” “leaving prisoner “mixed the -with custody ex period in Illinois after his brief returning the choice of to state court challenges that Massa tradition had failed so amending his claims or of exhaust resub custody. him into chusetts was free take mitting petition to present the habeas request The authorities refused to the court.” exhausted claims district Id. credit, Beauchamp sought and then further judicial superior granted court review. The Beauchamp’s request for full credit but Supreme Court, In his brief to the Judicial reversed, holding Judicial Court Beauchamp separate had a section devoted to no credit was due for the time process,” guaranties “state and federal of due resisting extradition. Common Illinois (for adequacy purposes) whose exhaustion Beauchamp, 413 Mass. wealth challenge, Commonwealth N.E.2d 307 equal protection,” which section on “federal briefly indigency argument makes the 1, 1993, Beauchamp com- On October argument adequately. equal protection present for habeas menced action based on irrational classification set court. 28 2254. In a the district U.S.C. § section, heading prior in a under the forth thoughtful decision rendered on November constitution—equal protection,” “state which writ, 18, 1993, granted the district court guaran- “the state with reference to 1,574 days’ begins ordering the state to allow the protection.” para- ty equal As the last sought by Beauchamp. court credit supposedly graph this section—after that to the credit would unconsti- ruled irrational classifications have been de- tutionally Beauchamp’s right to con- burden alternate, scribed—the brief concludes: In the the court test extradition. denial of

held that was unconstitu- Over and constitutional re- above state tional retaliation the state. quirements governing by which branch and [by proposed appeal, this Commonwealth first on what basis the rule On denying adequately credit] did not Commonwealth claims adopted, the rule violates state and Feder- exhaust his state remedies. district al how, Constitutional constraints why, e.g., Smith, Bounds whom a denial of liberty can be (1977), if imposed. are the These constraints of Illinois had barred Beauchamp from filing equal Federal protection and process due federal habeas action to challenge his deten guaranties under both Constitutions. tion, serious constitutional concerns would arise. We will arguendo assume possible It is read this final paragraph, included, federal of access as the district apparently did, to be a habeas proceeding as equal-protection well. attack on the classi- just fications length criticized at in the same one, however, No prevented Beauchamp section of Beauchamp’s brief. The more nat- filing his successive habeas actions in meaning ural paragraph may be to Rather, Illinois. the issue is whether Massa- read it as a transition to the two sections that chusetts’ refusal credit the which, follow above, as mentioned address litigation this is an unconstitutional burden (where equal “federal protection” the indi- upon Beauchamp’s right Here, of access. gency discussed) issue is and “state and fed- Supreme Court’s provide decisions relatively guaranties (where eral process” of due guidance. little direct issues, Burden pre- access discussed). to the courts issue is senting the familiar problem of how much is be, However this may we have no intention much, too peculiarly depend on facts and dismissing of the case under Rose v. Lundy. context, and Supreme the Court has not had The substance of the irrational classifications much say to about the relationship between argument’ amply was explained in Beau- extradition challenges and the refusal to champ’s state brief and his criticisms were time served in an out jail. of state premised not any peculiarity of language Where burdens upon are laid the or exercise Constitution un- of constitutional rights usual prisoners, state precedent. Supreme .court the Su preme Judicial Court’s approach Court can current hardly give is to been misled very merely substantial because the latitude to the judg reference to state’s equal protection ment. E.g., Safley, occurred Turner v. at the of end the 482 U.S. argument 107 instead of the S.Ct. 96 beginning. (1987); L.Ed.2d 64 Had the com caption pare of argument Martinez, Procunier v. read “federal and state S.Ct. equal protection,” But such constitution — substance would cases have been differ exactly because they the same. involve the actual running prisons of practical the most Rose Lundy assures that state courts considerations discipline, of security, admin have the pass chance to on federal constitu feasibility istrative and cost. While some of tional issues before federal courts intrude on these concerns apply case, in this they the state process. criminal Where the state are greatly diluted when the issue is the court has fairly not been apprised of a consti sentence, calculation of a performed task tutional argument, exhaustion is required. by an pencil. administrator with a Fair, Nadworny (1st 872 F.2d 1093 Cir.1989). But in this context “substance If one looks analogies to our own rather than form” critical, 872 F.2d at the closest ones in Supreme Court ap- 1101, and Judicial Court would pear to decisions, be two both of which con- not have viewed the matter differently if the cern litigation burdens on provided choices to word “federal” appeared had in the heading the defendant. Jackson, United States v. of the section that set out the irrational 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 138 argument. classifications (1968), the Court held it unconstitutional turn, therefore, to the merits subject and be a kidnapper possible pen- death gin with the district holding court’s alty if, that the if, the defendant elected a denial of credit to Beauchamp impermissibly jury trial. North Carolina Pearce, forecloses or burdens the “right of access” to U.S. 23 L.Ed.2d 656 the courts. Undoubtedly, Beauchamp (1969), has a equal firmness, with held that a de- of courts, access fendant who appeal chooses to a conviction subject successful, alleged escapee at If an higher 309-10. be may, where subsequent retrial. Jackson such a warrant a substantial defense sentence enormity by the to good prospect influenced extradition and thus a fair plainly jus- avoiding imprisonment, so Pearce—where seven penalty, a return to certain deterring likely discouraged by unconcerned about he tices seemed or she to be guide- (denial credit) pertinent the more appeals—may penalty be never be will post. if visited extradition is blocked. Turner, Taking together Jackson Finally, “ready there is no alternative” to Pearce, say we is that the best Turner, at the denial credit. See opportunity litigate cannot on the burden at 2262. If unreasonable, largely reasonableness very give Beauchamp, it defeats emphases facts. turns With that underlies the no-credit rule: interest peculiar prison regulation, Turner itself place fixes the Commonwealth pertinent criteria: whether identifies “To imprisonment, prisoner. not the rule governmental policy serves a valid state’s the defendant otherwise would allow interest; prisoner is the extent to which the where would serve choose State exercising foreclosed or burdened significant portion Beau his sentence.” presence of rea- rights; and the or absence champ, “[T]he 595 N.E.2d at 310. absence government sonable alternatives for of the rea ready alternatives is evidence other means with- achieve same ends [challenged policy].” sonableness of a impairment of significant cost Turner, at 2262. S.Ct. governmental interest at stake. 482 U.S. Accordingly, if the choice is between the 89-91, 107 at 2261-63.1 legitimate .challenges laid on and the burden interest governmental In this case the sentences, defining its in own state’s interest to shape is patent: is entitled legitimate, the interest is we think that state and, very its within broad own sentences very light, and no obvious the burden is limits, is to that a sentence of entitled insist available to achieve the former alternative is many years years in a so means served ques- latter. But two further and avoid the n prison. E.g., Na Boutwell the state’s deci- tions remain: one whether (11th Cir.1988), cert. de gle, 861 F.2d 1530 deny Beauchamp credit is tainted sion to nied, 109 S.Ct. . U.S. 1.04 motive, retaliatory a the other is whether and (1989); Rose, 486 Pernell v. prisoners singling escaped pres- the denied, Cir.1973), cert. F.2d 301 problem. ad- equal protection We ents an these issues in that order. dress True, in serving part of the sentence Illinois court, finding an district in addition to very But this is a may not' be different. right Beauchamp’s upon undue burden may vary. on practical matter which views courts, that the Com- access to the declared importance to symbolic is a Further there Beauchamp for sought penalize to monwealth ability, separate sovereign in as a the state’s resisting extradition: enforcement, shape its to own criminal law procedures penalties. and to Department of refusal Corrections’ [Beauchamp’s] sentence with the escaped prison- credit

Turning impact the on to custody challenging extra- ers, clearly does not the denial of credit courts, suggests cannot stand. The record we think it dition access to the and foreclose Beauchamp’s request refusing unlikely against claims extradi- that colorable credit, unconstitution- legitimate the Commonwealth discouraged. The tion will be exercising him ally penalized challenging warrant grounds for a rendition Massachusetts; [the contest rendition to reasonably to narrow and clear-cut. See otherwise. Beauchamp, Commonwealth] has not shown 595 N.E.2d Commonwealth operations the peculiarly to in Turner— linked 1. A fourth consideration mentioned to offi- remedy sought special for deference corrections any ripple the need effect at 2262. Id. 482 cials. institution and other inmates—was correctional 1468, 113 L.Ed.2d Although “finding” (1991), look like a this of the S.Ct. action, motive for the Commonwealth’s under sanctions Fed.R.Civ.P. not to men complicated situation is somewhat more than tion various law common torts such as mali that. prosecution. cious First, there is no record evidence concern- policy, The Commonwealth’s even if ing Department of the motive of Corrections’ concerns, resting litigation in part on seems personnel who made the initial decision. away a to us mile from a warden’s decision to Both district court decision Beau- disadvantage prisoner prison because .that arguments champ’s rely upon brief made er filed law suit the warden. This attorney general’s brief state’s not, be, at least has not been shown highest provide court that “to credit toward pursuing case individual retaliation for escapee’s] [an ... for time sentence most, rights. At as one ele opens floodgates contesting extradition in a generally ment decision significant increase in extradition contests deny escaped prisoners credit for time by escaped inmates.”2 are in the same Massachusetts, spent outside position as district court to reason from weight to the getting benefits of attorney general’s argument, written so escapee promptly back where he or she applica- the clear error doctrine has no belongs. tion here. proceeding, Depart the state court finally turnWe claim that Mas provided ment of also Correction an affidavit equal protection sachusetts has denied fugitive from the chief of its apprehension Beauchamp, a claim not addressed making contentions; this, unit similar district court but advanced too, essentially litigation document and an alternative judgment. basis sustain the suggest any did not per that Washburn had Beauchamp is entitled to defend the district making sonal involvement in decision judgment court’s properly preserved questiona to Beauchamp. It is ground it, that would serve to wheth sustain arguments ble whether either the made adopted by er or not E.g., district court. brief state’s or the Washburn affidavit Restaurant, Tango’s Martin v. 969 F.2d anything amount to more than a kind (1st Cir.1992). equal protec “post hoc rationale” that courts do nor claim indigency tion based on in made state mally accept appraising as a basis for admin court has not been renewed us. before Cf. Univ., istrative v. action. NLRB Yeshiva Dugger, Palmer v. 833 F.2d 253 Cir. 22, 100 678 n. n. 1987). proceed, therefore, to Beau- (1980). event, champ’s claim that Massachusetts its applies suggests any neither document individualized no-credit rule based irrational classifica attempt target Beauchamp. tions. Second, we do not think that unconstitu argument, As the foundation for his tional retaliation is if even we as involved Beauchamp arguendo asserts that sume that the “Massachusetts correctional authori parole awards sentence credit giving ties do believe that spur credit would violators time-wasting pre-trial challenges detainees to extradition. for time Gen served in contesting upon multiple eral rules often other states rest extradition to consider Massa ations, statute, chusetts.” It litigation by and concerns about is abusive true Massa adopted requires prisoners underlie a number chusetts rules be credited by the courts themselves. during pretrial These include re with time served detention. itself, 129B, strictions on e.g., 127, § habeas § Mass.Gen.L. eh. eh. 33A. Zant, McCleskey 111 Another statute denies parole credit say Beauchamp extradition, champ agreed 2. The district court does that if had and in fact extradition, had not contested he would Beauchamp have did with the spent very received credit for time spent in Illinois “for in brief time Illinois after his extradi- imprisonment." days those same But those failed contest and was available to Massa- days" "same would never if Beau- existed chusetts. during suspect there no here Since is classification spent for time violator Id., involved, § any deprivation nor of fundamental ch. proceedings. revocation ordinary equal protection case of is applies—as rights, test no statute Where while extremely in out of state detention The standard formula time deferential. resisting extradition—the non-suspect that a classification is uncon is apply a of fairness.3 test only courts stitutional if no basis E.g., Inde

imagined support it. Harrah only oth Martin, than Other pendent School District Supreme Court decision Judicial er

involving escaped prisoner an is “support” legisla that a And means Chalifoux. escapee was sentenced In that ture—or, here, acting a state its to be by a California court intended time provide a for the stead—could rational basis Massachusetts, concurrently, served E.g., Bradley, choice. Vance refused to there. Massachusetts 59 L.Ed.2d 171 of over accept immediate rendition because then, sen crowding and after California assertedly Turning to the distinctions served, had been refused to reduce tence Massachusetts, pretrial detainees drawn spent in for the time Massachusetts sentence (whether held out held in Massachusetts or grounds, fairness the Su On California. extradition) contesting the state side while Tak Judicial Court ordered a credit. preme credit; sympathetic peculiarly are a case for together, we that the ing the two eases think presumptively innocent individuals these ap practice Massachusetts is prevailing presence their primarily held to assure prisoners escaped parently widely is trial. Credit for such detention extradition, spent litigating absent for time nothing irra available. There is whatever extraordinary equit circumstances or distinct pretrial rule de general about tional ies.4 as a matter tention should be credited course, pre nor does it conflict with cautiously general tread One must sumptive rule credit for time protection, there are izing equal about later who is convicted and out of one precedents that countless from escapes prison. even in hundreds cannot all be reconciled fact, if presented by A closer case See, e.g., L. discussion. pages of erudite is, parolee who fact it that credit is (2d Tribe, ed. Law Constitutional 1436-1672 then con- parole, flees state and violates 1988). however, .the here, The classification tests extradition back Massachusetts.5 prison escapees fugitives and other between by one on a escape prison, even But any previously far sus and is deemed rationally as a pass, can be treated Sidoti, 12-hour Compare, e.g., 466 pect. Palmore v. parole than a violation. 1879, more serious default 429, 421 104 S.Ct. a more classification). By the state take (racial the same token (1984) Similarly, the spent time in detention sympathetic view of any deprive in or does not sense classification liberty on most, by one who out of anyone right; at deny to a fundamental residing suppose to be than one who was conjectural incidental may impose a it the dis- prison. Again, discourage any in a Massachusetts unlikely to substantial burden tinction is not irrational. objections to extradition. 309; original [the time as until such E.g., Beauchamp, N.E.2d the sentence 595 at Chalifoux Correction, 424, Mass. institution Commissioner 375 be returned to” the defendant] v. should of 923, (1978); N.E.2d 926 Commonwealth escaped). 377 from which he 484, 272, Grant, 486-87 366 317 Mass. N.E.2d Correction, (1974); v. Commissioner Brown agreeing that a letter 5. The state has submitted 718, 782, (1958). N.E.2d 784 Mass. 147 336 arguing is policy that it is the followed this 127, § ch. 149. See Mass.Gen.L. consistent with Kinney, Mass.App.Ct. 363 4. See also In re Rapons, C.A. 91-0795B Blake No. also (1977) general (stating the N.E.2d 21, 1991). (Mass.Super.Ct., April "suspend[s] running escape that the rule an says supposed holding that ex-

Beauchamp these lesson the Court’s further in assertion ceptions undercut the Com- Pearce that a on stiffer sentence retrial after having in is interested a appeal monwealth it a successful does not offend the only in Mas- Massachusetts sentence served clause. See 395 U.S. at at 2072. S.Ct. jails. But a sachusetts interest approach implicit in The same formal the ' not cease to be so because rational holding separate more famous even exceptions are made on account of counter- punishments state and federal for the same general equi- vailing or individual concerns jeopardy conduct do not violate double Here, exceptions of the ties. are more Alabama, E.g., clause. Heath v. others, compelling than but none a involves 89, 106 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 387 suspect classification is outside the bounds rationality of minimal so as to violate Beauchamp’s argument The force equal protection clause of the 14th Amend- does not lie on technicalities of double ment. jeopardy. process ap Its essence is due peal concepts of fundamental fairness: af Beauchamp’s final claim is that all, detainer, ter for denial of credit Fifth Amend violates the years would have four prohibition against jeopardy ment’s double jail; in an and the denying Illinois result of applicable to the through made states in custody, him credit is to hold him if the process 14th due Amendment’s clause. The Illinois and Massachusetts terms are com precedent upon relied bined, for than more the minimum term oth Pearce, Beauchamp is North Carolina in erwise available Massachusetts. This ar aspect of which was different discussed if, gument special would force for exam In part above. Pearce defendant served ple, pris a state denied credit convicted getting his sentence for an offence before pretrial oner for in detention. appeal. conviction overturned on on Then retrial he was In convicted and resentenced. But portrayal this is one-sided sentence, the new Pearce was denied credit stay Beauchamp’s events this case. time he served incident to the first jail causally Illinois related not to his conviction for same crime. Massachusetts sentence but also to his own ruling by Beauchamp, relied on in escaping action from Massachusetts Supreme Court denial held this of credit resisting (mainly then on jeopardy prohibi- violates double clause’s And, spurious grounds). as we have ex against “multiple punishments for the above, plained legiti has offense,” same 395 U.S. at S.Ct. mate, symbolic, if partly having interest 2076, observing: full prison. sentence served its own guarantee basic [T]his is vio- deny Beauchamp To simply credit is not a punishment already when lated exacted ease fundamental unfairness in consti fully impos- offense is not “credited” Compare tutional Rochin sense. v. Califor ing sentence a new conviction for the nia, L.Ed. 183 same offense. Id. at 2077. We think that The Massachusetts rule could strike some holding the formal of Pearce this issue one, arguably observers as a severe but an application Beauchamp: no In our automatically severe rule not is unconstitu- spent formally the time in Illinois not a tional. as underlying Where here the issue “punishment” for the Massachusetts second- of rationality, is one minimum and fairness a degree murder a conviction but decision polices federal court perimeter. the outer Beauchamp—who already Illinois to hold had Where issues are on which ones rational and once—pending complete fled reasonably civilized men and women dif- his Massachusetts sentence. fer, the resolution of such not choices is weight Formalities in applying deserve a us. fairly prohibition technical constitutional such jeopardy the double That clause. Reversed.

709 U.S; 483, (1974); Avery, 393 89 v. Johnson Judge, BOWNES, Circuit Senior 747, “[SJtates 718 21 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. dissenting. obligation to assure that have an affirmative very persuasive has written The to courts.” meaningful access inmates of two due to combination This is opinion. (1st 9, Vance, 14 Cir. Germany 868 F.2d v. writing outstanding and skill factors: 1989) (internal and citation quotation marks of the author; and its invocation style of Bounds, at 832- omitted); 430 U.S. also see reach a fairness” to “fundamental of doctrine 34, 1500-01.6 S.Ct. at and to be fair at first blush that seems result all, escaped felon why an should just. After developed access has been right of The resisting extradition rewarded for the inmate eases where prisoner primarily dissent, prison? I fled from which state his con challenge of the conditions seeks to opinion however, I the court’s think because underlying conviction. or finement constitu- important not meet head-on (5th 804, 811 Sinyard, 884 F.2d v. Crowder This issue by petitioner. issue raised tional denied, 110 Cir.1989), 496 U.S. cert. confronted was, judgment, squarely my These 638 S.Ct. court. by the district correctly decided and adequacy pris of generally concern cases assistance, that the basic libraries, I not think respect, legal do With access fairness”; instead, I and other paper, postage is “fundamental availability pens, issue of constitution- petitioner’s docu it is whether which court non-legal believe materials without See, courts was violated. e.g., to the Alston v. right of al access cannot be drafted. ments Cir.1994) (7th that this I think that follow reasons DeBruyn, (denial For the 13 F.3d 1036 right was legal constitutionally guaranteed library adequate access to law assistance); Maynard, 11 F.3d 991 abridged. Petrick v. Cir.1993) (10th library); law (inadequate federal con independent inmate has no An Cir.1993) (2d Smith, 4 9 F.3d Davidson v. law on sentence right to credit stitutional materials); (destruction legal inmate’s state, imposed one fully (9th 1504 Cir. Kangas, 951 F.2d v. Gluth state, absent statute custody another 1991) supply copying and (high postage, providing. See sentencing so (9th Lewis, costs); F.2d 608 v. 895 Ching (11th 1530, 1531 F.2d Nagle, 861 Boutwell v. Cir.1990) attorney .includes (right of access denied, Cir.1988), 109 490 cert. Bounds, visitation); at 824- see also (1989); Palmer L.Ed.2d 1006 5.Ct. (“[Ijndigent inmates at 1496 Cir.1987). F.2d Dugger, 833 paper expense with provided at state must be have a constitutional Petitioner does documents, notar with legal pen to draft custody for the time right to credit them, and with authenticate ial services Massachu fighting extradition in Illinois them.”). right of access The stamps to mail practice question is whether setts. however, cases. not, As limited such Department Correc of the Massachusetts in’ context held Supreme Court (DOC), he was de to which pursuant tions century ago: nearly a diversity action tort credit, to retaliation nied amounts of access their escapees who exercise in courts is sue and defend right to courts. organized In an of force. the alternative of all right conservative society it is less prisoners, no It is well settled at the foundation rights, and lies other citizens, have a other than high- It is one orderly government. Bounds to the courts. See right of access citizen- privileges of and most essential est Smith, protected McDonnell, ... ship granted (1977); Wolff constitution. L.Ed.2d IV, section has, Article leges clause of and Immunities Supreme at various Although Court Constitution, Germany, generally 868 see times, aspect of 2 of the right of as one access viewed the 9, that it is most we believe at 17 & n. F.2d the Fourteenth Clause of Due the Amendment, Process Clause Process the Due view right peti- appropriate to to First Amendment right. Id. at 17. source of grievances, and the Privi- government for 710 R.R.,

Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio 207 mate for pursuing legal action constitutes 28 S.Ct. 52 143 L.Ed. interference with that right inmate’s of ac least, And at one of appeals McDonald, cess to the courts. 610 F.2d at explicitly rejected has proposition 18; Maschner, see also Smith v. 899 F.2d (10th 940, Cir.1990); prisoner’s that a 947 right “adequate, Valandingham effec- v. tive, (9th 1135, meaningful” courts, Bojorquez, and 866 F.2d to 1138 access Cir. 1989). Thus, although as recognized not, an may inmate Smith, example, for Bounds v. presen- right is limited to a constitutional constitutional, particular tation remain in a rights, civil institution or and hold a claims_ [Tjhe particular job habeas assignment, prison Bounds officials opinion primarily not transfer him job concerned with con- him a assignment in rights stitutional and civil claims retaliation for‘the and with exercise of a legal constitutionally protected minimum prisons activity. resources that See Meese, 994, (10th must afford to Williams v. inmates to 926 ensure F.2d effective 998 Cir.1991) (inmate access Recognition to the courts. transfer cannot be used as retaliation); right courts, constitutional Kilquist, v. access Howland 833 F.2d however, (7th 639, Cir.1987) long precedes Bounds, (same); McDonald, 644 (same). from inception its 610 applied F.2d at 18 been civil as same rationale applies well as constitutional the denial against claims. of credit pris oner’s sentence for in another Procunier, 307, (5th Jackson v. 789 F.2d 311 custody state’s challenging while extradition. Cir.1986) cases); (collecting accord v. Straub Monge, 1467, (11th F.2d Cir.), 815 1470 cert. In addressing petitioner’s claim of retalia- denied, 946, 484 98 tion, the district court found: right The circumstances of this strong- case ... broad, access to the courts is ly suggest presence of a retaliatory limited to right an inmate’s to challenge con response prisoner’s exercising his con- ditions of confinement or an con underlying right stitutional of access to the courts. viction. It an right covers inmate’s bring The facts indicate a reasonable likelihood action, Estelle, divorce Corpus v. 551 F.2d that in denying Beauchamp’s request that (5th Cir.1977), 70 and a common law it credit his sentence with the time he lawsuit, nuisance Harrison v. Springdale custody solely in Illinois on the Comm’n, Water & Sewer 780 F.2d basis of the escape charges, (8th Cir.1986). 1427-28 I believe that also it Department Commonwealth’s of Cor- encompasses right of an escaped felon to impermissibly rections penalized him for challenge his extradition. invoking statutory his right challenge petitioner Under Illinois law had a statuto- Undisputedly, only rendition. because Pe- ry right challenge his extradition. 725 titioner right invoked his to contest extra- (Smith-Hurd 1992). ILCS 225/10 Petitioner deprived dition was he of sentencing credit also had a federal challenge 1,574 days he spent in custody; had he through a habeas corpus proceed- waived extradition and returned immedi- ing in Crumley federal court. Snead, 620 ately to custody, Massachusetts’ he would (5th Cir.1980) F.2d 483 (citing Roberts v. have received full credit for those same Reilly, L.Ed. days imprisonment. (1885)). Beauchamp, slip op. at 13. We review It firmly is now established that act an district court’s finding factual of retaliation taken in retaliation for the error, exercise of a for clear and will reverse if we constitutionally protected right forbidden, firmly unequivocally convinced that act, if even if taken pur different an error has been committed. See Tresca pose, proper. would have been McDonald Bros. & Sand Gravel v. Truck Drivers Un Hall, (1st 16,18 Cir.1979); F.2d ion, (1st Matzker Local Cir.1994); F.3d Herr, Cir.1984). 748 F.2d American Title Ins. v.Co. East West Finan by prison Retaliation cial, officials in (1st Cir.1994). 16 F.3d find uphold the district court’s factual choice but words, court’s if- the district other respondent impermissibly retaliated ing on a whole-record that plausible based finding is review, exercising through if we would have ha- against petitioner affirm even for we must in in the first proceedings right result of access a different reached beas City, 470 Bessemer Anderson v. stance. to the courts. 105 S.Ct. neatly avoids the issue of retalia- The court (1985). L.Ed.2d by pointing petitioner out that himself of the existence court inferred The district access to the courts. This was not denied respondent had the fact that retaliation ignores petitioner’s fact that claim that the denial of argued previously discourage credit was denied DOC in Illinois time he served for the petitioner future, regard- bringing of such claims to dis- was essential challenging extradition merits, in the less of the face by escapees. contests courage extradition recognized right escaped felons to contest enough on this is not argues that Respondent courts. extradition retaliation, finding which to base “fundamental fairness” ratio- part As of its retaliatory action “[positive that evidence effect, court, petition- in. finds that nale the Respondent at 24. Brief for necessary.” had no contesting er’s basis respondent sure what Although I am not right I not think that the of access means merit. do I assume that it by “positive,” means that a hinges probability on the circumstantial evidence. to the courts opposed to direct as will succeed. The resolution claim have stressed again courts Time and time turn question should not the constitutional ultimate fact of because the “[p]recisely that petition- that post hoc determination on defendants’ state turns retaliation challenges frivolous. were er’s extradition establish mind, difficult to particularly it is Smith, at 949 899 F.2d evidence.” direct that, regulation prison It settled “when 18). Thus, McDonald, F.2d at (citing rights, impinges on inmates’ evidence opposed as direct circumstantial reasonably if it is regulation is valid finding of retali enough support may be legitimate penological interests.” related to Co., 950 Elec. Mesnick General ation. See Safley, Turner v. — denied, (1st Cir.1991), cert. F.2d Although 96 L.Ed.2d 64 U.S.-, regula prison rules and concerned Turner however, there present In the tions, why its rationale I no reason' see support in the record to evidence was direct actions that apply to other should not In the allegation of retaliation. petitioner’s courts, access to the an inmate’s threaten Massachusetts, respondent Superior sentence, of credit on such as the denial showing quickly es how submitted evidence Dubois, 922 case at bar. Frazier Cf. to Massachu generally returned capees are Cir.1990) (applying Tur F.2d apprehended. It then ar being setts after transfer). inmate ner to not credited petitioner should gued that analysis, the dis- conducting a Turner doing would so Illinois time for his because “[r]espon- dispositive it trict court found escapees with an incen provide improperly pe- proffer[ed] ... no [had] dent Clearly re challenge extradition. tive to justify might nological interests which advocating petitioner’s spondent was ex- response to Petitioner’s Commonwealth’s so that should be denied for credit claim challenge rendition.” ercise of his from chal be deterred escapees would other Respondent Beauchamp, slip op. at 15. future, despite lenging extradition failing provide repeated its omission My review right to do so. established their any penological interests this court with conclude that there leads me to of the record by denying sentence credit are advanced a rational from which evidence was sufficient (real imag- interests petitioner. Those petitioner was reta could find that factfinder ined) prevent the Commonwealth did having challenged his ex against for liated the time he crediting petitioner with appellate as far as an And this is tradition. chai- his extradition in Illinois no the court had go. I believe that after lenge. n. 2. right See ante at 706 This belies to contest respectfully I extradition.-. court’s characterization of the no-credit rule disagree. For the reasons stated herein I generally as a “decision judgment would affirm the district escaped prisoners I, therefore, for time spent outside court. dissent. Massachusetts,” Application ante 706.

the rule to the time associated with the

petitioner’s exercise of his constitutional

right bolsters the inference that the denial of retaliatory. supra

credit was See at 704-05.

Respondent simply argues that tbe Turner

analysis inappropriate in the ease at bar. Respondent

See Brief at 23-24. But respondent so, explain why does not this is SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, Jose L. Appellee, nor it Respon- does offer alternative test. argue principles dent of federalism require this court to defer state court COMPANY, PUERTO RICO OIL prison- decisions credit or not to Defendant, Appellant. er’s sentence with time served in another No. 94-1171. I state. have been legal unable to find respondent’s theory. basis for Appeals, United States Court of I recognize prison administrators First Circuit. must be wide in formulating latitude Aug. Heard 1994.

policies procedures and' running their prison systems, Martinez, see Procunier v. Sept. Decided (“courts 94 S.Ct. at are equipped ill to deal with increasingly

urgent prison problems of administration and

reform”), particularly prisons where state

involved, Turner, see 482 U.S. at (‘Where penal system at 2259 a state

involved, federal courts have ... additional

reason to accord appropriate deference to the authorities.”). States, , however, can-

not implement, justification, without prac- policies

tices or that interfere with the exer- of-prisoners’

cise rights. 89-90,

id. at 107 S.Ct. at 2261-2262. While

there exist penological justify denying

interest would petitioner Illinois,

credit for the time he served in I can

only speculate as to what it might be. person

Petitioner is not a sym- who evokes

pathy. plight Nor does his suggest that a

great injustice has been done him. Never-

theless, he has raised an important constitu-

tional involving right issue of access to

the courts. And I do not think that the issue

should be avoided masking garb it in the

of “fundamental today fairness.” The court

decides that a escaped felon no to credit his time

in custody while exercising his undoubted

Case Details

Case Name: Robert C. Beauchamp v. Paul Murphy, the Superintendent of the Old Colony Correctional Center

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Date Published: Sep 26, 1994

Citation: 37 F.3d 700

Docket Number: 93-2385

Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.