Pаtrick ROBERSON, Appellant, v. PHILLIPS COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION; Jerome Turner, Johnnie Sumpter, and Allen Martin, in their Official Capacities as Commissioners; Linda White, in her Official Capacity as County and Probate Clerk of Phillips County; and Derrick Turner, Appellees.
No. CV-14-942.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
Nov. 19, 2014.
2014 Ark. 480
Chalk S. Mitchell, for separate appellee Phillips County Election Commission; Robert E. Kinchen, for separate appellee Derrick Turner.
DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.
1Appellant Patrick Roberson appeals two orders of the Phillips County Circuit Court, granting a pеtition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment filed by appellee Derrick Turner; finding that, pursuant to
In the summer of 2013, the Arkansas legislature passed Act 1471, codified at
On October 7, 2014, Turner, as a candidate for Helena-West Helena City Treasurer, filed a petition for writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment and injunction against the Phillips County Election Commission and others, seeking to remove Roberson‘s name from the ballot or, alternatively, refusing to count the votes, and arguing that Roberson‘s actions violated
The circuit court entered its order, ruling that “a person cannot run for more
On November 3, 2014, Roberson filed a motion for expedited appeal and for shortening the period of time for briefing and a motion for filing partial record with this court. On November 5, 2014, this court granted Roberson‘s motions and took the motions as a case. On November 6, 2014, Chalk S. Mitchell, Phillips County Attorney, gave this court notice regarding the unofficial 2014 general-election results filed with the Phillips County Clerk. Roberson won the election by 70.73% of the vote to Turner‘s 29.27%. In an affidavit, Phillips County Election Commissioner Allen R. Martin stated that the votes had been tallied by the election commission but had not yet been certified, as it was ordered to wait until this court rules on an appeal. Because certification has not yet occurred, we are not precluded from considering the merits of Roberson‘s appeal.
On appeal, Roberson argues that the circuit court erred (1) in disqualifying him from seeking re-election as treasurer of the City of Helena-West Helena; (2) in refusing to dismiss Turner‘s petition as there was insufficient proof to disqualify Roberson; (3) in refusing to 4permit a witness to testify as to his knowledge on the intent of the statute; and (4) in denying Roberson‘s request for alternative relief to withdraw from the Justice of the Peace ballot.
Because Roberson‘s first two arguments hinge on the statutory interpretation of
Roberson clаims that he was permitted to run for both offices because other statutes contemplate a dual-office holder. For example,
For the third point on appeal, Roberson argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow State Representative Chris Richey to testify about the legislative intent behind
For his fourth point on appeal, Roberson asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to retroactively withdraw from the Justice of the Peace election in order to run for the Helena-West Helena City Treаsurer position. We hold that this argument is moot because the election for Justice of the Peace has already occurred, Roberson was elected to the position, and there was no stay of the certification of the results for the Justice of the Peace position. Cf. Ball v. Phillips Cnty. Election Comm‘n, 364 Ark. 574, 222 S.W.3d 205 (2006). We decline to address any mootness exceptions, as the instant case does not merit any exceptions, and therefore, we dismiss that portion of Roberson‘s appeal involving the circuit court‘s denial of his motion tо withdraw from the Justice of the Peace election.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
Mandate to issue immediately.
HOOFMAN, J., concurs.
BAKER, GOODSON, and HART, JJ., dissent.
CLIFF HOOFMAN, Justice, concurring.
While I agree with the result reached in this case, I disagree with the majority‘s analysis on the first two points on appeal, as I do not believe that the language in
A statute is ambiguous if it is open to more than one construction or if it is of such obscure and doubtful meaning that reasonable minds could disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. City of Mau-melle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003). “Where 7a statute is ambiguous, we look to the language of the statute, subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject.” Id. at 694, 120 S.W.3d at 59.
Applying these rules of construction to the facts in the instant case, I agree with Roberson that the language in
However, I would affirm the circuit court‘s ultimate finding that Roberson was disqualified from running for both positions pursuant to the statute. Although Roberson introduced testimony from Representative Richey that the legislature intended the statute to read as suggested by Roberson, the legislative history itself does not support Roberson‘s argument. By agreement of the parties, the transcripts of the committee hearing and of the regular session of the House of Representatives at which Act 1471 was passed were 8introduced into evidence. These transcripts indicate that Representative James Word, who introduced the bill, intended for this law to prohibit someone from running for and winning more than one elected position, and if they are then unable or choose not to serve in one of these positions, the municipality would have to suffer the financial burden of holding a special election. Based on this transcript, Roberson argues that “there is no legislative intent to prohibit holding all dual offices but, only where the dual office is already improper by statute or doctrine of incompatibility and thus potentially causing a special election.” However, regardless of the specific situations for which the law was intended,
KAREN R. BAKER, Justice, dissenting.
The lead opinion affirms the circuit court‘s ruling based on an erroneous reading of the statute at issue. The lead opinion holds,
The statute,
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-111 (Supp. 2013) , in its entirety provides “A person shall not run for election formore than 9one (1) state, county, or municipal office if the elections are tо be held on the same date.” Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-5-111 plainly states that “[a] person shall not run for election for more than one (1) state, county, or municipal office if the elections are to be held on the same date.” Here, the phrase, “more than one” means two or more, and “state, county, or municipal” are adjectives modifying the word “office.” See id. In other words, the plain language ofsection 7-5-111 dictates that Roberson was prohibited from running for two offices—in this instance, Justice of the Peace, a county office, аnd Helena-West Helena City Treasurer, a city office—when elections for both offices were held on November 4, 2014.
The lead opinion‘s interpretation is inaccurate and ignores our rules of statutory interpretation and plain English. First, “we construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretаtion.” James v. Pulaski Cnty. Cir. Ct., Div., Fifth, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (internal citations omitted).
Second, the statute is clear in plain English. The lead opinion ignores the plain English of the statute and constructs a contrary interpretation in abrogation of generally accepted grammatical rules and our own rules of statutory interpretation without citation to any authority. In reviewing the statute, “One (1)” modifies each element of the following series-state, county, or municipal. Here, the number “One (1)” is applied to the series.1 10Stated differently, a person shall not run for election for more than one (1) state office, more than one (1) county office, or more than one (1) municipal office if the elections are to be held on the same date.
“Under generally accepted rules of syntax, an initial modifier ‘will tend to govern all elements in the series unless it is repeated for each element.’ ...; see United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Fireman‘s Fund Ins. Co., 896 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)(holding that the reasonable construction of the phrase ‘negligent act, error, or omission’ is that the policy covers only negligent and not intentional conduct); Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Emp‘rs Fire Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 4th 548, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (2003) (stating that ‘[m]ost readers expect the first adjective in a series of nouns or phrases to modify each noun or phrase in the following series unless another adjective appears‘); Lewis v. Jackson Energy Coop. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky. 2005) (stating that it is ‘widely accepted that an adjective at the beginning of a conjunctive phrase applies equally to each object within the phrase. In other words, the first adjective in a series of nouns or phrases modifies each noun or phrase in the following series 11unless another adjective appears.‘);” Wash. Educ. Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Right to Work Legal Def. Found., Inc., 187 Fed. Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2006). Where several things are referred to in the stat-
[m]ost readers expect the first adjective in a series of nouns or phrases to modify each noun or phrase in the following series unless another adjective appears. For example, if a writer were to say, “The orphanаge relies on donors in the community to supply the children with used shirts, pants, dresses, and shoes,” the reader expects the adjective “used” to modify each element in the series of nouns, “shirts,” “pants,” “dresses,” and “shoes.” The reader does not expect the writer to have meant that donors supply “used shirts,” but supply “new” articles of the other types of clothing.
Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Emp‘rs Fire Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 4th 548, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 849 (2003); see also Lewis v. Jackson Energy Coop. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky. 2005) (“[A]n adjective at the beginning of a conjunctive phrase applies equally to each object within the phrase. In other words, the first adjective in a series of nоuns or phrases modifies each noun or phrase in the following series unless another adjective appears.“); In re Estate of Pawlik, 845 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (Under the series-qualifier canon of statutory construction, “‘when several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.‘” (quoting Porto 1Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348, 40 S. Ct. 516, 64 L. Ed. 944 (1920))); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 147 (2012) (“When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.“).
Furthermore, this interpretation is also supported by Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts that provides in pertinent part “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or
The Fourth Amendment begins in this way, with a prepositive (pre-positioned) modifier (unreasonable) in the most important phrase: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” The phrase is often repeated: unreasonable searches аnd seizures. Does the adjective unreasonable qualify the noun seizures as well as the noun searches ? Yes, as a matter of common English.... In the absence of some other indication, the modifier reaches the entire enumeration.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Finally, also in support of this interpretation is
(a)(1) A person holding more than one (1) elective office shall be entitled to receive compensation from only one (1) of the offices held.
(2) The person shall select the office from which he or she may receive compensation by filing a statement with the Secretary of State and the disbursing officer of each governmental entity in which he or she holds an elective office.
3Here, the statute should be plainly read as stating that a person shall not run for election for more than one state office, [one] county office, or [one] municipal office if the elections are to be held on the same day. We are required to givе meaning to every word where possible and we do not interpret a statute in such a way as to leave any word void or superfluous. Curtis v. Lemna, 2014 Ark. 377, 2014 WL 4656613. However, the lead opinion relegates the words state, county, or municipal to a category of essentially meaningless adjectives modifying office that can be stricken from the statute without changing its meaning. This we cannot do. Finally, the lead opinion has necessarily disenfranchised over seventy percent of the electorate who voted for Roberson. Accordingly, I would reverse and vacate the circuit court‘s order.
GOODSON and HART, JJ., join.