Richard D. ROBBINS, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
No. 03SC563
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
Feb. 22, 2005.
107 P.3d 384
The court of appeals in the case now before us found that Muckle‘s case was similar to Page in terms of both the charges submitted to the jury, and the factual scenario evaluated. The court of appeals, applying Page instead of Qureshi, conсluded that Muckle‘s convictions could have been obtained on the basis of identical evidence; and therefore, the trial court was required to sentence Muckle to concurrent sentences.
Page is inconsistent with Qureshi and its interpretation of
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and direct it to return the case to the district court for reinstatement of Muckle‘s consecutive sentences.
John Suthеrs, Attorney General, Laurie A. Booras, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Respondent.
KOURLIS, Justice.
The defendant, Richard D. Robbins, filed a motion under Crim. P. 35(c) to vacate a judgment of conviction entered against him in 1958 for felony first degree murder. The trial court dismissed the motion after a hearing on the grounds that it was barred by laches. The court of appeals affirmed in People v. Robbins, 87 P.3d 120, (Colo.App. 2003) (”Robbins III“), and we accepted certiorari to consider the question of whether
I. Facts
At age nineteen, Robbins, together with an accomplice, Gregory Warner, attempted to rob a pedestrian. On the evening of May 18, 1958, Warner and Robbins accosted the victim and informed him it was a “stickup.” The defendant stood behind the victim with a pistol while Warner stood in front of the victim with a knife. After Warner had “poked” the victim a few times with his knife, Robbins struck the victim in the head with the butt of the pistol. The gun discharged and the bullet struck Warner, killing him.
Criminal charges, including one count of first degree murder, were filed against Robbins in Denver District Court. Robbins entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial began on October 21, 1958. On October 23, Robbins’ attorney, Anthony Zarlengo, requested a preliminary examination of Robbins’ physical and mental health.1 The court appointed a psychiatrist and permitted an еxtensive examination of Robbins at the Colorado State Hospital. The report by the appointed expert indicated Robbins was not subject to epilepsy and was not insane. The court thus denied defendant‘s motion to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered the trial to continue. Robbins did not testify in his own defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the first degree murder charge. Robbins was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In 1971, Governor John Arthur Love commuted Robbins’ life sentence to 29 years to life. Robbins was paroled three times between 1972 and 1979 but was unable to adjust to civilian life. In 1994 he arrived at the Limon Correctional Facility where a fellow inmate allegedly assisted him in formulating the postconviction challenge which the court now addresses.
II. Procedural History
Robbins, represented by Mr. Zarlengo, first challenged his conviction in 1960 on the grounds that the trial court erred in refusing his request for a directed verdict on certain
The case lay dormant until April 21, 1995 when Robbins brought a pro se motion pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. As grounds for his motion, Robbins alleged that Zarlengo had conducted an inadequate investigation into possible affirmative defenses and that Zarlengo denied Robbins the right to testify at trial. The trial court denied Robbins’ motion without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Robbins failed to establish a present need for review of his 1958 conviction and that the time between his trial and motion for relief comprised an unconscionable delay resulting in prejudice to the People. Robbins appealed, and the court of appeals vacated the district court‘s decision. People v. Robbins, No. 95CA1566 slip op. at 2 (Colo.App. Oct. 24, 1996) (not selected for official publication) (”Robbins II“). The court of appeals opined that the while the equitable doctrine of laches could be asserted against the defendant, Robbins must be given the opportunity to explain the delay and rebut the claim of prejudice to the People. Id. at 4-5. Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court.
In February 2001, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Rоbbins’ Rule 35(c) Motion. Following the hearing, the district court found that notwithstanding the statute, Robbins’ claim was barred by unconscionable delay that resulted in irreparable prejudice to the People. The court noted that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was available to Robbins in the early 1960‘s and he had numerous opportunities to pursue postconviction relief prior to 1995. Finally, the court noted that Zarlengo‘s death eight months before the filing of Robbins’ motion made his timing suspect. The trial court rejected Robbins’ assertion that his delay was attributable to mentаl deficiencies. Robbins again appealed the denial of his motion.
This time, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s order in Robbins III, 87 P.3d at 124. It is from this decision that Robbins now appeals. We granted certiorari to determine whether the equitable doctrine of laches can be applied, as a time bar, to avoid postconviction review of a class one felony conviction.
III. Analysis
Crim. P. 35(c) affords every person convicted of a crime the right to seek postconviction review upon the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 247, 519 P.2d 945, 947 (1974). Since 1984, motions under Rule 35(c) have been constrained by
A. Statutory Limitations on Postconviction Relief
In construing a statute, it is our primary purpose to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo.1988). To that end, we look first to the language of the statute itself. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986). Words and phrases are given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. This plain meaning rule informs our principle that a statute may not be construed to abrogate the common law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the general assembly. Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 440 (Colo.2001), Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 52, 355 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1960). Absent such clear intent, statutes must be deemed subject to the common law.
As relevant in this case, the statute of limitations for collateral attack upon convictions provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, no person who has been convicted as an adult or who has been adjudicated as a juvenile under a criminal statute of this or any other state of the United States shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period, as provided in subsection (1), following the date оf said conviction...:
All class 1 felonies: No limit
All other felonies: Three years
Presumably because of the severity of sentences imposed for class one felonies, the legislature determined that attacks on judgment of convictions for such offenses should not be subject to absolute statutory limits. Id. at 428. However, the statute is silent as to whether laches may still bar such an attack. First, we consider the nature and application of the doctrine of laches.
B. Equitable Doctrine of Laches
Lаches is an equitable doctrine that may be asserted to deny relief to a party whose unconscionable delay in enforcing his rights has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought. People v. Bravo, 692 P.2d 325, 326 (Colo.App.1984). We have held that where extensive delay has resulted in the death of witnesses, or where their memories have dimmed, equity should bar relief. O‘Byrne v. Scofield, 120 Colo. 572, 578, 212 P.2d 867, 871 (1949). However, the application of laches cannot be predicated upon delay alone. See People v. Salvador, 189 Colo. 181, 183, 539 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1975). Rather, the record must show lack of diligence in the face of actual knowledge of the conditions giving rise to the claim. See Board of County Comm‘rs v. Echternacht, 194 Colo. 311, 572 P.2d 143, 146 (1977); Bravo, 692 P.2d at 326-27. Finally, the party asserting laches as an affirmative defense has the burden of demonstrating prejudice. Nolan v. Dist. Court, 195 Colo. 6, 9, 575 P.2d 9, 10 (1978). If the court invokes the doctrine sua sponte, the party against whom laches is asserted must be given an opportunity to explain the delay and rebut the claim of prejudice. See Hagerman v. Bates, 24 Colo. 71, 80, 49 P. 139, 142 (1897).
Although courts have primarily applied laches in a civil context, it has also been used as a time bar against stale postconviction attacks in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-1343 (7th Cir.1992) (laches barred 17-year-old claim); Paxton v. State, 903 P.2d 325, 326 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) (laches applicable to postconviction attack after enactment of Okla. Stat. 22, § 1080 whiсh provided no statutory limit); State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214, 399 S.E.2d 760, 762 n. 1 (1990) (motion for postconviction relief dismissed on grounds of laches); State v. Evans, 273 Wis.2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784, 796 (2004) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to defense of laches); see also Donald E. Wilkes, State Postconviction Remedies and Relief § 3.2, App. A (2001 ed.).
Prior to the enactment of section 16-5-402, this court applied laches as a time bar
It is clear that before the enactment of section 16-5-402, Colorado courts had the power to apply laches as a bar to postconviction relief. In interpreting statutes, the court presumes the legislation was passed with deliberate and full knowledge of all existing law dealing with the same subject. In re Questions Submitted by U.S. Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270, 275, 499 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1972). We therefore presume the general assembly was aware that laches worked as a time bar against criminal postconviction challenges to any conviction. Thus, we must consider whether the legislature abrogated that doctrine by imposing no time limit on challenges to first degree murder convictions.
C. Application of Laches Within Statutory Limits
Although the statute provides no limitation on the time in which a postconviction challenge to a class one felony may be brought, the mere existence of a statute of limitations does not preclude the application of laches. Rather, laches and statutory limits can be co-extensive. Where this is the case we have held that the statute will be followed, O‘Byrne, 120 Colo. at 578, 212 P.2d at 871, but “within this limit the peculiar doctrine of courts of equity should prevail,” Great West Mining Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Mining Co., 14 Colo. 90, 98, 23 P. 908, 911 (1890). Hence, laches may be invoked against a stale claim where there is otherwise no time limitation to collateral attack—unless it has been clearly abrogated by statute. Because we find the statute‘s silence with respect to the doctrine of laches or other common law defenses ambiguous, we look to the legislative history of section 16-5-402 and our case law to determine whether the abrogation of laches is here within the intent of the general assembly. See
Before the statute was enacted into law, both the Senate and the House Committee on Judiciary received testimony from various witnesses. Whether section 16-5-402 would preclude the application of laches was not discussed in either hearing. Rather, the bill was characterized as codifying a time limit for attacks on convictions such that if the defendant did not file within the time limit, he would be presumed to have waived his rights. Such a presumption was justified “because of laches and sleeping on your rights.” Concerning Amendments to the “Colorado Code of Criminal Procedure:” Hearing on S.B. 262 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 53rd Gen. Assembly (1981) (statement of Otto Moore, Assistant District Attorney, Denver County). Testifying before the House, Moore again stated that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to “provide a statute of limitations beyond which no collateral attack could bе made on a judgment of conviction of a crime.” Concerning Amendments to the “Colorado Code of Criminal Procedure:” Hearing on S.B. 262 Before the House Committee on Judicary, 53rd Gen. Assembly (1981) (statement of Otto Moore, Assistant District Attorney, Denver County). He did state that “there is no statute of limitations against a class one felony.” Id. In response to Representative Scherling‘s concern that without a limit to class one felonies, the statute would not eliminate the problem of delay, Moore responded that while the legislature could not bar collateral attacks, the intent was to establish a time frame in which “a person should come in [sic] and realize the fact that he‘d been unjustly convicted.” Id. While this exchange does not conclusively
D. Case Law Considering Limitations on Collateral Attack
Our case law has also acknowledged the importance of curbing delayed postconviction motions. We have recognized
In Bravo, the court of appeals applied laches as a bar to the dеfendant‘s challenge to his 1955 robbery conviction. 692 P.2d at 326.2 In Bravo, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in 1981. Id. The trial court denied his motion holding that his request was time barred under the doctrine of laches. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that since a motion for relief under Crim. P. 35 was governed by equitable principles, laches was applicable. Id. at 327.
Following Bravo, a trial court again considered laches as a possible bar to postconviction relief. See Fagerholm, 768 P.2d at 691 (assuming applicability of laches to criminal cases, trial court found no evidence of unconscionable delay; issue was not addressed on appeal).
Finally, we note that when the general assembly wishes to abrogate the common law in other areas of criminal law, it has done so explicitly. See, e.g.,
Our legislature and courts have evinced a strong desire to curb stale postconviction claims in order to ensure finality of convictions in our criminal justice system, give force to repeat offender statutes, and alleviate the difficulties of litigating stale claims. The preservation of laches as a time bar against stale claims comports with that intent. We now hold there is no express implication that the equitable doctrine of laches was abrogated by the enactment of
IV. Application
Robbins was convicted of first degree murder in 1958. His conviction was affirmed in 1960, and since that time his life sentence had been commuted by the Governor and he has been paroled three times. More than three decades after his conviction, and a mere eight months after his original defense counsel died, Robbins filed a Rule 35(c) Motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The issue being raised in the subject motion was available to Robbins in the 1960‘s. Also, during his рarole, Robbins had the opportunity to contact Mr. Zarlengo or other counsel and pursue postconviction
V. Conclusion
We now hold that while
In this case, the record supports the trial court‘s finding that the defendant filed his Rule 35(c) Motion after unconscionable delay, which resulted in irreparable prejudice to the People. Because we have found no indication that
Justice RICE dissents, and Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice BENDER join in the dissent.
RICE, J., dissenting.
The majority essentially concludes that the common law doctrine of laches survives the General Assembly‘s enactment of time limitations for collateral attacks upon trial judgments in
In construing statutes, this Court does not make policy decisions, but must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, looking first to the plain language of the statute at issue. E.g., Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo.2004); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo.1998). Even “[i]n the face of statutory silence, questions of interpretation are governed by legislative intent.” Williams v. White Mountain Constr. Co., Inc., 749 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo.1988) (citing Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223, 493 P.2d 651 (1972)). Ambiguity gеnerally exists only when at least one of the statute‘s terms is susceptible to multiple meanings. In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury in and for First Jud. Dist., 97 P.3d 921, 924 (Colo.2004) (citing Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246, 252-53 (Colo.1996)).
When the statute is unambiguous on its face, this Court need not look beyond the plain language, e.g., Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo.2004), because “if courts can give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words adopted by a legislative body, the statute should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said,” Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1218-19 (Colo.2002) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Colo.1995)). Also, “[i]f a statute can be construed and applied as written, the legislature‘s silence on collateral matters is not this [C]ourt‘s concern....” In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d at 924 (citing PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542, 545 (Colo.1995)).
When it acts, the Gеneral Assembly is presumed to be aware of existing, applicable case law. E.g., Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 331 (Colo.2003). Of course, the General Assembly may modify or abrogate the common law, but “it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication,” Vigil, 103 P.3d at 327 (quoting Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997)), because “[a] statute, general in its terms, is always to be taken as subject to the common law,” Bradley v. People, 8 Colo. 599, 604, 9 P. 783, 786 (1886) (quoted in
Despite the statute‘s plain meaning, the majority concludes that the phrase “[n]o limit” actually means no limit in addition to that already imposed by common law laches because “there is no express implication that the equitable doctrine of laches was abrogated by the enactment of
Despite the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the General Assembly may abrogate or modify the common law either expressly or by clear implication, sеe, e.g., id., the majority requires the General Assembly to abrogate laches “explicitly” because it has done so with the common law elsewhere in criminal statutes. See maj. op. at 390 (citing
Had the General Assembly intended to time-bar collateral attacks by class оne felons, it easily could have imposed a limitations period, as it did for petty offenses, misdemeanors, and all non-class one felonies.
I further find it improper to consult the statute‘s legislative history, as the statute is clear and unambiguous. Nevertheless, since the statute does not expressly negate application of laches, the majority finds it necessary to examine the legislative history to determine the General Assembly‘s intent. Maj. op. at 389. To my knowledge, however, this Court has never before gone so far as to find an ambiguity from nothing more than mere statutory silence. See, e.g., In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d at 924-25 (
Even with reference to the statute‘s legislative history, I fail to understand how the majority can disregard the plain language of
In conclusion, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous, I would apply
I am authorized to say Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice BENDER join in the dissent.