89 Mo. 303 | Mo. | 1886
is an appeal from a judgment of the Hannibal court of common pleas sustaining a demurrer to the petition. The' suit is in equity and the petition discloses the following facts : In 1872 John B. Helm died at Hannibal, Missouri, leaving a will and eight codicils. In one of the codicils John L. RoBards
Afterwards, and on the nineteenth of May, 1874, the defendant, as administrator pendente lite, filed his settlement in the probate court, which settlement disclosed a balance of assets in his hands of $56,136.39, consisting of a few hundred dollars in money, bonds, notes and the like. On the same day the probate court made an order reciting the fact that the will and codicils had been established, and also stating that the administrator had filed his settlement disclosing the above balance in his hands, and ordered the same to be turned over to the executors nominated by the will, and that he should be discharged upon filing their receipt therefor ; and on the same day he filed in that court their receipt acknowledging the delivery to them of “all the moneys, bonds, notes, coupons and other evidences of debt,” as shown and disclosed by the settlement, and thereupon and on the same day the court made an order discharging the administrator pendente lite. Prom this order Mr. RoBards, one of the executors, prosecuted an unsuccessful appeal, the history of which is set out in the petition and will be found in RoBards v. Lamb, 76 Mo.
There can be no doubt but the order' of the probate court, approving the settlement made by the administrator pending the will suit, and discharging him upon filing the receipt of the executors, is a judgment and must be treated as a judgment of a court having full and complete jurisdiction of the subject matter. When the case-of RoBards, Ex'r, v. Lamb, was here, it was distinctly held that as the executors received and receipted for the money and property ordered to be turned over to them, and thereby accepted the fruits of the judgment in their own favor, they could not prosecute an appeal from the judgment which they had thus satisfied. The plaintiff seeks to avoid the force of that adjudication and the binding force of the judgment approving the settlement- and discharging the administrator by showing, and the fact is admitted, that the administrator gave no notice of his intention to make the settlement, and because of which it is claimed the judgment is void as to the plaintiff. This presents the inquiry whether any notice was required to be given. All executors and administrators are required to make annual settlements, the details of which are defined by law. Sections 16 to 19, chapter 124, General Statutes, which are the same as sections 238 to 241, Revised Statutes, 1879, provide, that if any administrator wish to make, final settlement he shall give notice-of his intention, so to do for four weeks, by publication,.
As to section 47, chapter 120, which provides that if any administrator die, resign, or his letters be revoked, he or his legal representatives, shall account to the successor, etc., it is sufficient to say the section has no application to this case, for here, the special administrator neither resigned, nor were his letters revoked, but his powers ceased by operation of law and the express terms of the appointment. We do not intimate that in these cases notice of the settlement must be given, though when an administr ator desires to resign, notice of his intention to make application to that end must be given.
It follows that the judgment of the probate court discharging the special administrator is final and conclusive, even' as against the plaintiff:, for there is no saving clause as to minors or married women. The petition does not seek relief on the ground of fraud.
The judgment in this case is, therefore, affirmed.