206 Ky. 618 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1925
Opinion-of the Court by
Eeversing.
The indictment in this case charges the appellant, Carter Eoark, with “the offense of unlawfully manufacturing, selling, possessing, bartering, giving away and keeping for sale, and transporting, spirituous, vinous, malt and intoxicating liquors; committed in manner and form as follows, viz.: The said Carter Eoark on the 15th day of May, 1924, in the county aforesaid did unlawfully manufacture, sell, possess, barter and give away to divers
The only prosecuting witness was a brother of the defendant, and after stating his name, his relation to the defendant, and the fact that he appeared before the grand jury, he was asked and answered these questions: “In Letcher county within twelve months before that time did you see the defendant Carter Boark with any whiskey? A. Yes, sir. Q. Tell the circumstances. A. I was at his home in Letcher county and he gave me a drink of whiskey. Q. When was that before the indictment was returned? A. It was in February before the indictment was returned in May.” He was then excused by the Commonwealth’s attorney for cross-examination by defendant’s counsel. From the quoted examination in chief, and which was all that was introduced by the Commonwealth, it readily will be seen that the charge of giving-a%vay whiskey was but vaguely testified to. But conceding the testimony as sufficient for the purpose, the only offense it proved was that of giving away whiskey, an offense denounced by section 1 of our present prohibition act, being chapter 33, page 109 of the Session Acts of 1922. But the court in its instruction submitted to the jury only the offense of defendant unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, and there was a verdict of guilty upon which judgment was pronounced after the motion for a new trial was overruled, and from which this appeal is prosecuted.
Supplementing the errors above recited, the court permitted the Commonwealth, in re-examination of the prosecuting witness over the objections and exceptions of defendant, after it was developed upon his cross-ex
"We are inclined to endorse the general rule, especially under the facts of this case, for to allow the evidence would result in the injection- of a collateral issue, and at the same time permit the introduction of a separate and independent criminal charge against defendant, the inevitable effect of which would be to prejudice the jury against him. We, therefore, think that the better practice is, as stated in the excerpt, supra, where the case does not fall within any of the modifications and exceptions subsequently stated in the text, and especially so where the explanation of the ill-feeling necessarily serves to develop a commission by or a charge against defendant of another and independent crime.
We, therefore, conclude that the defendant has not had even a “tolerably fair” trial, and that the judgment should be and it is reversed with the directions to grant a new trial and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.