150 Ark. 505 | Ark. | 1921
The General Assembly of 1921, by special act approved February 18, 1921, (Act No. 143) created a road improvement district in Hot Spring County and named the commissioners thereof. Authority was conferred to improve a certain road or roads, to levy assessments to pay for the same and to issue bonds. A complaint was filed against the commissioners in the chancery court by an owner of real property in the district attacking the validity of the statute and seeking to enjoin proceedings thereunder. Other owners of real property in the district intervened. The chancellor granted a temporary injunction at the commencement of the action, and on July 14, 1921, the court entered an order or decree from which an appeal is prosecuted.
The finding of the court is recited in the order to the effect that in a suit pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas a temporary injunction had been issued at the instance of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., plaintiffs in the suit, temporarily restraining the commissioners of this district from collecting any of the taxes assessed on the property of said railroad corporations, which the conrt found to be at least 40 per cent, of the entire taxes assessed against the property of the district, and the order of the court was that the “temporary injunction heretofore granted by this court in this cause against Road Improvement District No. 1, and the commissioners thereof, their agents, servants and employees, should be continued until the temporary injunction issued by Jacob Trieber, Judge of the United States District Court of the Eeastern District, Western Division of Arkansas, enjoining and restraining said commissioners and their servants, agents, and employees from the collection of taxes or penalties assessed against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway 'Company, is fully and finally determined by said United States courts, or until the further order of this court.” There was a further order that the commissioners be enjoined from attempting to enforce the payment of the taxes for the year 1921 until the further orders of the court, and that the injunction bond executed by the plaintiffs in the action (appellees) “be and remain in full force and effect.”
The first question which arises is whether or not this is a final decree from which an appeal will lie. We think that it is not such a decree, ‘and the appeal must be dismissed. An order granting or refusing a temporary injunction is interlocutory and not final. Miller v. O’Bryan, 36 Ark. 200; Ex parte Batesville & Brinkley R. Co., 39 Ark. 82. An order or decree extending an injunction for a fixed time, or until the happening of a certain event, may be final, but it appears clearly from the recitals in the decree that the court meant to continue control over the injunction grantéd in this case and over the subject-matter of the litigation. It was so declared in the decree, and the court continued in force the bond executed by plaintiff at the commencement of the action, which shows that the injunction was not intended to be permanent nor the order final; it was merely interlocutory, and remains within the control of the court. It- is argued by counsel with much earnestness that a decree of this sort may work great injury unless there can be an appeal from it. This may be true, but the authority of this court is limited by the Constitution to jurisdiction over final judgments and decrees, and we are without power, to correct errors which occur during the progress of proceedings until after there has been a final decree from which an appeal can be prosecuted. If injury results, it is one merely incident to the litigation which cannot be corrected by an appeal in advance of a final decree.
Appeal dismissed.
