Road District No. 4 v. FraileyRoad District No. 4 v. Frailey
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Thompson
delivered the opinion of the court:
Viola Belle Oxford, one of the defendants in error, filed with the commissioner of highways of Road District No. 4, in Hardin county, a petition asking that a road for private and public use be laid out over the lands of Martha
Plaintiff in error does not question the sufficiency of the petition to lay out the road. She does, however, contend that the notice given pursuant to the statute is irregular and does not conform to the petition; but it is clear from an examination of the record that she is referring to a notice used in a similar but different proceeding and which was improperly placed in the transcript in this case. The record before us shows that proper notice was given in accordance with the statute and that there is no variance between it and the petition.
Plaintiff in error questions the sufficiency of the plat filed with the commissioner of highways. The petition requests that said road be laid out, beginning at the southwest corner of the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 2, township 12, south, range 10, east of the third principal meridian, and extending south forty feet wide along the east side of the west line of the southwest quarter of the same quarter section for a distance of seventeen rods and five links. The plat filed shows the road laid out with the west line of the southwest quarter as the middle line of the road, so that twenty feet of the road is taken from the southeast quarter of section 3. The surveyor who made the plat testified, on cross-examination by counsel for plaintiff in error, that his notes show that the road was laid out on
Plaintiff in error also challenges the sufficiency of the certificate of the commissioner of highways filed with the justice of the peace. Section 82 of the Roads and Bridges act requires that in case damages are not released or agreed upon, the commissioner shall make a certificate that he is about to lay out a road, describing it and the lands over which it is to be established, naming the owners of such lands and asking for a jury to assess the damages of such owners. The certificate filed in this case is a lengthy, disjointed document, which states awkwardly the facts required by the statute to be stated. It describes the land over which the road is laid out and names the owner of it. It does not state that the owner and the commissioner were unable to agree upon the amount of damages, but such a statement is not necessary in this proceeding for the reason that the statute makes no such requirement. This holding is supported in principle by the decision in Cahill v. Village of Norwood Park, 149 Ill. 156. It is sufficient in a case of this character if the fact that the parties could not agree upon the amount of damages is brought to the attention of the court in any manner which will satisfy it of the fact. While the certificate filed in this cause contains much surplusage, we are of the opinion that it is sufficient to give the justice of the peace jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The important question presented for our decision and the question which gives this court jurisdiction to review this cause is the challenge to the constitutionality of section 98 of the Roads and Bridges act, which authorizes the laying out of a road for private and public use. Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1870 this court held a similar act void. (Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110; Crear
On the trial of the cause the circuit court held that the value of the property taken was to be fixed as of the date of the hearing. This was error. The rule is well established that the value of the property is to be fixed as of the date of the filing of the petition. (Sanitary District v. Chapin, 226 Ill. 499; Chicago and State Line Railway Co. v. Mines, 221 id. 448.) For this error the judgment must be reversed.
Plaintiff in error contends that the court improperly directed the jury to apportion the damages between the petitioner and the road district, and erred in giving to the jury a form of verdict which assumed that the road district was benefited by the laying out of the road. The statute provides that the amount of damages shall be paid by the persons benefited thereby to the extent and proportion they are benefited, as determined and declared by the court. Reading together all of the sections of the act that have to do with the laying out of a new road, we are of the opinion that the legislature used the word “court” in its general sense, thereby including
The transcript of record filed in this cause is not prepared in accordance with the rules of this court. The parts of the record do not follow each other in chronological order nor are they connected by apt statements. There are incorporated into the record many papers which have no relation to the cause presented for review by this writ of error, and in other respects there is confusion, which makes it difficult to determine whether all the proceedings to lay out this road have been regular. We have endeavored to cover all the points presented by the briefs filed and have made some investigation of the questions presented in addition to the argument found in the briefs. While the proceedings had in the opening of this road are unsatisfactory in many respects, we are of the opinion that the errors are such that they can be corrected on a new trial in the circuit court.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Hardin county for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.