34 Ga. 78 | Ga. | 1864
The well considered opinion of Judge Fleming is so clear, forcible, and convincing upon all the grounds taken by counsel for the plaintiff in error in this bill of exceptions, that we cannot do better than to substitute it as our own, and make it the judgment of this Court. It is as follows:
“ The motion in arrest of judgment is made on the ground that there was no proof to show that the Court had jurisdiction. This want of jurisdiction is contended for on thp ground that there is no evidence to show that the deceased died in the county of Chatham, or in any other county of the State of Georgia. Assuming for the present, that “ The testimony does not show that Patrick Tye died in the county of Chatham, or in any other county of the State of Georgia,” does it follow that the Court had no jurisdiction ?
By the Constitution of Georgia, “ all crimes shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed. ” Where was this crime committed ? Counsel says “ in the county or placo where the death occurs.” At common law this answer is correct. But section 4,557 of the Code says: “ when any mortal wound shall be given, or any poison shall bo administered, or any other means shall be employed in one county, by which a human being shall be killed, who shall die thereof in another county, the indictment shall be found and the offender shall be tried in the county where the act was performed or done, from which the death ensued. ” It is not denied, that, according to the testimony, the mortal blow was given in the county of Chatham. But the argument is, that this is not enough; that it must be shown that the deceased died in the State of Georgia. , Such is not my interpretation of the statute. My idea is, that the statute assumes,
The motion for new trial is made on the ground of newly discovered testimony. Applications for new trial on this ground are not favored by the Courts, and very properly not favored, for if they were favored, litigation would become endless. Eor this reason, the applicant is held to very strict rules. It is not one of these rules, as stated by counsel, that the evidence, if produced, might produce a different verdict; the rule is, mightprobably produce a different verdict. The minds of men are so differently constituted, that it is impossible to say what might possibly be the effect of certain evidence. We may, however, have some idea as to the probable effect of evidence; for we are authorized to suppose that evidence will probably have .that effect to which it is entitled. Is it probable that this newly discovered evidence would have produced a different verdict? I feel perfectly satisfied in my own mind, that this evidence ought not to prodnioo a different verdict; and, therefore, I conclude that it probably would not have produced a different verdict. To understand the weight and effect to which this new testimony is entitled, we must take it in connection with the testimony had upon the trial. The new testimony is this : The witness, John W, Counts, it seems, was standing on the corner of Montgomery and Bryan streets, when-he heard a row on the opposite side of the street, and on being informed that one of his company was in a row, went immediately over to see what was the matter. On going over, he looked through a toindoio and saw five persons in the house.'- One was Eoach. The other men
The motion in arrest of judgment, and the motion for a new trial, are both overruled.