Jerry Lee ROACH, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.
No. 90-282.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Nov. 29, 1990.
799 P.2d 1037
URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The problem with this argument is that it comes on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim decision.
In final argument, the State attacks petitioner‘s contention that the citing court should have provided findings and conclusions. The proper question is whether the “final judgment * * * shall state the basis for the court‘s decision” as statutorily required and not whether that purpose may be accomplished by “findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
The procedural disabilities of this court‘s decision in denial of the petition for writ of certiorari are self-evident and will not be highlighted further by extending this dissent. I do not necessarily believe that the final action of the district court should have been reversed or would have been reversed if this court had chosen to analyze carefully and address all of the presented issues, including sentencing included by sustaining a motion to dismiss where a factual issue existed, procedural forfeiture of constitutional rights and the constitutional effect of an involuntary guilty plea.
To reiterate what I have so frequently stated, including the extended discussion in dissent in Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo.1988), we would singularly benefit the state and the justice delivery system if we were to decide constitutional issues on the merits. Our processes would be simplified, and re-reference by rote and near total relinquishment to the courts of the federal system could be diminished if not avoided. Substantively here, with real issues and factual conflict that should have been addressed and philosophically for the reasons expressed in Swazo v. State, 800 P.2d 1152 (Wyo.1990) where I dissented to the denial of the writ of certiorari to a denied petition for post-conviction relief, I again dissent.
If post-conviction petitions are brought to remedy violations of constitutional rights that were not raised on appeal, then declining to review a district court denial of a petition for post-conviction relief forecloses judicial protection of the guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution. I believe that our action, by denying a right of appeal and rejecting the petition for writ of certiorari, violates both
Jerry Lee ROACH, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.
No. 90-282.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Nov. 29, 1990.
This matter came on before the Court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion for Appointment of Counsel seeking review of a decision of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of Campbell County by Petitioner pro se, and the Court having considered the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and the records and files of the Court, and being fully informed, finds that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion for Appointment of Counsel should be denied because the Petitioner‘s right to appeal the decision of the district court constitutes an adequate remedy, and it, therefore, is
ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion for Appointment of Counsel be, and the same hereby are, denied.
URBIGKIT, C.J., would have granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and dissents from the order denying Petitioner‘s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Jerry Lee ROACH, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.
No. 90-282.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Nov. 29, 1990.
799 P.2d 1038
URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, dissenting.
This petition for a writ of certiorari from a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief addresses multiple convictions of burglary and resulting sentence in the Sixth Judicial District. In pursuit of my firm judgment that we cannot constitutionally deny review by this court where the post-conviction relief proceeding is utilized to address contended violations of constitutional rights, I dissent.
Following the reasons expressed in Swazo v. State, 800 P.2d 1152 (Wyo.1990), Urbigkit, Chief Justice, dissenting, my conviction remains unaltered that this court‘s declination to review a district court denial of a petition employs a foreclosure and creates an abandonment of our constitutional responsibilities to enforce the Wyoming Constitution.
Admittedly, this record, as presented by a slim petition and few attachments, affords us little opportunity to make any informed decision. For that reason, I also reject our present denial of petitioner‘s request to have the assistance of counsel for this presentation of substantive legal questions. Denial of the assistance of counsel causes concern about the majority‘s expectation and implementation of the Wyoming Constitution in asking someone who is untrained in the law to navigate through their construction of
Obviously, this proceeding is a difficult case which might have been substantively resolved with reasonable efficiency in recognition of petitioner having initiated an appeal from the original sentence and then approved its dismissal for reasons presently unexplained in any fashion in this record. We do know that the claims considered by the district court in the post-conviction relief denial as now presented by this petition include, as quoted from the district court‘s Findings of Fact:
(1) the plea agreement was allegedly violated since he was lead to believe that all four of the sentences would run concurrently; (2) effective assistance of trial counsel was allegedly violated; (3) he was allegedly prejudiced and denied a “proper” hearing on the motion for severance; and (4) he was allegedly denied access to the courts.
I reject denial to petitioner of the informing assistance of a lawyer in responsible present review substantively of issues he presents to assess constitutional deprivation and merit. Following my perspective for all post-conviction relief petitions, we, by substantive review, should do it once, do it right, and be done with it. What seems so strange to me since I so strongly believe in due process is that in a very high
Consequently, I dissent from rejection of any review and from denial of legal assistance for proper presentation to provide qualitative substantive review.