40 Miss. 754 | Miss. | 1866
delivered the opinion of the court.
The counsel for the appellant invites our attention to a single point arising upon this record. Roach, the appellant, was guardian of Catharine C., Robert E., John C., and Lawson H. Jelks, minors. In his annual account of John C. Jelks, at January Term, 1853, he charged himself as follows: “This amount received of E. J. Nelly, administrator of F. A. Jelks deceased, in the division of the personal estate of said deceased, as per reference of the division of said estate, $75.35.” In his accounts filed at February Term, 1854; he charges himself with the sum of $175, received from the administrator for the share of each of his four wards in the proceeds of land sold. On the settlement of the final account of the guardian, in 1866, the court, on exceptions, ordered all these items to be struck out of the annual accounts, and charged the guardian with the -same sums in the final ’account, with interest from the dates when they respectively came to his hands. This action of the court is complained of as erroneous.
It was therefore erroneous for the Probate Court to strike the charges of the sums above stated, from the annual accounts of the guardian, and to transfer these sums to the final account; and it was also erroneous to charge the guardian with interest upon them, there being no showing that the guardian consented to take the money at interest, or that he was ordered to invest it, or that he has employed it for his own profit. The partial accounts, having been duly approved by the court, were primeo facie correct, and could only be assailed by proof that they were wrong. Any errors thus shown to exist in them being corrected, they formed the basis of the final account, by transferring the balances in the mode pointed out by the statute.
Some objection is made to the sufficiency of the allowance of compensation to the guardian. The amount allowed, three and a half per cent, on these small estates, appears to be veiy inadequate indeed, but the subject is one belonging very much to the discretion of the probate judge, with the exercise of which we would be reluctant to interfere, unless in a strong case. There is no proof in the record that would justify us to do so in the present case.
For the-errors above stated, the decrees of the Probate Court appealed from, will be reversed, and the cause remanded, to be proceeded in according to this opinion.