239 Pa. Super. 311 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1976
Opinion by
Appeal is taken from an Order of the lower court dismissing preliminary objections of appellant. Appellant’s objection as to proper venue is the only issue before us.
The record shows that appellee filed a complaint in assumpsit as above-captioned, averring that the corporate defendant had an office in Lawrence County and
“Orders made on preliminary objections are interlocutory, and ordinarily not appealable” in the absence of a statute providing for appeal. Wilcox v. Evans, 190 Pa. Superior Ct. 166, 168, 153 A.2d 817, 818 (1959). Also Pincus v. Mutual Assurance Co., 457 Pa. 94, 321 A.2d 906 (1974). However, the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, 12 P.S. §672, provides as follows: “Wherever in any proceeding at law or in equity the question of jurisdiction over the defendant or of the cause of action for which suit is brought is raised in the court of first instance, it shall be preliminarily determined by the court upon the pleadings or with depositions, as the case may require; and the decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court or the Superior Court, as in cases of final judgment.” While the distinction in terminology between “jurisdiction” and “venue” has unfortunately been obliterated to a great degree, our Supreme Court has spoken with authority that objections as to venue do raise questions of jurisdiction. Caplan v. Keystone Weaving Mills, Inc., 431 Pa. 407, 246 A.2d 384 (1968). As to the propriety of the
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 2179(a) mandates that “a personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in:
(1) The county where its registered office or principal place of business is located; or
(2) A county where it regularly conducts business [(note omitted); or]
(3) The county where the cause of action arose; or
(4) A county where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose.”
Appellee’s allegations of fact did not establish venue as to appellant corporation under any of the four (4) foregoing provisions.
Holding that the issue is properly before us, our attention turns to Pa.R.C.P. 1006, wherein Section (a) mandates that actions against individuals “may be brought in and only in a county in which he may be served or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose or in any other county authorized by law” [Emphasis added]; Section (b) refers among other things to Rule 2179 for venue as to corporations;
The instant cause of action was commenced against the individual co-defendant in Lawrence County. While this individual is not an appellant, the record reflects no preliminary objections filed by him; he has posed no objection to venue and we must assume that as to him venue is proper. The appellee-plaintiff claims that the appellant and its co-defendant Clyde M. Bartley are jointly or jointly and severally liable. Venue being proper as to Mr. Bartley it is also proper as to his co-defendant, the appellant.
We hold that Lawrence County is a proper venue as to appellant.
Order affirmed.
Hoffman and Price, JJ., concur in the result.
. See Pa.R.C.P. 1017(b) (1).
. “Appellate Court Jurisdiction”, Act of 1970, July 31, P.L. 673, No. 223, Art. Ill, 17 P.S. §211.301.
. See quotation of Pa.R.C.P. 2179, supra.