Rizzo v. PackRizzo v. Pack
Thе plaintiff brought this action on April 26,1983, to establish the paternity of her second child, a daughter born out of wedlock on March 27, 1983. A judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant. The state of Connecticut, a party to this action pursuant to
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. This action was tried to the court, Gerety, J., on March 7, 1985. On March 22,1985, subsequеnt to trial but before judgment was rendered, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs counsel to notify the state of the pending action and of its status after the court found no record in the file that the state had been served with a copy of the petition even though a public assistance recipient was involved.
A judgment in favor of the defendant was rendered on July 3, 1985. No posttrial proceedings were instituted by the state until August 20, 1985, when a petition for a new trial was served upon the defendant.
A hearing on the petition was held on September 24, 1985, before the court, Ryan, J. On January 8, 1986, the petition was denied with respect to the claims of law; the equitable issues were referred to the trial court, Gerety, J., for considerаtion. These issues were denied by oral decision from the bench following a hearing on June 30,1986.
The state claims that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition at law and in equity. The state maintains that the memorandum of decision regard- . ing the paternity actiоn demonstrates that “the decision of the trial judge, Gerety, J., was based, in párt at least, on that judge’s disregarding as contrived the testimony of specific witnesses for the plaintiff, which witnesses the official record indicates never еntered the courtroom or took the stand.” We need not reach a decision on the merits of this claim because we find that the filing of the petition for a new trial was an improper attempt by the state to оvercome its failure to take an appeal from the judgment rendered in the paternity action.
The purpose of a petition for a new trial is to permit the granting of a new trial when a party had a meritorious defense below, but did not hаve an opportunity to present it. Id.; Krooner v. State,
“A petition will never be granted except on substantive grounds. It does not furnish a substitute for, or an alternative to, an ordinary appeal but applies only when no other remedy is adequate and when in еquity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted.” Id.; see Wetzel v. Thorne,
Nothing in the record of this matter distinguishes it from a case in which a litigant has failed to take a timely appeal. The grounds alleged in the state’s petition for a new trial, as well as thе state’s appearance as a party and waiver of notice of action in the paternity proceeding, support the reasonableness of the trial court’s conclusion that an appеal should have been filed.
The state’s petition does not claim the discovery of new evidence, but instead alleges grounds which are properly the basis for an appeal. In its petition, the state requested that a trial court decide whether a previous trial court committed error in view of the trial evidence and the record. Specifically, the subsequent trial court was requested to review the prior proceedings and, based on the state’s claim that the original trial court had made mistaken identifications of testimonial witnesses in its memorandum of decision, determine whether the judgment rendered was “unjust.” Such judicial inquiry, by its very nature, has been reserved for review by this court and our Supreme Court.
The state was a party to this action. Although it did not participate at trial, the state was later notified of the pending action and of its status before a judgment was rendered. No request was made by the state for a new trial before or after the rendition of judgment.
The state had available to it the remedy of an appeal. Nоtwithstanding our conclusion that we need not address the merits of the state’s claim, we observe that no injustice will result if a new trial is not granted. The trial court’s apparent confusion in its recollection as to the identity оf the witnesses who had testified, and in attributing credit for testimonial evidence given, did not affect the probity and credibility of the evidence with regard to the issues before the court. The testimony relied upon by the court was сorrect; only the identity of its source was inaccurate in the court’s memorandum of decision. The decision relied upon the facts given, and not the confusion in the names of their source.
, The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the state’s petition for a new trial. The petition was an attempt to escape a judgment finalized upon failure to appeal.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Since a petition for a new triаl is the institution of a separate and distinct cause of action; State v. Asherman,
Following the filing of this appeal by the state on July 18, 1986, at the request of the clerk of this court, Judge Gerety underscored and signed the portions of the hearing transcript constituting his memorandum of decision.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 52-270. causes for which new trials may be granted, (a) The superior court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to apрear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a non-suit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecutе with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. The judges of the superior court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon promрt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.
“(b) An affidavit signed by any party or his or her attorney shall be presumptive evidence of want of actual notice.”
See footnote 5, supra.