Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Wе granted certiorari in this case, along with Perez v. People,
12 For the reasons discussed in Peres, % 14-19, we conclude that the trial court did not err, nor commit рlain error, in referring to the prospective jurors by number, instead of by name, when the jurors' identifying information was provided to the defendant. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
1.
T 3 The victim in this case called the police to report that her friend, Martha Rizo, and Rizo's boyfriend, Rene Perez, sexually assaultеd her while the three were playing a drinking game. The Weld County District Attorney charged Rizo with sexual assault, pursuant to section 18-8-402(1)(a), C.R.S. (2012), and alleged a sentencе enhancer, pursuant to section 18-3-402(5b)(a)(D), CRS. (2012), because another person physically aided or abetted her in the assault. Perez was tried separately.
T4 During pre-trial conference, the trial court alerted the parties to its policy of referring to the jurors by number instead of by name. The court asked the parties to refer to jurors by their assigned three- or four-digit juror number when they were in the gallery and by their seat number when they were seated in the jury box. Defense counsel responded, "That's great, because I always have to have to [sic] apologize to the jury for butchering their names." Defense counsеl did not object to the practice at any point.
"[ 5 During voir dire, the court explained its practice as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, I will be referring to you by your seat number as opposed to your last name. As you can now see, my reporter types very quickly, and she is writing everything down that is said in court. It makes а much cleaner record if we refer to you by your seat number rather than your surname. It's not done out of disrespect or being discourteous to you, it is to mаke sure that the record is more clearly taken.
The potential jurors had already filled out a two-sided jury questionnaire that included their names and statеd at the top, "This information will remain confidential and will be known only by the court and the parties to this case." The judge read the jurors' names, along with their cоrresponding seat number, aloud on the record outside the presence of the jury to ensure that both sides knew which juror occupied each seat. The parties also had access to documents that matched jurors' names with their three- or four-digit juror number. The trial court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence before allowing them to deliberate.
16 The jury convieted Rizo of sexual assault and found that the sentence enhancer applied. The court sentenced her to eighteen years to life in prison. The court of
T7 Because we find that this was not an anonymous jury and thаt Rizo's right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, was not undermined, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
IL.
T8 As we held in Perez, we decline to apply the federal anonymous jury test to cases such as this one, where the trial court provides the parties with jurors' names and identifying information but refers to the jurors by number in open court. Perez,
T9 For the reasons discussed in Perez, id. at 11 14-19, we conclude that the trial court did not err, nor commit plain error, in referring to the prospective jurors by numbеr, instead of name, when the jurors' identifying information was provided to the defendant.
1 10 In sum, there was no reason for jurors to infer that the court's practice was anything other than a general policy adopted for administrative convenience that had nothing to do with Rizo, or her рossible guilt or dangerousness. As Rizo's right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, was not undermined, the trial court committed no error, nor plain error, by referring to the jurors by number. We also reject Rizo's public trial and equal protection claims. Id. at 120 n. 6. Although we find that the practice of referring to jurors by number, rather than by name, does not undermine the presumption of innocence, we note that the practice is subject to future rule or statutory development.
IH.
4 11 Because we conclude that this was not an anonymous Jury and that Rizo's right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, was not undermined, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Notes
. Specifically, we granted certiorari on the following issue:
Whether the trial court violated pеtitioner's fundamental rights to a fair and public trial, to the presumption of innocence, and to equal protection, and violated long-standing federal case law, by arbitrarily ruling that the lawyers had to refer to the jurors by number rather than name and by seating an anonymous jury without any justification other than the court's rоutine policy.
. Perez's conviction is the subject of the appeal in a companion case we decide today. See Perez v. Peoрle,
. In part, Instruction No. 3 provided as follows: ''Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. This presumption of innocence remains with the dеfendant throughout the trial and should be given effect by you unless, after considering all of the evidence, you are convinced that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
. In fact, Rizo's counsel expressly approved of the practice on the ground that it was easier to call jurors by number, rathеr than by name.
. Because we find no error, we necessarily find there was no structural error.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{12 The majority, following its reasoning in Perez v. People,