Defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. He appeals, contending the trial court erred in ruling that an incriminating statement was made voluntarily and that the cocaine was seized pursuant to a valid consent search.
On October 16, 1987, DeKalb County police officers went to an apartment occupied by defendant to execute a search warrant. Arriving at 7:45 p.m., the police found defendant, his wife and two children outside. The police identified themselves and accompanied defendant and his family inside the apartment.
Defendant’s wife was introduced as Rosa Sarmentos. Rosa, who spoke broken English, acted as the translator for defendant, who appeared to understand some English but spoke Spanish exclusively.
Defendant sat next to his wife on a living room sofa as the police officers searched the apartment. Unbeknownst to defendant and his family, one of the police officers, Officer Woods, was fluent in Spanish.
Woods heard defendant tell his wife in Spanish that she was to say she knew nothing. The officer also heard defendant make references in Spanish to “the stuff.” Moreover, Woods heard defendant praying as the officers continued their search.
Defendant’s wife asked Officer Woods in English why the police were searching the apartment. When the officer replied in English that they were looking for cocaine, defendant said he did not know what cocaine was. Defendant’s seven-year-old child dissented, stating *824 in Spanish: “You know, the stuff you put in your nose.”
When Officer Woods asked if the family owned any cars, she was told they owned a car and a van, but the car was at a friend’s house. Asked if the police could have permission to look in the van, defendant’s wife produced a key. The van was searched by a police officer at that time, but nothing was found.
The telephone rang and Officer Woods answered it. A voice on the other end asked for someone named Martha. In Spanish, defendant told his wife to tell the officer that Martha was an old girl friend.
Thereafter, Officer Woods looked in defendant’s wife’s purse and came across two valid Florida driver’s licenses. A picture of defendant’s wife was on each one. Although the pictures were the same, the names on the licenses were different. One license bore the name “Rosa Sarmentos”; the other — “Martha Hill.” Questioned about the discrepancy, defendant’s wife burst into tears, exclaiming that she was in the United States illegally.
Officer Woods told defendant’s wife in English that she could be taken to jail for giving a false name. At that point, defendant stood up and said he would show the cocaine to the police if they did not take his wife and kids to jail. The police agreed and defendant led them to the van. Officer Woods stayed behind.
After a short period of time, Officer Woods went outside and saw defendant and the other police officers near the van. At that point, defendant still had not shown the officers the cocaine. Officer Woods approached defendant and told him that she spoke Spanish. Hearing that, defendant showed the officers a toy which was in the van. Inside the toy the officers found a white power subsequently identified as cocaine.
Defendant was led back into the apartment, placed under arrest and advised in Spanish of his
Miranda
rights. See
Miranda v. Arizona,
1. Defendant contends that his statement that he would show the police the cocaine and the subsequent statement which was translated and transcribed by Officer Woods were inadmissible in evidence. In this regard, he argues that he was not given a
Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona,
“It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda
become
*825
applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ [Cit.]”
Berkemer v. McCarty,
In the case sub judice, defendant had not yet been arrested when he stated he would show the police where the cocaine was hidden — he was simply being detained pending the execution of the search warrant. See OCGA § 17-5-28 which provides that an officer executing a search warrant may reasonably “detain” any person in the place being searched to protect himself or to prevent the disposal or concealment of items described in the search warrant. Compare
Orozco v. Texas,
With regard to the incriminating statement which was translated and transcribed by Officer Woods, the evidence is clear (and the trial court found) that after he was arrested defendant was orally given his Miranda rights in Spanish, that he indicated he understood those rights, and that that Miranda warning preceded the statement made by defendant. The mere fact that defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda rights subsequently (after he was taken to jail) did not invalidate the prior oral warning. It cannot be said, therefore, that defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights before making the statement which Officer Woods translated and transcribed.
Defendant also argues that the statements were not made voluntarily, having been induced by the threat that defendant’s wife could be taken to jail and the ultimate promise that she would not be taken to jail. See in this connection OCGA § 24-3-50 which provides: “To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”
Defendant’s statements were not induced by a threat made to defendant’s wife in violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. On the contrary, when Officer Woods informed defendant’s wife that she was subject to arrest for giving a false name, she was merely stating a “truism.” (Having come across two valid driver’s licenses with pictures of defend
*826
ant’s wife and two different names, the officer did not know which name was legitimate.) Accordingly, OCGA § 24-3-50 is inapplicable.
Copeland v. State,
Likewise, it cannot be said that defendant’s statements were induced by hope of benefit in violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. Any benefit to be derived by the hope that defendant’s wife would not be taken to jail was purely collateral. See
Patrick v. State,
The trial court did not err in ruling that the incriminating statements made by defendant were voluntary and admissible. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not meritorious.
2. Defendant asserts the motion to suppress should have been granted because the search of the van was not within the curtilage of the apartment. See
United States v. Stanley,
597 F2d 866 (4th Cir. 1979). This assertion misses the mark. The police did not search the van under the aegis of a warrant. Rather, they searched the van with the consent of defendant. And that consent was given freely and voluntarily. It cannot be said, therefore, that the search of the van was invalid.
Lombardo v. State,
Relying upon
Radowick v. State,
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Judgment affirmed.