262 Conn. 730 | Conn. | 2003
Opinion
The principal issue in this appeal
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. In their second amended complaint dated April 17, 1998, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had treated them for various work-related injuries, and thereafter had subjected the plaintiffs to unlawful collection activity for charges resulting from that treatment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia: abuse of process; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; defamation; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Also on April 17,1998, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion for certification of a class action.
On June 2, 1998, the trial court, Levine, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motion and certified the matter as a class action.
I
As a threshold issue, the defendant contends that a decertification order is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not a final judgment. Accordingly, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We disagree.
Our law surrounding interlocutory appeals and final judgments is well settled. “The right of appeal is purely statutory.
“Adherence to the final judgment rule is not dictated by legislative fiat alone. ... In both criminal and civil cases ... we have determined certain interlocutory orders and rulings of the Superior Court to be final judgments for purposes of appeal. An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30-31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983); accord State v. Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 667, 778 A.2d 134 (2001). “Unless the appeal is authorized under the Curdo criteria, absence of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that [necessarily] results in a dismissal of the appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Malcolm, supra, 667.
Applying these principles, we conclude that a decertification order satisfies the second prong of the Curdo test, and is, therefore, appealable.
Our determination is predicated on the fact that class actions serve a unique function in vindicating plaintiffs’ rights. “[C]lass action procedures . . . increase efficiencies in civil litigation by encouraging multiple plaintiffs to join in one lawsuit. Many jurisdictions have recognized that in certain situations, class action suits are superior to individual lawsuits.” Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236, 244, 698 A.2d 302 (1997). “Connecticut’s class action procedures . . . are designed to prevent the proliferation of lawsuits, and duplicative efforts and expenses.” Id., 247. Accordingly, we have noted that class actions serve four essential and distinct functions, specifically, to: “(1) promote judicial economy and efficiency; (2) protect defendants from inconsistent obligations; (3) protect the interests of absentee parties; and (4) provide access to judicial relief for small claimants.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 244.
In the present case, when the plaintiffs were certified as a class by the trial court, Levin#, J., they secured the right to proceed in a class action against the defendant. That right provided to the plaintiffs an economically efficient means to proceed in an action that they otherwise might be unable to pursue. See Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 997 (3d Cir. 1976) (concluding that “those members of the class whose claim is small will not be able to secure the necessary assistance of counsel unless the decertification is lifted”); Miles v. America Online, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 297, 304 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that “[e]ach individual’s amount [of damages] is fairly minimal and the cost large for each member to proceed individually against [the defendant]”). When the trial court, Aurigemma, J., decertified the class two years after the initial certification, the right to proceed as a class was “irretrievably lost and the [plaintiffs were] irreparably harmed.”
II
We next turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court, Aurigemma, J., abused its discretion when it decertified the class. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion because it changed the definition of the class from the one previously certified and then decertified the class based on the plaintiffs’ inability to satisfy the requirements of a class action applying that new definition.
We do so, however, mindful that the federal rules impose additional constraints on trial courts overseeing class actions beyond those imposed under our rules. Specifically, rule 23 (c) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs the trial court that “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.”
The federal courts have determined that, “under [r]ule 23 (c) (1), courts are required to reassess their class rulings as the case develops.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boucher v. Syracuse University, 164 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999). Therefore, “[e]ven after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent
Our courts, however, are not bound by these federal requirements, although we have stated that “[a trial court] has broad discretion in determining whether a suit should proceed as a class action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., supra, 244 Conn. 680. Nonetheless, despite the absence of a requirement under our class action rules that trial courts monitor developments that may bear upon certification, we conclude that such a procedure is prudent and sensible when a trial court considers it warranted under the circumstances of the particular case. Such an approach not only protects the resources of the courts, but also may protect the parties’ interests— defendants may be protected from frivolous class action lawsuits and plaintiffs may be permitted to adjust the class definition when necessary to conform to the changing circumstances. Therefore, we adopt an approach similar to that under the federal rule, which permits the trial court to revisit the issue of class certification throughout the proceedings.
We note, however, that, although it is within the purview of the trial court to revisit the issue of class certification, and, if facts require, to alter the definition of the class as developments dictate, principles of equity
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. In its memorandum of decision dated June 2, 1998, the trial court, Levine, J., adopted the class definition proposed by the plaintiffs and certified a class comprising of “[a]ll persons with accepted workers’ compensation claims . . . who were the subject of collection activity by [the defendant] ... for unpaid medical bills incurred in the treatment of injuries or work-related occupational diseases . . . provided that [the defendant] . . . [was] placed on notice . . . that said injuries or occupational diseases were work-related . . . .” Two years after the action was commenced, when the case was transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, the trial court, Aurigemma, J., sua sponte, raised concerns about the providence of the class certification. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to review the file of every twentieth person of the purported class and to submit a report to the court regarding the potential of these persons to constitute members of the class. After submitting the report, the defendant filed, for the first time, a motion for reconsideration of class certification, contending that the majority of the named plaintiffs did not have accepted workers’ compensation claims and, therefore, were not part of the class as certified.
In the memorandum of decision, the trial court stated that the class had been certified initially as “[a]ll persons with accepted workers’ compensation claims . . . against whom the [defendant] brought suit for unpaid medical bills incurred in the treatment of work-related injuries or diseases at a time when the [defendant] knew or should have known of the existence of the accepted workers’ compensation claim.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claim that the class, as originally defined by Judge Levine, included those against whom the defendant took any “ ‘collection activity,’ which would presumably include merely writing a letter.” Judge Aurigemma, however, responded that “[t]he prior decision of this court certified only the class of people against whom suit had been brought. . . . Therefore, this decision deals only with whether that class, i.e., those against whom suit was brought, was improperly certified.”
The trial court next examined the commonality and typicality requirements in light of the essential elements of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. The court determined that there was no evidence to prove generally that the defendant commenced suit against the plaintiffs at a time when it knew or should have known of the plaintiffs’ accepted workers’ compensation claims. The court further determined that the plaintiffs did not establish that the defendant, through its procedures, had the intent to abuse process for a wrongful or malicious purpose or to inflict emotional distress and, therefore, that such evidence would be required on a case-by-case basis. The trial court, therefore, concluded that commonality and typicality also were not satisfied and, accordingly, ordered the class decertified.
“Our review [of the trial court’s order decertifying the class] is confined to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., supra, 244 Conn. 680. “Judicial discretion [however] ... is always legal discretion, exercised according to the rec
“[I]n determining whether to certify the class, a [trial] court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410 (C.D. Cal. 2000), quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. California, v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 464 U.S. 1068, 104 S. Ct. 972, 79 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1984). “[T]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action. . . . [S]ometimes, it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, supra, 457 U.S. 160. “In determining the propriety of a class action, [however] the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the class action rules] are met.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974). Although “no party has a right to proceed via the class mechanism”; Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 652 (C.D. Cal. 2000); “doubts regarding the propriety of class certification should be resolved in favor of certification.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651.
It is evident, however, by reference to the original certification order, that Judge Aurigemma, changed the definition in two significant ways. Compare footnotes 4 and 14 of this opinion. A class of plaintiffs who were subject to “collection activity” is substantially broader than a class of plaintiffs against whom the defendant had “brought suit,” because collection activity could encompass conduct that falls short of filing a court action. Similarly, evidence that, at the time the defendant engaged in those collection activities against the plaintiffs, the defendant was “placed on notice . . . that [the plaintiffs’] injuries or occupational diseases were work-related,” as set forth in the original certification order, imposes a substantially lower threshold of proof than evidence that the defendant “knew or should have known of the existence of the accepted workers’ compensation claim.”
Moreover, the plaintiffs never were given an opportunity to conduct further discovery to ascertain whether they could satisfy the prerequisites of this new class. Although we grant a trial court a wide degree of latitude in managing a class action, in the present case, the court’s change in the definition of the class, its failure to articulate a rationale for that change, and its failure
Additionally, the record clearly reflects that the trial court considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ action when deciding the issue of decertification.
The decision of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
Named as plaintiffs in this case were Daniel Rivera, Jesus Ruiz, Bradley Elkins, Thomas Ludemann, Margaret Dorsey, Patrick Mullaney and Richard Smeriglio, all of whom received treatment at the defendant Veterans Memorial Medical Center. The plaintiffs brought the action “on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.” References herein to the plaintiffs are to the seven individually named plaintiffs.
Prior to the trial court’s order decertifying the class, the defendant had filed a third party complaint against Brown, Welsh and Votre, P.C., the law firm and certain of its members that had represented Veterans Memorial Medical Center in connection with collection activity relevant to this case. References herein to the defendant are to Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
The trial court certified “as a class to be represented in this case by the named plaintiffs:
“All persons with accepted workers’ compensation claims, as that term is defined in the workers’ compensation code and relevant case law, who were the subject of collection activity by [the defendant], its agents, servants and assigns, for unpaid medical bills incurred in the treatment of it\juries or work-related occupational diseases, as those terms are defined by the workers’ compensation code and relevant case law, provided that [the defendant], its agents, servants and assigns, were placed on notice by the person or his agents, servants, assigns, employer, employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, or the workers’ compensation commission, that said injuries or occupational diseases were work-related, as that term is defined in the workers’ compensation code and relevant case law.”
We note that we have, in the past, considered class action certification orders on appeal to this court. See, e.g., Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 244 Conn. 676, 711 A.2d 700 (1998). We have not, however, been presented expressly with the issue of whether we have jurisdiction to hear such appeals.
In the present case, the defendant concedes that, pursuant to General Statutes § 42-1 lOh, the plaintiffs have a statutory right to appeal from the trial court’s decertification order as it pertains to the COTPA count. See General Statutes § 42-110h (“[a]n order issued under this section shall be immediately appealable by either party”). The defendant contends, however, that the CUTPA allegations can provide no basis for jurisdiction, because “[n]o argument on the record pertained to CUTPA issues.” We disagree with the limited scope of inquiry that the defendant proffers. Section 42-1 lOh expressly confers jurisdiction independent of whether the trial court’s decision was predicated on the CUTPA allegation. Therefore, because the final judgment rule is satisfied with respect to the CUTPA counts, we limit our consideration to the issue of whether the trial court’s order, as it affects the remaining counts, constitutes a final judgment.
Because we conclude that a decertification order satisfies the second prong of Curdo, we need not decide if it satisfies the first prong.
The defendant cites Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S. Ct. 2464, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978), for the proposition that certification orders are not immediately appealable. The defendant’s reliance is misplaced because that case was superseded in 1998 by the addition of subsection (f) to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for interlocutory appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals from District Court orders of class certification or decertification. Review, however, is not automatic, as the courts may exercise discretion in hearing such appeals. See Prado-Steiman ex rel Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000).
In their brief to this court, the plaintiffs contended that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have revisited the issue of the propriety of class certification. At oral argument before this court, however, the plaintiffs conceded that the trial court properly could have revisited the issue and, therefore, focused on whether the trial court had abused its discretion by decertifying the class under the facts in the present case.
Practice Book § 9-7 provides: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Practice Book § 9-8 provides: “An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of Section 9-7 are satisfied and the judicial authority finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: “(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parlies will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
“(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
“(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
“(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
“(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
“(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
“(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
The defendant did not file a motion for reconsideration after the initial decision by Judge Levine certifying the class, despite the fact that the defen
Judge Aurigemma defined the class as follows: “All persons with accepted workers’ compensation claims, as that term is defined in the workers’ compensation statutes and relevant case law, against whom the [defendant] brought suit for unpaid medical bills incurred in the treatment of work-related injuries or diseases at a time when the [defendant] knew or should have known of the existence of the accepted workers’ compensation claim.”
The following excerpts from the trial court’s memorandum of decision are examples of the court’s statements reflecting that it considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims when analyzing whether to decertify the class: “There was clearly no evidence that the [defendant] actually knew about the existence of an accepted workers’ compensation case for any of the named plaintiffs ... at the lime it brought suit against them.
“In order to state a cause of action for violation of Connecticut workers’ compensation law and public policy (counts two, three, four, five, eight, nine), each plaintiff must prove that the [defendant] filed suit against him to recover for medical treatment at a time when the [defendant] knew or should have known that the plaintiff had an accepted workers’ compensation case. ... In order to establish a cause of action under count one (abuse of process), count seven (intentional infliction of emotional distress), count ten (defamation), and count eleven (false light), the plaintiffs must prove intent and/or knowledge of the [defendant]. Had the [defendant] adopted a procedure of immediately bringing suit against all patients, even those with work-related injuries, then intent to abuse process and/or inflict distress upon the plaintiffs might be inferred. However, there was no evidence of such procedure. The [defendant] went to rather extraordinary lengths to attempt to collect its bills prior to resorting to suit. . . . [The plaintiffs] would have to prove the [defendant’s] knowledge and intent in order to recover. The plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence that could permit any inference as to the [defendant’s] knowledge or intent with respect to the purported class as a whole.” (Emphasis in original.)