*1 213 fact, with the of a material also of the omission or concealment consist deceive, duty creating opportunity under circumstances intent Time, Inc. speak. Perlman 1040,1044. N.E.2d relation- finding with the court’s that no confidential agree
We trial adduced at ship plaintiffs Testimony existed between and defendants. Kidding Brodner plans compete trial informed of his shows or before before Brodner executed Brodner on Contrary their Kidding thereby prior relationship. plain- notes. ended tiffs’ as to business would have done arguments person what a rational circumstances, agree finding under these we with the trial court’s defendants, plaintiffs executed the notes in so settlement their debt that defendants would to mold for them interruption. continue without trial We hold that the that no existed in execu- finding court’s fraud tion the promissory contrary weight notes was not to the manifest the evidence. foregoing reasons, of the circuit court of Cook judgment
For is affirmed. County
Affirmed.
JIGANTI, P.J., ROMITI, J., concur. RIVERA, Cross-Appellee, THE DEPART- Plaintiff-Appellant JUAN al., Defendants-Appellees Cross-Appellants. AID PUBLIC MENT OF et Division) (2nd First No. 84 — 1664 District 12, 1985. filed March Opinion *2 J., HARTMAN, part dissenting in concurring part. Foundation, Saltzman, (Steven Legal Chicago Michael Assistance Col- Stob, counsel), lins, appellant. and Barbara for J. General, (Karen Hartigan, Attorney Springfield Konieczny,
Neil As- F. General, counsel), Chicago, of for Attorney appellees. sistant opinion delivered the PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS court: the General Assistance benefits under
In January plaintiff’s seq.) 6—1 et ch. Stat., Supp., par. (Ill. Program (GA) Rev. due plaintiff’s months terminated for a four were (SSA) Administration Security from the Social of a lump-sum payment 1984, and, af appealed of 1983. Plaintiff November Aid of Public hearing, Department ter a the Director the Illinois is termination final administrative decision (IDPA) affirmed the in a seeking filed a complaint March 1984. Plaintiff thereafter sued on sum” “lump upheld review. The trial court’s order judicial rule, GA for by cancelling rule but directed the IDPA enforce rule, continuing GA mandated but appropriate time as period. a six-month prorating disqualification over man who resides with 49-year-old Plaintiff Rivera is a disabled accident in Chicago. wife and seven children Plaintiff suffered an has to work since then. been unable In filed a claim for August disability In December (SSI). the SSA income seeking supplemental security for and plaintiff applied while SSI application pending, began receiving program. assistance benefits the GA *3 1982, wife and children were to the cash January plaintiff’s five added grant. GA 1981, 1983, claim,
In filed in was August October SSI plaintiff’s over $6,784.37 and from SSA retroactive approved, he was awarded eligi- he was determined to-have been disabled two-year period agreement signed by plaintiff, for SSI. Pursuant to an authorization ble to provided SSA sent entire to IDPA for assistance award sum, From IDPA de- while his claim was that plaintiff pending. SSI GA $2,389.15 pro- assistance to under the provided plaintiff ducted for A 1983. State warrant was gram through from October February $4,395.25 as the balance payable plaintiff drawn amount due after IDPA’sdeduction. plaintiff 1983, grant, IDPA the GA 21, plaintiff
On October deleted 1983, 1, receiving monthly effective he would be November because as SSI Plaintiff was then established payments. “representative Plaintiff, however, was not remaining for the GA case. payee” family informed the IDPA of these changes. the IDPA
Plaintiff sum from in November lump received that, effec- plaintiff informed In a notice IDPA January dated be benefits GA would discontinued. January tive stated, to receive General Assistance “your family ineligible notice (5) for five lump months because of the sum from SSI. you received This action conforms with the in Categorical statement contained Assistance Manual PO 510.2.” Plaintiff filed a administrative timely appeal, and the GA benefits were family’s thereby during continued of the pendency action. suspension
IDPA’s GA temporary upon based in IDPA Rule “lump policy, (7 Reg. 395) sum” embodied 3.387 620.2(c) PO of IDPA’s GA 510.2(f) sections and PO manual. This rule, case that effective renders GA receives a January one-time, for a cash for GA benefits nonrecurring payment ineligible period of months by dividing lump-sum determined the amount of the payment by IDPA’s monthly applicable “standard need” case.
At the hearing administrative stated plaintiff that the entire he lump prior sum received from SSI had been spent benefits, IDPA’s proposed suspension various documents were receipts tendered to the officer hearing plaintiff’s claimed support expenditures. The final administrative decision issued on March 1984, affirmed the rule, of benefits under IDPA’s suspension but directed recomputation ineligibility because fact, unit was, greater than the unit included original calculation.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint for administrative review on 5, 1984. The April complaint was amended to a writ of subsequently certiorari. May an order entered on the circuit court af- decision, but such firmed the administrative modified that lump- against continuing sum offset disqualification period prorated on the predicated assistance for modification was six months. The the local court’s that to plaintiff, belief when the sum was sent IDPA office had a GA would duty simultaneously notify be suspended under the rule. The court thus that the determined rule would fall too on the plaintiff. The court also harshly considered why the local office did budget for plaintiff. The court stated that due process given required notice of conse- quences of receiving lump sum simultaneously the sum. The court thereafter ordered the disqualification prorated over six months of a suspension. instead blanket *4 order,
Plaintiff of trial appeals, seeking a reversal court’s and defendant cross-appeals, seeking portion a reversal of that of order that modified the of application lump-sum by engrafting prora- rule it, tion order principles up- and an affirmance of the of the portion rule. holding lump-sum the administrative decision and the First, on appeal. lump- three that IDPA’s points Plaintiff raises Aid Code of the Public language the plain of sum rule is violative authorizing such enactment prior legislative of a in the absence (Code), was invalid to plaintiff of its rule rule; second, application that IDPA’s interpreta- IDPA’s own in contravention application because the was de- manual; third, that plaintiff in its rule as set forth tion of the that his notify to promptly IDPA’s failure process by nied due lump-sum receipt due to suspended would be GA benefits payment. preven of the Code is the alleviation overriding
The purpose De 1; Lawrie v. 1981, 23, par. Stat. ch. (Ill. tion of Rev. poverty. 1— 348, 226.) To Public Aid 72 Ill. 2d 381 N.E.2d partment of (1978), resources of the State’s fiscal the allocation salutary goal, achieve this num greatest toward relief eye providing must be made with that the source of funds Economic demonstrates people. reality ber of construc and, finite accordingly, for is public programs (Miller Depart reflect that fact. tion or the Code must application 11, 17, The ment Public Aid 178.) 418 N.E.2d (1981), 94 Ill. regulations rules and charged implementing IDEA is with the duty spirit of the Code “to the end that its carry out the aims necessary and the aid administered purpose may programs be achieved 12— throughout par. the State.” Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. efficiently sections Plaintiff first contends that IDPA’s rule violates suspension 6—1.2 6—2 of the Code because the rule authorized the termi at the time his benefits were though, of his GA benefits even that, under nated, argues the entire sum. Plaintiff already spent he had 1.2, 2) pars. sections 6—1.2 and 6—2 Rev. Stat. ch. (Ill. 6— 6— Code, IDEA, evaluating a for GA person’s eligibility of the sum, consider that income may only after use” to the GA recipient. or for immediate “present ready which sum, entire of his bene expended suspension Since had 6—2 IDPA’s rule violate sections 6—1.2 and of the Code. fits and that the of an administra authority is well settled proposition to enact rules is limited regulations statutory tive agency Laborato (Bio-Medical under which the rules are enacted. language ries, City 223; Inc. v. Trainor 68 Ill. 2d 370 N.E.2d Com. 108, 112- Employment v. Fair Practices 65 Ill. 2d Chicago statute, regula “Like a an administrative rule 357 N.E.2d Automobile (Northern Illinois tion enjoys presumption validity.” Dixon Association v. Wreckers & Rebuilders (1979),75 if is consistent 320.) Generally, spirit the rule N.E.2d then the rule will sustained. As the statute and furthers its purpose, *5 stated our by supreme court in v. Motor Casualty Vehicle Co. Stofer 361, 68 Ill. 2d cases, therefore, N.E.2d 875: “In most the administrator’s task is not to merely interpolate among broadly stated legislative prohibitions, but, rather, to extrapolate the broad lan statute, and, guage enabling using given the tools him regulatory deal by legislature, problems which the legislature sought 370.) (68 interpreting grant address.” of authority rule-making power under the Code and its derived from section this court stated: 12—
“Wide latitude must be to such in their exercise given agencies of such broad, discretion. The discretion is and its exer [IDPA’s] cise will not be overturned this court we solely may because think that the decision unwise or because we find the policy behind it inappropriate.” (Miller Department Public Aid 94 Ill. App. 178.) 418 N.E.2d 1, 11, 14, See also Warrior v. Thompson (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 449 N.E.2d 3.387, IDPA rule, Rule provides pertinent part: “If which, the assistance unit income in receives month to- *** gether received, with all other income exceeds the applicable AFDC or GA size, standard of need for that unit the assistance unit is ineligible for assistance for a specific period of time ***.” Plaintiff argues Code, two following sections of the which de- fine and limit the income that IDPA can use in determining eligibility rule. Section need, above-quoted provides 6—1.2 in rel- prohibit evant part: added to contributions “Income available to the when person, *** must be substance, from other sources
money, or services Depart insufficient amount equal grant established ment regulation (Emphasis added.) (Ill. ***.” Rev. Stat. ch. par. 1.2.) 6— governs Section 6—2 grant eligible amount cash GA recip- ient can IDPA receive and instructs the as follows: regard
“Due shall be given requirements and conditions case, income, existing each and to the money contributions available, and other and resources support from whatever (Emphasis added.) (Ill. source.” Rev. Stat. ch. 6—par. Plaintiff argues ignores that IDPA’s Rule 3.387 the word “available” because it treats a if it is to meet cur- lump-sum payment as available rent needs for a set of time even if the has payment previously spent. statutory entirely consistent with rule is find that IDPA’s
We the term “availa limiting the Code as reading of directives. Plaintiff’s would, logical usable carried actually presently ble” to mean conclusion, purpose inconsistent with activity entirely promote interpretation Plaintiff’s its prior interpretations. the Code and spend sums encourage recipients would “available” longer usable” “presently is no as so rapidly possible eligibility. rapid dissipation recipient’s IDPA considers the under the eligible desire to remain satisfy recipient’s funds would states, however, that 1—1 of the Code program. explicitly GA Section dissi poverty. Rapid is to purpose prevent Code alleviate antithetical to goals retard these and would be pation funds would *6 More our court has stated that importantly, supreme self-sufficiency. to with an toward eye providing were be achieved goals the salutary (Lawrie of persons. Department greatest number assistance to the recipient a sum 335, 348.) squanders If a Public 72 Ill. Aid of longer entitled, to he is no receiving which in order continue eligible, other could be deprive the net effect would who persons be who are excluded money who have not received sums of and of from the of finite nature its resources. Such a program because the in the patently result is untenable of the of Code and the purpose view in it is manner which to be administered. this not
Though the word as used in context has “available” courts, is by plaintiff’s dictionary overly defined our definition restric- in terms of nature of assistance and their public programs tive ad- presented A in Toulou Depart- ministration. similar situation was ment 27 616 App. Social & Health Services Wash. P.2d of There, 678. a woman under the receiving payments Aid to Families with Dependent received a (AFDC) program Children per capita and a tax payment May refund $500 $299.42 all itof before the end of that and almost month. She spent promptly Department receipt money Social her and reported ineligibility no effort forestall but for (DSHS), Health made Services demonstrating that by next AFDC grants two months’ such as medical money expenses, used for and proper was verifiable care, so to AFDC. DSHS that she would have still been entitled When July for June and the woman suspended her AFDC benefits stating since the the end of complained, money spent by May, that was for currently July it could not considered available June and be grant that she received her normal for those months. 27 should have 616 137,139-40, P.2d App. Wash. is 42 602(a)(7) statute for AFDC U.S.C. sec. pertinent Federal
220
(1982). The applicable implementing regulation, promulgated Department Services, of Health Human provides in relevant part that net “only such income as is actually available for current use on a regular considered, will basis be and only currently available resources will be (45 Also, considered.” C.F.R. 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c)(1975).) “net in- come for available current use and currently available resources shall considered; be income and resources are considered available both when actually available and has a interest in applicant legal a liquidated sum.” C.F.R. 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(d)(1979).
The Washington Court Appeals stated: “We do not read the fed- eral statute the regulation made thereto pursuant that resource or income be must mean available is actually presently hand at moment grant for eligibility determined. Even ***, under subparagraph (D) income is available as a resource and shall if be considered has a interest recipient legal liquidated sum legal has the to make such ability support a sum available for That language clearly contemplates maintenance. that the money need (27 be in hand.” R2d 682.) Citing Wash. court, supreme the Toulon court went on to say that “once funds have in fact made been received or for disposal available recipi- ent, the them may state consider within available the framework of regulations.” (27 WAC Wash. App. 616 R2d Since not conclusively DSHS did that the presume available, meant that it used procedure proper. “Welfare payments which come from the basis taxpayer should be on the of ac- tual need. There should no for approval given recipients hasty disposal of all cash in order to nonexempt maintain eligibility.” *7 678, Wash. 616 P.2d App.
While there are certain differences between Toulou and the case, the present compelling. interpretation is This court’s analogy of the in of pocket statute does not the to the the require money recipi- be ent at the time in order for it to eligibility is determined be considered Also, does not the conclusively “available.” Rule 3.387 avail- presume of it the ability money only operates because after comes into recipient the it possession sum; of the that only presumes recipient the will budget the over of money period equivalent period a time that the if GA, same sum would cover received from a the presumption IDEA power Also, has the to make. took it himself upon it expend all of his of when he upon receipt almost immediately knew, known, of GA certainly receipt should have that continued A would interpretation benefits were based need. most upon contrary funds, ineligi- the of otherwise certainly promote rapid dissipation keep other needy per- the payroll prevent ble on assistance recipients a to maintain subsis- receiving they require the sons from tence income. level of in support posi has cited numerous Federal cases
Plaintiff cases, opinion, the recent of which is a 1981 deal tion. the most All of the The es program. with statutes and AFDC regulations State regulations a State statutes and sence cases is prohibition of those sources, something or income presume that the existence of resources in Also, 1981, that does not it is that Con noteworthy IDPA’s rule do. 1981 (OBRA). the Reconciliation Act of gress Budget Omnibus passed (Pub. 97—35 in 1 U.S. Code (1981), reprinted Cong. Law No. sec. 2304 845; & 45 C.F.R. sec. 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(d) Adm. News 95 Stat. the of Federal designed OBRA was to reduce dollars (1979).) outlay programs. lump-sum pro for social OBRA amended the targeted prior the lump AFDC such that a sum is considered vision under future months according month it is received income in the specifically the received. OBRA allows support previously level set for a lump-sum States to consider income available followed regulation obviously time. The Federal the format was IDEA 3.387, it enacted Rule because 3.387 is virtual twin Rule Congress’ of the It regulation. purpose above-cited Federal sum, sum, such a treatment of a as IDPA’s rule treats lump statute, would of the which encour prior alleviate wasteful result aged dissipation of funds in order to retain AFDC rapid eligibility. re Sess., 1st (Senate Cong., No. June Report 97— printed & Adm. a recent (1981) Cong. U.S. Code News v. Miller case Duckworth district, in the fourth suspension 469 N.E.2d court considered appellate of AFDC benefits to a woman, income, no who earned received $8,500 death wrongful settlement. IDEA AFDC suspended her settlement. The decision was affirmed and the because woman 3.387, here, that IDEA Rule the same rule as appealed arguing provisions in that its could only the Federal AFDC statute contrary court, The dis appellate income. persons having earned applied is a 3.387 virtual and its the fact that Rule cussing history, OBRA upheld carbon rule as copy regulation, lump-sum Federal her income. even the absence earned here, Duckworth issue in is not the issue
Though present same court noteworthy upheld application AFDC program. rule in the context cooperative court now Federal courts of review which have join stated: those “[W]e view, come on the of this In our cost-cutting para down side issue. *8 mount concern in this area of legislation was the conservation of all- too-scarce resources. To allow recipients to rapidly dissipate funds ac quired sources, from other only to fall back upon government as a income, source of would be counterproductive to self-sufficient econ omy.” (127 Ill. App. 1093.) interpretation Rule 3.387 in a similar manner applied when State-funded GA exclusively pro gram, will the similar keep systems Plain harmony. tiff’s essential argument, which we reject, that Rule 3.387 is valid if the Illinois only legislature statute, passes like the OBRA, Federal authorizing the promulgation of such a rule.
Plaintiff has cited a case from the Superior Court of Rhode Island which involved the identical question presented here and which ulti- mately accepted plaintiff’s argument the Rhode Island Depart- ment of Social and Rehabilitative (RIDSRS) Services’ regulation con- travened its own General Public Assistance (GPA) (Mullins statute. & (R.I. Ct., Gioielli Murray Super. v. Feb. 1984), 2173.) No. The Mur- 83— ray case involved Rhode Island’s exclusively State-funded GPA system, while the instant case involves Illinois’ program. GA In Murray, as here, there was no prior legislative authorization similar to OBRA. Fi- nally, when the State department of public aid Rhode Island brought regulations OBRA, AFDC in line with it also included its GPA sys- tem, just as Illinois included its GA system amending its AFDC regulations. case, however, The Murray is distinguishable and will not be followed this court.
First, when discussing Federal AFDC cases regarding ap plication of OBRA to income, without recipients earned the Rhode Is land court Sweeney relied (D.R.I. 560 F. 1983), Supp. Affleck 1118, a case which limited the application of the amendment to those recipients income, with earned a position clearly minority not Duckworth. followed our court in appellate cases cited (See Wylie v. Kitchin (N.D.N.Y. 1984), and Duck 589 F. Supp. worth v. Miller Second, 127 Ill. App. the court’s holding premised the idea upon the RIDSRS should have waited for the Rhode Island legislature to a statute similar to pass OBRA. statute, Since had not such a passed regula court felt tion extends to Director Legislature “unenforceable until the itself the power to promulgate regulation.” added.) (Mur such a (Emphasis ray, at slip op. 61.) Our research the Rhode Island GPA regarding pro gram discloses that its DSRS was vested with broad and dis as IDPA cretionary powers, (See has under section 12—13 of the Code. seq.) Gen. Laws sec. 40—6—1 et R.I. The IDPA’s broad powers section 12—13 have of this repeatedly upheld by courts State. 11; Warrior v. 96 Ill. 2d Lawrie v. Thompson (1983), Department of 335, 348; Department Public Aid 72 Ill. 2d Miller Public *9 11,18-19. Aid 94 Ill. asserts, Plaintiff’s first noted and as argument previously also in that IDPA should not plaintiff Murray successfully argued, enact similar to legislative authority allowed to Rule 3.387 without granted However, in the Federal the three system by AFDC OBRA. Illinois cases cited allow the IDPA to such a just clearly promulgate rule its delegated powers embodied in section 12—13. Conse- IDPA’s rule is a exercise quently, valid of its administrative powers and does not violate or exceed IDPA’sstatutory powers.
Plaintiff’s second is that point appeal assuming IDPA’s rule valid, it was Plaintiff that the erroneously applied plaintiff. argues rule clearly contemplates its when an assistance unit application only receives a lump-sum Plaintiff maintains that since he payment. was a “representative payee” sum, when he actually received he was not assistance unit part rule should not have been A applied. is defined in IDPA’s representative payee manual as “If follows: adult with whom a child is is not living unit, included in the assistance the adult is designated Representative Payee.” GA Manual sec. PO 905.
It is unquestioned that where an administrative agency adopts rules or regulations under its statutory it is authority, by bound those rules and cannot disregard them or them a arbitrarily apply in discrimi (Heavner nate fashion. Racing Illinois Board 103 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1025, here, however, 432 N.E.2d present Under facts IDPA did not violate the The facts above-quoted law. are clear that plaintiff began receiving GA benefits in December of 1981 and was assistance unit part through of 1983. October Pursuant to the agreement signed authorization his SSI by plaintiff, award sent by was IDPA, SSA which received it on October 1983. IDPA deleted from the assistance unit on October effective Novem ber thereafter was established as the representative payee from that date. Plaintiff received State warrant in November sense, In a technical plaintiff was a when he representative actually of the But, received his share SSI award. he not deleted assistance unit until after IDPA pursuant received award from SSA to plaintiff’s agreement. Thus, own IDPA when received the award on 19, 1983, plaintiff unit, October was a of the assistance part and he was deleted, not until the first of the effectively, following month. It is be award, yond that at the time IDPA held the dispute plaintiff had a legal interest in and had the legal ability make that money use, available for his to a subject certain only right amount the award, inall October of 1983. the mere Consequently, fact that plaintiff did not receive his share until November is irrelevant in terms assistance status October IDPA received and held award for him according to his own authorization.
Plaintiff a attempts obviate rational application rule arguing: “Mr. Rivera was deleted from October, the unit in effective November 1983. The check representing his lump-sum payment dated and, November could have re- consequently, ceived him after until he was deleted from the assistance unit.” Plaintiff’s would IDPA to argument require forego procedures until knew, fact, that the pocket. had sum in his This is an recipient overly approach burdened, mechanistic to a system heavily scarce resources, highly regulated. IDPA did not delete on Octo- ber when it received the It award. deleted No- plaintiff effective vember the same date as on the This appears appears check. to be fair, reasonable, to adjust and rational way person’s status under *10 circumstances.
(cid:127) 3 argument appeal Plaintiff’s third is that he was due denied failure him of process by consequences to the of receiv- notify ing contemporaneously the sum with his lump receipt thereof. Plaintiff maintains that IDPA’s assumes that the of a policy recipient sum budget will that income over a time to the unit’s proportion standard of IDPA to Consequently, need. since failed notify plaintiff suspension of benefits forthcoming with IDPA’s contemporaneous remittance to he plaintiff, of the sum was not to take knowing able effective action maintain this for in- family’s to subsistence was, therefore, come and process. January denied due IDPA’snotice on 6, 1984, and came subsequent too late to affect hearing family’s and, actions since the to whether appeal only determine IDPA cor- rectly computed suspension, months of the denial of due process find argument cured. We entire to be plaintiff’s without merit. requires
Due that process given be “notice cal reasonably culated, circumstances, under all to apprise pendency [him] 444, 449-50, action.” 456 72 L. (Greene Lindsey U.S. 249, Ed. 2d 255, 1874, 1878.) 102 S. Ct. protections Constitutional area of welfare stem Goldberg Kelly (1970), benefits 254, U.S. L. 287, 1011, 397 25 Ed. 2d 90 S. Ct. where it was deter mined that the of public triggers withdrawal assistance benefits consti 287, 296, (397 254, 262, tutional restraints. U.S. 25 L. Ed. 90 S. Ct. 1011, discontinued, a 1017.) only pre-termination welfare “[W]hen hearing evidentiary provides recipient procedural due pro-
225 264, (397 254, 287, 297, cess.” U.S. 25 L. 1011, Ed. 2d 90 S. Ct. 1018.) The “termination of aid pending resolution a over controversy eligi- eligible bility may deprive recipient means which to very 254, live while he waits.” (Emphasis original.) (397 U.S. 25 L. 287, 297, Ed. 2d S. not, 90 Ct. “Due process does course, If, two require hearings. for a State example, simply wishes to continue benefits until after a hearing ‘fair’ there will no for need preliminary hearing.” (397 n.14, U.S. 267 25 L. Ed. 2d n.14, 90 S. Ct. n.14.) The court went on to that due explain process principles required timely notice to the recipient that detailed termination, the reasons for the proposed and that hearing must afford recipient to opportunity effectively defend his claim by confronting adverse witnesses and orally presenting his own argu- ments and evidence. The court found these rights important in cases where recipients challenged proposed terminations because of mislead- ing information, incorrect factual or where there has been a misap- of rule or plication policies the particular facts present. U.S. 254, 267-68, 25 L. 1011,1020. Ed. 90 S. Ct.
Our examination of record relative the administrative hear- ing discloses that plaintiff was afforded the opportunity effectively defend his claim by presenting evidence and cross-examining wit- nesses, if presented. Thus, were they there is no defi- constitutional ciency hearing provided. Also, it is clear that plaintiff’s during were continued the duration of this cause upon filing appeal. Though at first there appears blush be a notification problem in that plaintiff was notified after January his benefits were terminated effective we are convinced otherwise because, arguments, at oral for plaintiff counsel was not able to show that plaintiff would have missed a GA payment before his benefits were continued. Nor was a sufficient record provided this court on which to a conclusion base the IDPA’s system notifying recipi- suspension, ents of a and their continuation of benefits pending the *11 outcome of an are infirm Goldberg. appeal constitutionally
Rather, that plaintiff only argues what is constitutionally required under these circumstances is a notice from IDEA regarding Rule impact 3.387 and its on plaintiff’s contemporaneous assistance unit with the remittance of agency’s lump sum to We must plaintiff. disagree. of notice Receipt lump help budget with the sum to plaintiff has no constitutional extend support, and we refuse to estab- lished in principles this area. “The fundamental of due requisite pro- cess of law is the (Grannis Ordean opportunity (1914), to be heard.” 385, 394, 1363, 1369, 779, 783; 234 U.S. 58 L. S. Armstrong Ed. 34 Ct. v. Manzo 14 L. Ed. U.S. 85 S. Ct. assuming Even had received notice from the IDPA plaintiff when he was, received his sum in lump November there at time, heard, essence, nothing argued, be decided. the due process relative to the requirements Goldberg suspension triggered. had not The restrictions of due yet pro constitutional cess do not notice to a for information’s sake. The require recipient Goldberg designed protect constitutional are an indi requirements vidual’s and to confront adverse right be heard witnesses before his welfare benefits are terminated. It is clear in this case that plaintiff received notice in to his in adequate suspension, relative order to have his benefits continued his claims all of protected, which, record, on this satisfies the mandates of Plaintiff’s Goldberg. that, facts, under these effective should argument notification notification, stated, as no equated contemporaneous has constitu certainly tional Plaintiff knew or should have known that his support. unit’s would program status GA be affected sum and that his entire involvement in the GA receipt lump pro It gram upon was based financial need. was his to take responsibility light effective action relative to his of that sum in of Rule 3.387, nearly year. setting which had been effect for This factual Brengola-Sorrentino distinguishable Department Public Aid 129 Ill. where the IDPA applying eligi initial in a bility haphazard standards discriminate fashion.
In its the IDPA court to reverse a cross-appeal, urges por this tion of the order. IDPA circuit court’s contends that lower court remaining ordered the IDPA to enforce the two months of erroneously of GA to Rule 3.387 suspension pursuant by prorating disqualifica tion amount period offsetting against over a six-month contin uing assistance.
Rule 3.387 here provides part: relevant period
“The of time of is the whole ineligibility number (minus months the total income received assistance unit meet exemptions) deductions and would applicable Standard of Need.” terms, its
By discretionary powers this rule does not afford determining formula for application. gives specific whole rule months. The trial court’s annexation of ineligibility, whole rule, feeling on its that the proration principles apparently based fall that the IDPA should have told harshly rule would how the rule operated, improper. earlier rule, the court applies give a trial court must agency’s When
227 (Rend Lake of its rule. interpretation own agency’s deference to the Community Teachers, v. Board Local 3708 College Federation of of N.E.2d 405 No. College, District the area of public This is 364.) especially important rule (Warrior the IDEA. great the vests discretion benefits because Code “it is not the 11.) importantly, 96 Ill. 2d More Thompson (1983), the legislature of the wisdom of guess’ function court to ‘second [the] the difficult of allocat charged responsibility or the ‘state officials with among recipi of myriad potential limited welfare funds the ing ” Aid 72 Ill. 2d (Lawrie Department Public ents.’ of proration the trial erred when it annexed court Consequently, 3.387, of the trial court’s order is Rule and that principles portion onto reversed. is affirmed reasons,
For the the order of the trial court foregoing which annexed plaintiff, proration as to of the order portion Rule onto 3.387 reversed. principles reversed in part part.
Affirmed J., EERLIN, concurs. HARTMAN, concurring specially dissenting:
JUSTICE up- I of portion opinion concur in that which majority however, funds; I holds circuit court’s construction “available” of the circuit court’s majority’s dissent from reversal respectfully onto IDEARule 3.387. annexing proration principles order exercises here may individually proper The IDEA rules at issue constitutionally and are not authority of administrative under the Code infirm, of their in- effect yet potentially devastating combined re- case ameliorative application flexible instant some required requiring circuit court. In my opinion, prora- order sponse response. such a deduction was tion of settlement seven, Here, incapable supporting physically a disabled father GA benefits. He for SSI and through family employment, applied the GA settlement SSI authorized IDEA deduct from was sent he benefits had received. November already IDEA, after it had made its SSI settlement balance plain- consequences potential notice from IDEA of the deduction. No check. While the settlement accompanied tiff’s check man- constitutionally not have been such notice contemporaneous may notice, such dated, require would seem justice and fairness simple IDEA through channeled where, here, the settlement was especially itself, and Nevertheless, was not sent by SSA directly plaintiff. plaintiff was not notified until 1984 that his benefits GA would funds, be terminated because of the settlement. The how- settlement ever, were then longer no available to support Although family. have may improvident funds, in spending these notwith- notice, the lack standing prior IDPA of subsequent application by 3.387, its Rule requiring termination GA in whole *13 months, would have worked substantial family. this hardship regulations
The rules and by an promulgated agency administrative valid; are presumptively nevertheless, a set reviewing court them may if aside (Illinois they clearly arbitrary, are capricious, unreasonable. Coal Operators Association v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 59 Ill. 305, 310, Midwest Petroleum Marketers Associa 782; 2d 319 N.E.2d City Chicago tion v. 494, 501, (1980), Ill. 3d App. 402 N.E.2d 709.) The rules permitted which the IDPA here to send a lump-sum affording settlement without him contemporaneous notice thereof, then, stark consequences notify two months later him all months, GA benefits would be discontinued for five are Although both unfair and process requires unreasonable. due law only that the opportunity be heard be is an provided, opportu “[i]t nity granted which must be at a meaningful meaningful time and in a (Armstrong Manzo 545, 552, manner.” (1965), 380 U.S. 14 L. 2d Ed. 85 S. Gt. here, The notice hearing provided after the settlement depleted, funds had were meaningless insofar was concerned. The circuit court’s order requiring prora tion, therefore, would not only have alleviated the harsh consequences of the rules in this particular application, but also would have de only not denied layed, altogether, the IDPA’s recovery of the settlement proceeds. Illinois circuit general courts have the authority to determine constitution, arising all matters in reason statute controversy by (Skilling Skilling or under the law or common equity 881), 432 N.E.2d and are with wide discre endowed tion respect general jurisdiction to their legal equitable over Hospitals v. Health & (Biggs Governing Commission matters 505-06, Ill. App. 1150). The relief fashioned 370 N.E.2d was, therefore, judice case sub the circuit appropriately court adjusted it and authorized law and presented facts before precedent. reasons,
For the foregoing I would affirm the circuit court’s order all respects.