MARIA ESTELA VILLEGAS RIVAS v. JUANNA DAYEL VILLEGAS AND MARVIN DAVID LANDAVERDE
No. 2517 EDA 2022
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
July 27, 2023
2023 PA Super 135
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.
J-S03016-23. Appeal from the Order Entered September 7, 2022. In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2022-04171-CU.
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2023
Maria Estela Villegas Rivas (Grandmother) appeals from the order denying her petition for special relief pursuant to
I. Facts & Procedural History
Child was born in January 2007 and lived in El Salvador with her mother, Juanna Dayel Villegas (Mother), until November 2021.2 See N.T., 8/19/22, at 16; Grandmother‘s Complaint For Custody (Custody Complaint), 6/15/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). It is unclear from the record whether Mother and Child‘s father, Marvin David Landaverde (Father), were ever married, but they are no longer in a relationship. See N.T. at 10-11. Child also indicated she no longer has communication with Father. Id. at 16.
In November 2021, Child moved to the United States to live with Grandmother and her husband, who presently reside in Chester County, Pennsylvania. See Custody Complaint at 2 (unpaginated). Grandmother paid for Child‘s travel expenses. See N.T. at 12.
A. Custody Complaint
On June 15, 2022, Grandmother filed a complaint, seeking sole physical and legal custody of Child. See Custody Complaint at 1.3 That same day,
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13. Reunification with Father is not viable because Father is not willing to support and provide for Child. Father has abandoned and neglected the Child.
14. Reunification with Mother is not viable because Mother does not have the financial means to support and provide for Child.
15. The best interest and permanent welfare of the Child will be served by granting the relief requested because the Child will be in a safe and loving environment. [Grandmother] provides the Child safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare. In addition, it is not the Child‘s best interest to return to El Salvador because there is no appropriate relative who can provide adequate care or supervision.
Custody Complaint at 3 (unpaginated).
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B. Federal Law - SIJ Statute & Classification
At this juncture, it is necessary to set forth the applicable federal law at issue. “The SIJ statute,
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant‘s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law[.]
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien‘s best interest to be returned to the alien‘s or parent‘s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]
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(b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the Act as described at section 1[1]01(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they meet all of the following requirements:
(1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition;
(2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication;
(3) Is physically present in the United States;
(4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this section; and
(5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile. For [United States Citizenship Immigration Services (USCIS)] to consent, the request for SIJ classification must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish that a primary reason the required juvenile court determinations were sought was to obtain relief from parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law. . . .
(c) Juvenile court order(s).
(1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and parental reunification determination. The juvenile court must have made certain judicial determinations related to the petitioner‘s custody or dependency and
Yeboah v. United States DOJ, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). “Although not binding on us, we may cite federal authority for its persuasive value.” Toppy v. Passage Bio, Inc., 285 A.3d 672, 690 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2022).
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determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law.
(i) The juvenile court must have made at least one of the following judicial determinations related to the petitioner‘s custodial placement or dependency in accordance with State law governing such determinations:
(A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the juvenile court; or
(B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner under the custody of an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court.
(ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial determination that parental reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is not required to terminate parental rights to determine that parental reunification is not viable.
(2) Best interest determination.
(i) A determination must be made in judicial or administrative proceedings by a court or agency recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law to make such decisions that it would not be in the petitioner‘s best interest to be returned to the petitioner‘s or their parent‘s country of nationality or last habitual residence.
(ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering the standards for best interest determinations that juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant State law.
(3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s).
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(i) The juvenile court must have exercised its authority over the petitioner as a juvenile and made the requisite judicial determinations in this paragraph under applicable State law to establish eligibility. . . .
C. Custody Hearing
On August 19, 2022, the trial court held a hearing regarding the custody issue. See N.T. at 3. Grandmother and Child were both present. Id. at 9, 16. Mother and Father did not appear in person or remotely.5 Grandmother‘s counsel requested the court consider both the custody and petition for special relief issues. See id. at 3-4. The court expressed concern that since the case was a custody matter, it did not qualify as a juvenile or dependency proceeding, and therefore, the court could not review the petition. Id. at 4-5. The court then questioned counsel about whether it had the authority to declare Child dependent and place her in the custody of the Commonwealth, to which Grandmother‘s counsel answered in the affirmative. Id. at 5-6. Counsel also stated that under the INA, “all we would need is a juvenile court
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Additionally, the trial court pointed out that because Grandmother filed a petition for special relief, that was not the “appropriate” application since
D. Trial Court Orders
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As for the second order, the court denied Grandmother‘s petition for special relief and her request for specific findings of fact. The court provided no further analysis in the order.
E. Appeal & Trial Court Opinion
On October 6, 2022, Grandmother filed a notice of appeal from the trial court‘s order denying her petition for special relief,7 and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
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In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court suggested that this Court quash Grandmother‘s appeal “for want of jurisdiction based on the failure to
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Next, the trial court determined “there was no basis for the grant of the special relief requested[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 6. The court stated the “custody factor analysis provided the trial court with ample opportunity to address allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment, provided there was enough credible evidence, of sufficient weight to support such claims, but that was not the case.” Id. The court then determined that SIJ status was not the proper subject for special relief, stating it “was unable to find a single statutory or procedural rule in the Commonwealth related to obtaining [SIJ status]
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The court further found Grandmother‘s request for special relief was “defective” as there “was no emergency or other circumstance present, which warranted special relief[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Moreover, the court stated that “there was no allegation by [Grandmother] that there was an emergency or apparent urgent need for court action to preserve the well-being of Child” and “no evidence of record that Child would be put at risk or that there would be a change in circumstances with regard to custody, in the absence of special relief.” Id. at 8. The court determined “status quo . . . favors” Grandmother. Id.
Third, the trial court determined there was insufficient credible evidence to support Grandmother‘s petition for special relief and specific findings of fact. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9. The court stated it “observed the witnesses’
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Lastly, the court addressed the issues identified in Grandmother‘s concise statement. See Trial Ct. Op. at 10-17.
II. Statement of Questions Involved
Grandmother presents the following three issues on appeal:
- Whether the trial court erred in denying [Grandmother]‘s request for an SIJ eligibility order because it deprived [her] and [Child] of a remedy for [Child]‘s right to seek SIJ status and violated their right to due process?
- Whether [the Superior] Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court‘s order as a final order under
42 Pa.C.S. § 742 and Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) & (b)(1) because it disposes of all of [Grandmother]‘s claims relating to her request for the issuance of an SIJ eligibility order? - In the alternative, whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court‘s order as a collateral order under Pa.R.A.P. 313 because the issue of SIJ eligibility is separable from
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Grandmother‘s Brief at 7-8.
Based on the nature of Grandmother‘s arguments, we will address her second and third issues first because they pertain to the jurisdiction of this Court.
I. Jurisdiction & Appealability
“[T]he appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Knopick v. Boyle, 189 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We note because questions concerning the appealability of an order go to jurisdiction, they may be raised sua sponte by this Court. Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review plenary.” Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted). Generally, “[f]or an order to be appealable, it must be (1) a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341-342; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission,
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, “a final order is one that disposes of all claims and of all parties or is entered as a final order
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A collateral order is an order [(1)] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action [(2)] where the right involved is too important to be denied review and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). If an order satisfies the three-pronged test set forth in Rule 313(b), this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over the order, even though it is not final.
The collateral-order rule is a specialized, practical application of the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right. As such, this Court must stringently apply the requirements of the collateral-order doctrine. If an order does not meet all three prongs of the collateral-order test, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal from that order.
Smith v. O‘Brien, 2023 WL 309009, at *2 (Pa. Super. Jan. 19, 2023) (quotation marks & some citations omitted).
Here, Grandmother complains that in accordance with this Court‘s recent decision in Orozco, supra, she “has a right to seek an SIJ eligibility order in the context of a custody proceeding.” Grandmother‘s Brief at 12. She further asserts the trial court‘s September 7, 2022, order qualifies as either a final order or a collateral order. See Grandmother‘s Brief at 17. She states: “[T]he order constitutes a final order . . . because it disposes of all of [her] claims relating to [her] request for the issuance of an order to establish [Child]‘s eligibility for [SIJ] status pursuant to
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With respect to this question, we are guided by this Court‘s decision in Orozco, supra.10 In Orozco, the appellant filed a petition seeking the
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As will be discussed infra, the trial court discussed Orozco in its Rule 1925(a) opinion but found that it was distinguishable. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6 n.3, 15-16.
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The trial court found the order at issue was “not ripe for review because it is a temporary order and thus interlocutory.” Orozco, 284 A.3d at 477. A panel of this Court disagreed, determining “the subject order is appealable as of right as a collateral order.” Id. at 478. This Court analyzed the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine, and determined:
[The appellant]‘s emergency petition for an SIJ order is separable from [her] main custody action because we can decide the propriety of the denial of the SIJ motion without delving into the merits of the underlying custody case. Further, the interest at issue - a predicate order for [the child] to apply for SIJ status and seek adjustment of his immigration status - is an “important right” significant enough to outweigh the efficiency interests of the court. Lastly, [the child]‘s ability to obtain appellate relief will be effectively foreclosed if we deny immediate review. [The appellant] candidly informs us that deportation proceedings are pending against [the child] and she sought the SIJ order so he could obtain relief from deportation. Hence, we conclude that the . . . order was immediately appealable as a collateral order.
Id. at 478-79 (citations & footnote omitted; emphasis added). Additionally, this Court concluded that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it declined to provide reasoning for its refusal on the record in any capacity, stating: “The federal statutory scheme puts the factual determinations necessary for SIJ status solely within the purview of state courts. Yet the court flatly refused to issue the SIJ order. In this posture, the refusal was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 479.
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We now turn to Grandmother‘s substantive argument regarding the court‘s denial of her petition seeking an SIJ order. She contends “there was nothing improper with [her] request for the issuance of an SIJ eligibility order” because “such a request can only be made within the context of a custody,
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Federal law requires the issuance of an SIJ eligibility order by a state juvenile court as a prerequisite to pursuing SIJ status before USCIS. By necessity, SIJ eligibility must be determined in a state custody, guardianship, or dependency proceeding, applying state law. [Grandmother]‘s request for an SIJ eligibility order was proper and appropriate in the context of the custody proceeding and the denial of such relief violated [Grandmother]‘s fundamental right to due process. Further, the failure to deny the application without a hearing and without articulating any reasons for the denial violates Appellant‘s right to due process and deprives this Court of its ability to review the decision for error.
Id. at 16.
We may reverse a decision in an equity matter only for an error of law or abuse of discretion. The findings of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by competent evidence or are demonstrably capricious. To the extent that this appeal implicates statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. We review trial courts’ interpretations of statutes for error of law.
Orozco, 284 A.3d at 479 (citations & quotation marks omitted).
We note that at the outset of the hearing, the trial court was disinclined to consider Grandmother‘s petition based on several procedural nuances of the case, which it also relied on in its Rule 1925(a) opinion - particularly, (1)
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First, the trial court in Orozco was not a juvenile or dependency court, and there is no indication that the minor child was declared dependent upon the court or legally committed to an agency/department of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, this Court still found that the lower court erred by refusing to address the petition. See Orozco, 284 A.3d at 478-79. It merits mention that the language of
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Second, we note that while Grandmother may have filed her request as a petition for special relief which may not have been the most appropriate practice, the title of the document should not control where the substance of the relief requested is clear - particularly where a child is the subject of the underlying matter. Where there are allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment regarding a child, a reviewing court should excuse the misnomer and address the merits set forth in the filing.
Next, we point out that in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court opined that Orozco is distinguishable from the case sub judice because, in Orozco, this Court “addressed [SIJ status] findings in the context of the lower court‘s failure to provide a rationale for its declining to make such findings[, which is] not the case in the present matter.” Trial Ct. Op. at 6 n.3; see also id. at 15. Then, contrary to its statements at the hearing, the trial court decided to address the SIJ status issue in its opinion, determining there was insufficient credible evidence to support Grandmother‘s requested relief and specific findings. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10. The court analyzed the issue, relying on the testimony of Grandmother and Child during the custody part of the August 19th hearing, to find no evidence of abuse and abandonment. Id. The court further stated:
In the present matter, [it] provided [Grandmother] with a meaningful opportunity to present her entire case, has now
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discussed the reasons for its denial [o]rder, and is addressing the alleged errors set forth by [Grandmother] as permitted by Rule 1925(a). Finally, the trial court may make findings that would permit a litigant primarily seeking relief from abuse or neglect to apply for [SIJ status], if the evidence supports such findings. There is no legal requirement that a trial court make such findings, especially where, as here, the evidence does not warrant it. Neither Orozco nor federal law requires a court to turn a blind eye to the evidence of record in order to make findings that would support an [SIJ status] application.
Id. at 16 (italics in original; citation omitted).
We find that the trial court‘s analysis is misplaced. As mentioned above, at the August 19th hearing, because the court opposed reviewing the SIJ status matter for several reasons, it limited the testimony to the custody issue and the
The court‘s actions amounted to an abuse of discretion. A reasonable person would not agree that Grandmother was given a full opportunity to present her case regarding Child‘s SIJ status. Moreover, based on the refusal to review the matter and the inadequate testimony, the court cannot
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Judge Bowes joins the opinion.
Judge Sullivan files a concurring statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/27/2023
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Notes
At any time after commencement of the action, the court may on application or its own motion grant appropriate interim or special relief. The relief may include, but is not limited to, the award of temporary legal or physical custody; the issuance of appropriate process directing that a child or a party or person having physical custody of a child be brought before the court; and a direction that a person post security to appear with the child when directed by the court or to comply with any order of the court.
In the complaint, Grandmother alleged, in relevant part:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
The statute was ratified for the following reasons:
The SIJ provisions of the INA were enacted in 1990 to protect abused, neglected, or abandoned children who, with their families, illegally entered the United States. Congress provided an alternative to deportation for these children. Rather than being deported along with abusive or neglectful parents, or deported to parents who had abandoned them once in the United States, such children may seek special status to remain in the United States.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
In the concise statement, Grandmother raised the following claims:
- The [trial c]ourt abused its discretion and violated due process of the law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment by denying [Grandmother]‘s request for special relief and specific findings of fact.
- The [c]ourt erred in finding that it is not a “juvenile court” for the purposes of [SIJ status] classification.
- The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying [Grandmother]‘s special request for relief and specific findings when it had proper jurisdiction to do so.
- The [c]ourt egregiously misapplied and misinterpreted both Pennsylvania state law and [SIJ status] federal law.
- The [c]ourt violated [Grandmother]‘s right to Due Process because it deprived [her] and [Child] of a remedy for the minor‘s right to seek SIJ status.
- The [c]ourt erred and violated [Grandmother]‘s right to Due Process by failing to place on the record a comprehensive discussion of the reasons for the final order denying special relief and specific findings of fact.
- [Grandmother] reserves the right to supplement and/or amend this [concise statement] pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(2) and Pa.R.A.P. 902, as the hearing transcript has not been received to date. . . .
Grandmother‘s Concise Statement of Errors Complaint of on Appeal, 10/6/22, a 1-2 (unpaginated; footnote omitted).
We take this moment to acknowledge that the law in this area has not been fully developed. While the statute was enacted in 1990, its interpretation and application in this Commonwealth has been limited until very recently. See Orozco; see also Velasquez v. Miranda, 2023 WL 4069151 (Pa. Super. June 20, 2023).
Moreover, the statute creates a unique procedural caveat where the ultimate determination is of the federal immigration nature, but preliminary factual determinations are made by state courts. See Orozco, 284 A.3d at 477 (citation omitted). Since the statute‘s enactment, no settled interpretation or application of the SIJ statute has been developed among the states, and there is no unified body of law for considering what evidence will be sufficient to support SIJ findings. As such, the courts of this Commonwealth may face confusion and produce inconsistent results in future proceedings as we see this type of case occurring often in the future. Consequently, we note that further guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and General Assembly may help to clarify those problems that will continue to challenge our orphans‘, juvenile, and family courts.