{¶ 2} Appellant pled guilty in 1989 to one count of rape and оne count of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to prison. Appellant was classified as a sexual *2
predator in 2001 аnd subsequently released from prison. In 2007, appellant received notification of a reclassification as a Tier III sexual offender as the result of the Ohio General Assembly's passage of Senate Bill 10 amendments to R.C. Chapter
{¶ 3} Appellant filed a petitiоn contesting his reclassification on specific constitutional grounds and requesting relief from community notification. See R.C.
{¶ 4} Assignment of Error:
{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT BY DENYING HIS PETITION CONTESTING RECLASSIFICATION PURSUANT TO R.C.
{¶ 6} Under this assignment of error, appellant asserts five specific constitutional challеnges to the new sexual offender law. This court's inquiry begins with the fundamental understanding that a statute enacted in Ohio is presumed to be constitutional. State v. Ferguson,
{¶ 7} Appellant first argues that the reclassification, and its associated requirements, constitutes a breach of contract and violation of the right to contract under the United States and Ohio Constitutions and requests specific performance of the agreement contemplated by the law in effect at the time of his plea agreement.
{¶ 8} Both the United States and Ohio Constitutions prоvide that no laws shall be passed that impair the obligation of contracts. See Section 10, Article
{¶ 9} Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to contract law standards. State v. Wintrow, Preble App. No. CA2003-10-021,
{¶ 10} The record indiсates that appellant entered a plea in 1989. No evidence was presented regarding the terms of the plea agrеement. Appellant was classified as a sexual predator in 2001. We note that it does not appear that appellant appealed that classification.
{¶ 11} The Third District Court of Appeals in State v. Paris, Auglaize App. No. 2-2000-04,
{¶ 12} The same appellate court, while addressing the provisions of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act, stated that where thе Ohio Supreme Court previously said a convicted felon had no reasonable expectation that his criminal conduct wоuld not be subject to future legislation and had no vested rights concerning the registration requirements imposed, it was not persuaded the Ohio Supreme Court would deviate from that rationale to find a contract impairment. In re Gant, Allen App. No. 1-08-11,
{¶ 13} We are persuaded by the reasoning of the above-cited cases to find that the sexual offendеr law in Ohio's Adam Walsh Act does not interfere with any vested contractual right and, therefore, does not violate the contract clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶ 14} Appellant next argues that his reclassification constitutes a violation of the seрaration of powers doctrine.
{¶ 15} We find the current version of the law does not violate the separation of powers dоctrine. State v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2008-02-029,
{¶ 16} Appellant next argues that the retroactive application of the law violates the prohibition on retroactive laws in the Ohio Constitution. We find this issue not well taken. See Williams at ¶ 36 (Ohio's Adam Walsh Act is remedial, and, as such, the classification and registration provisions of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act do not violate the ban on retroactive laws set forth in Section
{¶ 17} We also reject appellant's argument that the law in Ohio's Adam Walsh Act violates the prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws in the United States Constitution. See Williams, at ¶ 72, 74-75 (rejecting argument that Ohio's Adam Walsh Act is so punitive in effect that it negates legislature's non-punitive intent; law does not promote the traditional aims of punishment of retribution and deterrence; retroactive application of classification, registration and notification provisions do nоt violate Ex Post Facto clause); see State v.Honey, Medina App. No. 08CA0018-M,
{¶ 18} Appellant's final argument asserts that the reclassification constitutes multiple punishments and, therefore, is in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶ 19} We find this argument not well taken as the sexual offender classification law is not a criminal, punitive statutory scheme and does not constitute punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clauses. See Williams at ¶ 107-111; Sewell,
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant's single assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed.
BRESSLER, P.J., and WALSH, J., concur.