15 Colo. App. 224 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1900
On this record we are confronted with the inquiry, whether a railroad company can be mulcted in exemplary or punitive damages for the acts of a conductor done while he is engaged in the performance of his duties.
Prior to the enactment of the statute it would not have been debatable. Long ago in elaborate and fully considered opinions, reviewing the whole subject, the supreme court decided that exemplary damages could not be recovered in civil actions sounding in tort where the injury done admitted of a criminal prosecution. The court went no further in the Hobbs case than to inhibit the recovery of these damages in such actions. The learned court, however, very gravely suggested it was a doubtful proposition whether they could be recovered in the other large class of actions in tort, even
Such being our conclusion, we are next to determine whether the statute can be deemed applicable to suits brought against corporations for the acts of its agent. Whether this could or could not have been done under the law prior to the statute is a vexed, disputed, troublesome, indeterminable question. The only thing that the court, to which the question is presented, can do is to accept that line which commends itself to their judgment, and the one which as they conceive is the most strongly supported by the most cogent reasoning of courts whose decisions control, if they do not entirely satisfy, the judgment of the deciding tribunal. As we suggested at the outset, counsel have presented both lines, and no leading or controlling case has been overlooked by either. We confess that we pay little heed to the views of authors, however distinguished, unless they are supported by what we regard as the controlling authorities. Bias, professional training and antecedent experience largely influence their discussion, and it would be unwise for courts to permit themselves to be much influenced by anything other than the particular reasons which they may have been able to cull from the decisions, and possibly in a few instances evolve from their own consideration. It is quite possible the judicial decisions of the various states may be nearly equal in number and in force, and may occupy the same plane of judicial distinc
If we had not reached this conclusion respecting the law we are very frank to say that a careful examination of the record and of the testimony would lead us to hold that there was no sufficient evidence of either fraud, malice, or insult or of a wanton disregard of Blocker’s rights to permit the submission of the question to the jury. Judge Thomson expresses no opinion on the rule heretofore discussed and laid down, but puts his concurrence on this precise ground. There was a dispute between Blocker and the conductor. It is a matter of considerable doubt under the testimony regardless of the verdict of the jury, whether Blocker tendered his fare prior to the time that the conductor stopped the train or pulled the bell to stop it. Whichever might be true, we do not believe the conductor exhibited any malice or insulted Blocker, or that he acted with a reckless disregard of his rights. If he put him off by reason of the misunderstanding, and if he failed to apprehend that Blocker intended to tender him his fare, it would not necessarily follow punitive damages could be assessed. Blocker was undoubtedly attempting to ride without paying his fare. He was insisting on his right to ride on his membership in the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. He was likewise endeavoring to compel the conductor to hold his money as security until he got to the Springs to avoid the payment of $1.60, which if it had been promptly tendered would have undoubtedly been received, a receipt given to him for it, and thereon he could have recovered the money if he was entitled to ride free. There is enough in the case to
For the reasons heretofore expressed, this judgment must be reversed and the case sent back for a new trial.
Reversed.