43 Neb. 287 | Neb. | 1895
Henry Eisse filed, or caused to be filed, in the county court of Adams county a writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Carl Julius Gasch, deceased, and prayed that said writing might by said court be proved and adjudged the last will and testament of said deceased. The widow and only heir, a son, of Carl Julius Gasch, deceased, appeared in the county court and objected to the paper filed by Eisse being approved and adjudged to be the last will and testament of the deceased, on the ground that it was in fact not his will, that he had never signed it. The county court admitted the paper filed to probate as the will of the deceased, and the widow and heir appealed to
.1. The first assignment of error is in the following language: “That the court erred in the admission of testimony offered by the respondent, and' duly excepted to by 'the plaintiff and proponent when the same was offered.” This assignment is too indefinite for consideration. The plaintiff in error at the trial made many objections to the ■evidence introduced by the defendants in error, and we are unable to determine from this assignment at what particular evidence offered or given by the defendants in error it is aimed.
2. The second and third assignments are: “That the ■court erred in giving of instructions requested by the defendants, and the court erred in refusing to give instructions asked by the plaintiff.” These assignments, and each ■of them, are too indefinite for review. It has been so many times decided by this court that a general objection to the ruling of a district court in giving instructions or refusing instructions cannot be considered, that it is unnecessary to •do more than call attention to the rule.
3. The fourth and fifth assignments are, that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence and the judgment is contrary to the law of the case. The judgment is not contrary to the law of the case if the verdict is sustained by sufficient competent evidence, and that we will consider later.
4. The sixth assignment is: “That the verdict was given under the impulse and under the influence of passion and sympathy rather than under the law and evidence of the ■case.” Assuming that the assignment is true as a matter
5. The seventh assignment is: “That the verdict should have been for the plaintiff instead of for the respondents.”' This is included in the assignment that the verdict is not supported by the evidence.
6. The eighth assignment is: “That there were errors-at law occurring at the trial, and which were duly excepted to by the plaintiff, which in themselves were a sufficient cause for a new trial. The court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.” The assignment,. “Errors of law occurring at the trial,” is sufficient in a motion for a new trial to enable the district court to determine whether it erred in admitting or rejecting evidence, but under such an assignment in a petition in error this court cannot review anything; and the court did not err in overruling the motion of Risse for a new, trial if the verdict of the jury is supported by the evidence.
7. The only assignment of error urged here by counsel for the plaintiff in error which we are permitted under the law and the decisions of this court to examine is the one that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence. The only issue in the case was whether the paper proposed for probate, and alleged to be the last will and testament of Carl Julius Gasch, deceased, was in fact his last will and testament; that is, whether he signed such paper. To prove that he did, plaintiff in error called as a witness one Enking, who testified that on the 15th day of June, 1875, he was a real estate agent and broker residing in the city of
Charles Ferdinand Gasch testified that he was a brother of Carl Julius Gasch, deceased; that the paper in controversey was signed by Carl Julius Gasch June 15, 1875, in the office of Enking, in Fond du Lae, Wisconsin; that he saw Carl Julius Gasch sign said paper, and that he, Charles Ferdinand Gasch, at the request of Carl Julius Gasch, witnessed his signature to it; that the signature, Carl Julius Gasch, on the paper in controversy was the signature of his brother, Carl Julius Gasch.
Charles Liebemann testified that the signature of one of the witnesses on the paper alleged to be the last will and testament of Carl Julius Gasch was his, Liebemann’s.
The defendants in error, to sustain their contention that the signature on the paper alleged to be the last will and testament of Carl Julius Gasch was not his signature nor his handwriting and therefore not his will, produced the following evidence:
The widow testified that she was married to Carl Julius Gasch, deceased, in Germany; that in 1847 they immigrated to the United States and soon thereafter bought and settled on a farm some twenty miles northeast of the city of Sheboygan, in Sheboygan county, Wisconsin; that she and her husband and their son, Morris Gasch, lived together on said farm prior to and some time after and during the entire year of 1875; that they lived peaceably and happily together; that her husband, Carl Julius Gasch,
Other witnesses testified to their acquaintance with Carl Julius Gasch while he lived in Wisconsin, and that he was there known by the name of Julius Gasch and that he signed his name Julius Gasch.
A justice of the peace of Wisconsin testified that he, by virtue of his official position, had had occasion to take the acknowledgments of papers signed by the deceased, and to those papers he signed his name Julius Gasch. A distillery bond was also put in evidence, on which the deceased was surety. This bond was executed in the state of Wisconsin, and the name of the deceased was signed thereon Julius Gasch. The deed made to the deceased for the farm he bought in Wisconsin was put in evidence, and in that the deceased was described as Julius Gasch; andthedeed he made
On cross-examination of Liebemann, whose named appeared signed to the paper purporting to be the will of the deceased, he stated that he did not remember the circumstance of having signed his name to the paper; that he could not say that he ever knew the deceased, and that the only thing he was sure of was that the signature was his, and that he signed it at the request of some one.
It also appeared from the cross-examination of Charles Ferdinand Gasch that on June 15, 1875, he lived in Calumet county, Wisconsin, some forty miles from where the deceased lived, and that about that time the deceased came to his, Charles Ferdinand Gasch’s, home and he and his brother went to the city of Fond du Lae, as the deceased expressed a wish to buy a horse, and they went there for that purpose, and it was at that time that the will was made. By the terms of the will all the property of the deceased, except one hundred dollars a year to the widow during her life, and one hundred dollars in cash to the only heir, the son, was devised to the children of Charles Ferdinand Gasch. He testified to no reason assigned by the deceased as to why the deceased was thus disinheriting his wife and child; nor does he testify to any consultation between himself and the deceased as to the intentions of the deceased to make the will prior to the date of its execution; nor does he testify as to whether the deceased bought a horse at that time.
One Bigelow, a neighbor of the deceased, who was present at his last sickness, testified that the deceased expressed a desire to make a will stating that he had none.
In all of the papers introduced in evidence on the trial
Enking, in his cross-examination, admitted that he was not well acquainted with the deceased; that he had seen him only once or twice prior to the time of the execution of the paper claimed to be his will.
The foregoing is not all the evidence introduced by the parties, but it may fairly be said to be the substance of it; and now we are asked to say that this evidence does not support the finding of the jury. Had we been the jury we •might have reached a different conclusion, but how can we say that the conclusion reached by the jury under this evidence is the wrong one? Or, rather, how can we say that ■the jury’s conclusion is unsupported by sufficient competent evidence? We did not see nor hear the witnesses testify. We had no opportunity of observing their demeanor while upon the stand. So far as their evidence is concerned we have before us but the lifeless record in which the testimony of one witness, if consistent with itself, weighs just as much as the testimony of another. Except the signature in writing attached to the paper alleged to be the will of the deceased, and which is in German characters, we have never seen any signature or handwriting of the ■deceased. The jury had before it numerous papers on which the handwriting and signature of the deceased appeared, and which handwriting and signature were indisputably genuine. The jury had an opportunity to compare the admittedly genuine handwriting of the deceased with that alleged to be his on'the paper alleged to be his will. We have not even that opportunity. The original papers bearing the genuine handwriting and signature of the deceased introduced in evidence on the trial have not been brought
Twelve jurors, wholly disinterested in the results of this-case, have said on their oaths that the signature to the páper in controversy was not the signature of Carl Julius Gasch, who died in Adams county in 1888, and that he was-not present in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, on the 15th of June, 1875. This court is not invested with authority by the constitution or laws of this state to set aside this finding, if it has for its support competent evidence, even though we might be of opinion that had we been the triers of the case we would have reached a different conclusion. To-have disputed questions of fact put at issue in actions at law tried and determined by a jury is one of the rights guarantied by the constitution of the state to its citizens. But another thought occurs in this connection. This trial was presided over by a learned judge who had had sixteen years of experience as a judge. During that time there had probably been tried before him a thousand jury cases. He' heard this testimony; he saw these witnesses testify; he observed their demeanor upon the stand; and he has, by overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error for a new trial, stamped upon this finding the seal of his approval. The verdict of the jury, then, fortified as it is by the evi
-Affirmed,