Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Stringham
239 U.S. 44
SCOTUS
1915
Check Treatment
Mr. Justice Van Devanter

delivered the opinion of the court.

This wаs a suit to quiet the title to a strip of land claimed and used by the plaintiff as a rаilroad right of way under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, and to which the defendants asserted title under a patent for a placer mining claim. At the trial the faсts were specially found and judgment for the defendants was entered upon the findings. In reviewing that judgment the Supreme *46 Court of the State, accepting the findings below, held that the plaintiff in virtue of proceedings had in the Land Department under thе Right-of-Way Act while the land was yet public acquired a right of way two hundred feet wide through the lands afterwards embraced in the mining claim and that the defendants’ ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍title undеr the placer patent was subject to this right of way, and thereupon reversed the judgment and remanded the case with a direction to “enter a judgment аwarding to the plaintiff title to a right of way over the lands in .question one hundred feet wide on each side of the center of the track.” 38 Utah, 113. Acting upon this directiоn the trial court vacated its prior judgment and entered another adjudging the рlaintiff to be “the owner of a right of way” through the mining claim one hundred feet wide on each side of the centér line of the railroad, declaring the plaintiff’s titlе to such right of way good and valid, and enjoining the defendants from asserting any clаim whatever to the premises, or any part'thereof, adverse to the plaintiff’s “said right of way.” The plaintiff again appealed insisting that it was only adjudged tо be the owner of a right of way when according to the true effect of the Right-of-Way Act' it had a title in fee simple, as was asserted in its complaint. But the judgment was affirmed, the court saying (39 Utah, 236):

“If counsel for appellant thought that this court, in the prior opinion, did not correctly define and determine the extent of аppellant’s rights to the land in dispute, or did not fully safeguard its rights as defined and adjudged, they should have filed a petition for a rehearing. This they did ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍not do. The conclusions of law and judgment having been drawn and entered in conformity with the decision of this сourt, we are precluded from further considering the. case. The former dеcision became, and is the law of the case, and this court, as well as thе litigants, are bound thereby.”

*47 Being in doubt which of the judgments of the appellate сoürt should be brought here for review to present properly the question rеspecting the nature of its title, the plaintiff concluded to bring up both, eaсh by a separate writ of error.

Manifestly the first judgment was final within the meaning of Jud. Codе, § 237. It disposed of the whole case on the ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍merits, directed what judgment should be еntered and left nothing, to the judicial discretion of the trial court. Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3; Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U. S. 127; Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238. And as the questiоn sought to be presented arises upon the first judgment — it being final in the sense of § 237 — it is aрparent that the writ of error addressed to the second judgment presents nоthing reviewable here. See Northern Pacific R. R. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458; Great West. Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 214.

What the act relied upon grants to a railrоad company complying with its requirements is spoken of throughout the act аs a “right of way,” and by way of qualifying future disposals ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍of lands to which such a right has attaсhed, the act declares that “all such lands over which such right of way shall pаss shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.”.

The right of way granted by this and similar acts is neither a mere easement, nor a fee simple absolute, but a limited fеe, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the cоmpany ceases to use or retain the land for the purposes for whiсh it is granted, and carries with it the incidents and remedies usually attending the fee. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U. S. 171, 183; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 271; United States v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379, 398; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 195 U. S. 540, *48 570. The judgmеnt under review does not in words so characterize the plaintiff’s right nor was it essеntial that it should do so. It describes the right in the exact terms of the Right-of-Way Act and evidently ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍uses those terms with the same meaning they have in the act. So interpreting thе judgment, as plainly must be done, we think it accords to the plaintiff all to which it is entitled under the act.

In No. 4 Judgment affirmed.

In No. 5 Writ of error dismissed.