Rintoul v. TolbertRintoul v. Tolbert
Katherine R. Rintoul and William R. Garner appeal the grant of partial summary judgment against them. They argue the superior court erred in (1) considering the untimely motion; (2) granting the motion on the basis of res judicata as to Garner’s claim of constructive discharge under Georgia’s Whistleblower Act; and (3) granting certain defendants governmental immunity. We reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to Garner’s claim of constructive discharge under Georgia’s Whistleblower Act because the superior court improperly found the claim barred by res judicata. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remaining grounds because the superior court has discretion to consider the motion and because there is no remedy against individual defendants in their personal capacity under the Whistleblower Act.
Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met. In our de novo review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Cowart v. Widener,
Viewed in this light, the evidence
Rintoul and Garner allege that their reporting of these alleged misdeeds to the mayor led to a series of retaliatory actions, including the termination of Rintoul and the “constructive discharge” of Garner.
A consolidated action was filed in federal court against the city, the mayor, Russell, and several city council members by Rintoul and Garner, claiming retaliation in violation of their First and F ourteenth Amendments rights, conspiracy to deprive them of those same rights in violation of 42 USC § 1985, and violation of Georgia’s Whistle-blower Act, OCGA §45-1-4. The federal court granted summary judgment on the federal claims and dismissed the Georgia Whistle-blower Act claim without prejudice.
Rintoul and Garner then filed suit against Russell, the mayor, several city council members, and two police officers (collectively, the “defendants”) in the superior court of Jackson County, alleging a number of disturbing allegations, including that Rintoul’s termination and Garner’s “constructive discharge” resulted from their whistle-blowing activity, as well as claims for RICO violations, tampering with evidence, threatening and influencing witnesses, theft by conversion, theft of services, criminal conspiracy, bribery, extortion, false statements, libel and slander. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the federal judge’s finding that Garner’s work environment and conditions of employment did not “present the type of unbearable circumstances that the Eleventh Circuit has previously found necessary to sustain a constructive discharge claim” rendered their whistleblower claim res judicata. The superior court granted the defendants’ motion on
1. Rintoul and Garner argue that the superior court erred in considering the defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed after the deadline for such motions set in the court’s pretrial order. The superior court’s pretrial order provided that all motions (except motions in limine or to strike all or part of a deposition) were to be filed by August 15, 2013. The order further provided that it could “not be amended except by consent ofthe parties and the Court or by Order of the Court to prevent manifest injustice.” Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment nearly two years after this deadline without consent of Rintoul or Garner or a court order. But the trial court has discretion to extend the deadline for filing and hearing motions for summary judgment. Blakey v. Victory Equip. Sales,
2. Rintoul and Garner argue that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment as to Garner’s claims of constructive discharge and retaliation under OCGA § 45-1-4 on the basis of res judicata. In Georgia, OCGA § 9-12-40 represents a codification ofthe common-law doctrine of res judicata, and provides that
[a] judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.
The purpose of this doctrine “is to prevent the re-litigation of claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action.” Sampson v. Ga. Dept. of Juvenile Justice,
Here, despite the superior court’s determination to the contrary, the causes of action in the federal and state cases are not identical. In the superior court action, Garner’s claim was for retaliation, unjust termination, and constructive discharge in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act. But the corresponding claim in the federal action was dismissed without prejudice when the federal court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. However, the trial court found that res judicata barred Garner’s
Strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply because there is not an identity of causes of action in both the federal and superior court cases. For the purposes of res judicata, “[t]he fact that the subject matter of different lawsuits may be linked factually does not mean that they are the same ‘cause’ within the meaning of OCGA § 9-12-40. For that doctrine to act as a bar, the cause of action in each suit must be identical.” Morrison v. Morrison ,
[B]ut the rule with reference to the doctrine of estoppel by judgment^ or collateral estoppel,] is somewhat different, in that there can be an estoppel by judgment whenever there has been litigation between the same parties, even though based upon a different cause of action, as to such matters only as were necessarily or actually adjudicated in the former litigation.
House v. Benton,
3. Rintoul and Garner next argue that the superior court erred in granting the individual officials governmental immunity We disagree.
Rintoul and Garner alleged in their complaint that the mayor, Russell, and the council member defendants are individually and personally liable for their actions that violated the Georgia Whistle-blower Act based on the language set forth in OCGA § 36-33-4. However, the superior court held that the remedies provided under OCGA § 36-33-4 could not be “judicially grafted” onto the Whistle-blower Act, which does not mention that Code section nor provide for individual liability Indeed, because Rintoul and Garner have no remedy against the individual defendants in their personal capacities,
Notes
Rintoul and Gamer failed to cite to the record in their recitation of facts. Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (i) requires each enumeration of error to be supported “by specific reference to the record or transcript. In the absence of a specific reference, the Court will not search for and may not consider that enumeration.”
Garner alleges he was suspended without pay, placed on probation, demoted, had privileges revoked, and was barred from communicating with other police officers.
Jones v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga.,
In light of this disposition, we need not and expressly do not address the additional grounds on which the superior court granted summary judgment, nor Rintoul and Garner’s corresponding arguments regarding malice and the ministerial or discretionary nature of the individual defendants’ duties.