205 Mass. 115 | Mass. | 1910
The plaintiff brings this action to recover from the defendant money received by it, according to the first count, for the plaintiff’s use, and, according to the second count for the same cause of action, for breach of contract to convey to one Sinkonen, in Finland, pursuant to a receipt a copy of which is annexed to the declaration, money delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant for that purpose. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the case is here on exceptions by the defendant to a refusal of the presiding judge
It was not contended at the trial that Blomquist was expressly authorized by the defendant to receive money from the plaintiff and forward it to Finland, as he undertook to do; and the court instructed the jury in so many words that they were to “ start in this case with the proposition that there was no express authority from the Cunard Company to Blomquist to take the plaintiff’s money and send it to Finland.” No question of express agency is therefore before us. So far as any instructions were requested by the defendant in relation to that matter the ruling of the judge was in its favor and no exception lies thereto.
As we have said, the principal question relates to the matter of Blomquist’s apparent authority as distinguished from his actual or express authority. The question whether one is acting within the apparent scope of his authority as agent for another is usually one of fact, the answer to which depends on the inference to be drawn from a variety of circumstances relating to the conduct of the apparent agent, and the knowledge or means of knowledge of the alleged principal of what is claimed to have been done in his behalf. If the circumstances are such by reason of the acquiescence or negligence of the alleged principal, or by reason of the nature of the duties entrusted to the supposed agent, and the situation in which the alleged principal has put him, as to warrant third parties in the exercise of a reasonable prudence and discretion in dealing with him as having authority to represent the alleged principal in regard to the transaction in question, then such principal will be bound; otherwise not.
The plaintiff was a Finn who had been in this country about ten years. He could neither read, write nor speak English. He had known Blomquist, who also was a Finn, about four years, “ having first met him at the defendant’s office, when he went
In regard to Blomquist’s apparent authority there was evidence tending to show that on a previous occasion another person had gone to the defendant’s third cabin department and had been turned over by some one who either was or represented himself to be Mr. Martin, the defendant’s agent, to Blomquist to transact her business with, and that she had given Blomquist $20 and had purchased two and a half tickets from Finland to America, to be sent to her brother in Finland, and that the brother had received the money and the tickets. There was also evidence that Blomquist’s letters forwarding the tickets and money were copied into the letter books in the office. All of this evidence was excepted to, but was admissible as bearing directly on Blomquist’s authority and the defendant’s knowledge of what Blomquist had done. There was likewise evidence of an advertisement in Finnish inserted by the defendant in a Fitchburg paper in which Blomquist was referred to in connection with the passenger business from Finland as “ manager of the Finnish department.” This also was excepted to but was plainly admissible. The manager of the department in which Blomquist was employed testified, in substance, on cross-examination by the plaintiff, that they sometimes sent tickets to Finland for Finnish customers, and that if a Finnish customer came in, the business, whether relating to the sale of tickets or drafts, ordinarily would be turned over to the company’s Finnish representative and he himself would not appear in it at all. There was other evidence which it was contended by the plaintiff tended still further to show that Blomquist had apparent authority to do what he did.
Evidence of a contradictory nature was introduced by the defendant. But we do not think it necessary to go into the evidence more in detail. The question is not as to the weight of the evi
Some of the evidence which was admitted subject to the defendant’s exception has already been referred to. We see no error in regard to other evidence which was similarly admitted. It was all pertinent and competent either, as in the cáse of the receipt, as part of the history of the transaction, or, as in the case of Blomquist’s card,
Exceptions overruled.
The case was tried before Bishop, J. After his death the exceptions were allowed by Pierce, J.
The portion of the bill of exceptions relating to the admission of this card in evidence was as follows : “ The plaintiff offered in evidence a card given him by Blomquist at the defendant’s office, which reads ‘ Carl Blomquist,’ and Finnish words which the interpreter translated as ‘ Taking in Finnish cases and looking after Finnish business. Cunard Steamship Co., State Street, Boston.’ This was admitted at the end of all the evidence subject to the defendant’s exception.”