63 Cal. App. 2d 88 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1944
In this action for damages for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of defendant in firing a shotgun while plaintiff and defendant were quail hunting, plaintiff obtained judgment, in a trial without a jury, for $19,000 general damages for the loss of an eye and for minor injuries to other parts of his body, and $948.40 special damages. Defendant appeals from the judgment and asserts that (1) the amount of general damages was excessive; (2) the findings as to general damages were unsupported by the evidence; and (3) the court erred in restricting the cross-examination of plaintiff.
The evidence, in the view most favorable to plaintiff, shows: Plaintiff and defendant had been friends about three and one-half years, and had gone hunting together about fifteen times. On November 30, 1941, they went quail hunting on a ranch of defendant’s friend near Lancaster. The hunting place in the vicinity of the accident was covered with sagebrush ranging from knee high to waist high, and the ground was generally flat except for a dry wash or “little depression,” which varied in width from 50 to 300 feet, had gradually sloping sides from the level of the surrounding land to a depth of about two feet, and extended northerly across the ranch. Before they started to hunt, plaintiff and defendant agreed that, while hunting, they would stay in sight of each other, would walk 125 to 175 feet apart in the same direction
The trial court found defendant was negligent, and plaintiff was not contributively negligent. Defendant does not contend on this appeal that those findings were not supported by the evidence. Defendant does not make an issue as to the item of special damages.
As to defendant’s first contention, that the amount of the general damages was excessive, the evidence shows: Plaintiff entered the hospital on November 30, 1941, the date of the injury, and at that time his eyeball was collapsed, and he “had a feeling of a red hot poker” in his eye. The next morning, December 1st, additional X-rays were taken, and he was removed to the operating room where a small part of the iris was removed from his injured eye, an incision
The evidence shows further: Plaintiff was 40 years of age at the time of the accident. He had been employed by the Ford Motor Company at Long Beach since 1939. He worked forty hours a week only, and his salary was $215 a month
The matter of the amount of damages was for the determination of the trial court, upon the evidence, in the exercise of its sound discretion. An appellate court will not disturb a judgment insofar as the amount of damages is concerned unless the amount is so grossly excessive as immediately to suggest passion or prejudice. (Loper v. Morrison (1944), 23 Cal.2d 600, 610 [145 P.2d 1] .) There are several reported cases in which similar amounts have been held to be proper awards for the loss of an eye. Among such cases are: Katz v. Helbing (1932), 215 Cal. 449 [10 P.2d 1001]—$30,000; Conner v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 613 [47 P.2d 774, 48 P.2d 982]— $20,597.93; and Szasz v. Joyland Co. (1927), 84 Cal.App. 259 [257 P. 871]—$20,000. The evidence was sufficient to justify the amount awarded.
The next contention of appellant, that the findings as to damages were unsupported by the evidence, is based upon two general findings made by reference to the complaint that the allegations of two paragraphs of the complaint were true. Those general findings, as shown by the references, were: (1) that plaintiff “has suffered a fifty per cent disability and that his future earning power will be proportionately reduced to his damage in the sum of $20,000.00”; and (2) that plaintiff has suffered excruciating pain, sustained
The last contention of appellant is that the court erred in restricting the cross-examination of plaintiff. That contention is based upon a ruling of the court sustaining plaintiff’s objection to a question by defendant which, in substance, was whether plaintiff had told various persons that the accident was unavoidable. Before that objection was sustained, the same question was asked in varying language several times, and was answered. On cross-examination defendant asked plaintiff whether he had told the investigating officers that it was an accident and nobody was to blame. Plaintiff answered, “I recall telling them it was an accident, yes, but I don’t recall the other part of it.” Defendant also asked plaintiff whether he had told other persons that “this incident was just an accident and that no person was to blame.” Plaintiff answered, “I told people it was an accident.” Thereupon the court said, “The question is, Did you tell other people that it was just an
The judgment is affirmed.
Desmond, P. J., and Shinn, J., concurred.