87 N.Y.S. 682 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1904
I am of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of the learned County Court that the defendant received $1,500 of the plaintiff for investment on bond and mortgage. The defendant is incorporated under the name of ‘‘ Long Island Real Estate Exchange and Investment Company,” for the purpose of taking, holding and possessing real estate and buildings, and selling, leasing and improving the same. It bought farms, divided them into building lots, took back purchase-money mortgages, assigned such mortgages and exchanged properties. It maintained an office in the borough of Brooklyn. On one window thereof was displayed the sign “ Long Island Real Estate Exchange -and Investment Company, Ignatz Martin, President; Sydney H. Carr, Secretary,” and on the other : “ Property Sold and Exchanged.” The visitor passed through a railing to find the desk of Secretary Carr on the right and of President Martin on the left. Near Carr’s desk stood a safe marked with the name of the corporation. The secretary and treasurer and a former vice-president of the company testifies that Carr, in the discharge of his office, was at his desk almost every day for almost all of the day; that Carr had charge of the books and made the entries therein, drew up bonds, mortgages, deeds, contracts, assignments and all papers on behalf of the corporation, and received and collected all moneys which came into the office. The treasurer had no desk in the officehe came there only occasionally, as the board meetings required his attendance, and his duties were practically assumed by Carr, who deposited the . moneys in the bank, and who had charge of the bank account. There were seven directors who theoretically held weekly meetings, but who practically held them only when
I think that it cannot be heard to deny the receipt of the $1,500. The defendant held itself out as a real estate investment company, and permitted its business to be entirely managed and controlled by Carr. At least; so. far as its business was subject to any daily inspection or supervision, it was only to that of Martin. And the plaintiff says that in all matters so far as Martin concerned himself, he approved and ratified all that Carr did in receiving the money and in investing it. I do not mean to say that Martin was party to Carr’s thefts or forgeries. Far from it, for there is not the slightest proof of this, but'that does not alter the effect of his conduct so far as this plaintiff is concerned. • Martin may have supposed, and I give him the credit that he did suppose, that Carr would invest the money or had invested it. But in any event, the evidence is clear that the other officers of the defendant were lax to the last degree, and that ■the only officer who appears to have participated in the business was blind or was hoodwinked. Here, then, is a real estate and investment company which permitted its routine affairs to be wholly managed by one man, and who invited investors in real estate. When the plaintiff entered.the office to make an investment, to whom else could she apply ? She had the assurance of the secretary, whose acts were affirmed by the president. The company held itself out as an investment company. The plaintiff was told by the secretary and by the president that it would accept her money for investment, and it was thereupon paid to an'd accepted by them. In one instance it was deposited in the safe of the defendant in the presence of the plaintiff.
There can be little doubt, to say the least, that Carr, as secretary, was clothed by the defendant with the apparent authority to receive
The able and learned counsel for the appellant, in his printed points, frankly admits that there might be ordinarily some force in the suggestion that innocent third parties might have been misled, but asserts that there is none in this case, because it appeared that the plaintiff had employed Carr as a lawyer, and that he had carried on considerable law business for her. The plaintiff testifies that she
The defendant having received the money cannot be heard to plead as against the plaintiff that such investment as the payment to it contemplated was ultra vires. (Pratt v. Short, 79 N. Y. 437; Rome Savings Bank v. Krug, 102 id. 331.) Nor should the plea that as the plaintiff was told that the property belonged to Bender, and that as she. accepted the bond and mortgage directly, thereby she acquiesced therein and discharged the company, prevail, on the theory that she ratified such act and discharged the company in favor of Bender. Eor having accepted the money, the defendant
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment of the County Court of Kings county affirmed, with costs.