311 Mass. 679 | Mass. | 1942
These are four petitions in equity brought by ten or more taxable inhabitants of the respondent city under the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St. 1939, c. 294. Demurrers to three of the petitions were overruled by interlocutory decrees, and it was agreed that trial on the merits might proceed without any action on the demurrer in the other case, its final disposition to depend upon the final disposition of the other demurrers. The respondent, however, waived its appeals from these interlocutory decrees in this court.
The several petitions relate to the alleged failure of the respondent in the years 1938 to 1941, inclusive, to provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools, as required by said c. 71. They were heard by a judge of the Superior Court, who filed a memorandum of findings and rulings, applicable to all cases, and a final decree, favorable to the petitioners, was entered in each
Statute 1939, c. 294, approved on June 15,1939, provides as follows: “Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools as required by this chapter. Upon petition to the superior court, sitting in equity, against a city or town, brought by ten "or more taxable inhabitants thereof, or by the mayor of a city, or by the attorney general, alleging that the amount necessary in such city or town for the support of public schools as aforesaid has not been included in the annual budget appropriations for said year, said court may determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, and may order such city and all its officers whose action is necessary to carry out such order, or such town and its treasurer, selectmen and assessors, to provide a sum of money equal to such deficiency, together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent thereof. When such an order is made prior to the fixing of the annual tax rate the foregoing sums shall be required by such order to be provided by taxation in the manner set forth in section twenty-three of chapter fifty-nine; and when such an order is made after the annual tax rate has been fixed according to law such sums shall be required by such order to be provided by borrowing in the same manner and for the same period of time as is provided under clause (11) of section seven of chapter forty-four in the case of final judgments, subject to all other applicable provisions of chapter forty-four, except that, in the case of a town, such borrowing shall be made by the town treasurer, with the approval of a majority of the selectmen, and no vote of the town shall be required therefor. Said court may order that the sum equal to the deficiency
The first two petitions relate to alleged deficiencies in appropriations for the years 1938 and 1939, and the question arises whether this statute, which was not approved until June 15, 1939, is applicable to those petitions. The general rule of interpretation that all statutes are prospective in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retrospective appears by necessary implication, is well recognized, and it is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and evidence, that is, those relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and as applying to pending actions or causes of actions. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. 220 Mass. 1, 3, and cases cited. Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Corp., ante, 183, 190. Said § 34, prior to the enactment of St. 1939, c. 294, not only created the duty on the part of municipalities, but also provided the remedy for the breach of that duty. School Committee of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 357. Said § 34, as now appearing, imposes no new duty upon municipalities, although it is true that the language of its first sentence is not quite the same as it was before amendment. For example, the word “sufficient” is substituted for the word “necessary," but it seems apparent from the use of the word “necessary" in the next sentence that there was no intention of enlarging or modifying the duty that is imposed upon every city and town. The remedy, however, is changed, and apparently to the material advantage -of any municipality that violates the duty that is created. The present section discloses a legislative intent to make the remedy more practical and efficient. Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 277. The principle that statutes affecting the remedy only are liberally interpreted in order to effectuate their purpose is applicable to one providing
One question that arises is whether G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St. 1939, c. 294, seeks to impose other than judicial functions upon the Superior Court. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature intended any such thing. Selectmen of Milton v. Justice of the District Court of East Norfolk, 286 Mass. 1, 6. See Driscoll v. Mayor of Somerville, 213 Mass. 493, 494. Said § 34 relates in the first instance to the support of the public schools, “as required by this chapter.” Said c. 71, as more fully appears hereinafter, contains provisions relative to what a municipality must do by way of supporting the public schools, and we are of opinion that the question, whether, in a given case, the support that has been furnished is that required by this chapter, presents a judicial question. See O’Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 37. It does not purport to transfer to the judiciary any question of expediency as to appropriations or to require the court to enter into any consideration of municipal policy of financial administration of a city or town. The court, however, is required to determine whether the requirements of said c. 71 have been met. Judicial questions presented require consideration by this court. Selectmen of Milton v. Justice of the District Court of East Norfolk, 286 Mass. 1, 6. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 615. Whalen v. First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 295 Mass. 305, 308, and cases cited.
The respondent’s charter, St. 1897, c. 172, § 28, vests the management and control of the public schools in the school committee. No question is raised as to the status of the petitioners or as to the functioning of the duly elected school committee during the several years in question. The judge found that the committees in each year, seasonably within the law, submitted estimates of the “expenditures” voted by it as necessary for the support of public schools, “as required by Gen. Laws, Ch. 71.” These estimates contained amounts necessary to pay the teachers and the superintendent of schools, based upon contracts
The difference between the estimates submitted by the school committee and the amount of appropriation in each year is the amount that the judge found to be the deficiency necessary for the support of the respondent’s public schools as required by said c. 71, and the cause given for the deficiency is the failure on the part of the respondent to provide sums sufficient to pay all of the salaries of persons under contract with the city at the commencement of the fiscal years in question and the sums necessary to pay the non-salary items estimated by the school committee at the commencement of each fiscal year. The tax- rates in each year were legally fixed before the petitions were brought. The school committee acted in good faith.
The final decree in each case establishes the amount of the deficiency and orders the respondent and all its officers whose action is necessary to carry out the decree, to provide for the borrowing of money to meet the deficiency, together
The several amounts of estimates, appropriations and the difference between these amounts were agreed upon. The estimates submitted by the school committee in each year consisted of two classifications of items, one for salaries and wages, and the other for non-salary items. In 1938, the budget provided a sum for salaries and wages and a separate sum for other expenses. But in the remaining three years the appropriation for schools was in a lump sum, with no separation into salary and non-salary items. The judge’s finding, however, that the cause of the deficiency was a failure on the part of the respondent to provide sums sufficient to pay salaries and the sums necessary to pay for non-salary items, based, as it could be, upon the status of the appropriation in the year when sums were allocated to salary and non-salary items, is sufficient to raise the question whether all the items are required under said c. 71. There was evidence, however, that the non-salary items had been paid out of the total appropriation for the given year, and that the deficiency was allowed to “remain entirely with the teachers’ salaries,” although there was other evidence that the school employees had not been paid in full.
The respondent contends that it is not enough for the petitioners merely to show that the appropriations made by it were not as large as the estimates of the school committee, and that if it appropriated sufficient money to fulfil the minimum requirements of said c. 71, it has complied with the law.
We are of opinion that said § 34 relates to support that is mandatory, as distinguished from that which is permissive. Cushing v. Newburyport, 10 Met. 508, 517-519. See Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 88, 89; School Committee of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 358.
The itemized estimate submitted by the school committee for the year 1938 is divided into several groups. It is to be
The judge found that the subjects taught were either those required specifically by said c. 71, or those that the school committee, by virtue of said chapter, voted as expedient to be taught. (See §§ 1 and 4.) Section 4 of said chapter provides for the maintenance of high schools by certain municipalities, of which the respondent was properly found to be one. This section also provides that in such schools instruction shall be given in such subjects as the school committee considers expedient. The mandate requiring that instruction shall be given in the high school in such subjects as the school committee considers expedient, by teachers employed for that purpose, is equally compelling with the mandate requiring the maintenance of that school.
Section 48 of said c. 71 provides that the school committee shall, at the expense of the town, purchase textbooks and other school supplies. This is a mandatory provision, and the finding was warranted that the estimates were proper and represented books and supplies that were necessary. We are of opinion that these items are required by said c. 71.
The next heading in the estimate in question that was submitted is entitled “Operation School Plant.” It is apparent that a considerable portion of this item refers to. the salaries of janitors and custodians of buildings. The respondent’s charter (St. 1897, c. 172, § 30) provides that the school committee shall elect a superintendent of schools, but not from among, its own members, who shall also be its
Section 68 of said c. 71, inserted by St. 1934, c. 97, provides, among other things, that every town shall provide and maintain a sufficient number of schoolhouses, properly furnished and conveniently situated for the accommodation of all children therein entitled to attend the public schools, and the school committee, unless the town, otherwise directs, shall have general charge and superintendence of the schoolhouses, shall keep them in good order, and shall, at the expense of the town, procure a suitable place for the schools if there is no schoolhouse and provide fuel and all other things necessary for the comfort of the pupils. It is elementary in the law of cities and towns that public officers have only such powers to bind municipalities by contract as are conferred by the express terms or necessary implications of statutes, Simpson v. Marlborough, 236 Mass. 210, 213, but it is a well established general rule that when a general power is given or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is given by implication. Attleboro Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 257 Mass. 43, 52. Fluet v. McCabe, 299 Mass. 173, 178. We think that the employment of janitors and custodians of school buildings is necessary to the effective exercise of the express duties imposed by said § 68. It seems almost impossible to think of the mandate requiring that schools shall be kept
Under the heading “Plant Maintenance” there are two items: “Repairs” (upkeep) and “Outlay” (seven additional typewriters). Said § 68 expressly provides that the school committee shall keep the schoolhouses in good order, and we are of opinion that the item for repairs is therein comprehended. Section 48 of said c. 71 provides that the school committee, at the expense of the town, shall purchase school supplies. Typewriting is one of the subjects that the committee found it expedient to teach under the provisions of § 4 of said c. 71. We are of opinion that the estimate for typewriters comes within the mandate of said § 48.
The next item is entitled “Transportation,” and includes bus tickets for fifty pupils. Said § 68, inserted by St. 1934, c. 97, in addition to the provisions already referred to, provides that, in certain circumstances, if a school committee declines to furnish transportation, the department of education may require the town to furnish it. General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, § 4, provides that a “town” may make contracts for the furnishing of transportation of school children and also that the contracts for such transportation may be made by the school committee in certain circumstances. As was pointed out in the case of Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway v. Mayor of Fall River, 308 Mass. 232, 237, when express authority to make
The next item of estimate is entitled “Health,” and includes salaries and supplies. Section 53 of said c. 71 provides that the school committee shall appoint one or more school physicians and nurses, shall assign them to the public schools within its jurisdiction, and shall provide them with all proper facilities for the performance of their duties. (See also §§ 54, 55 and 57 as to mandatory duties imposed upon the school physician and the school committee relative to examinations of children, teachers, janitors and school buildings.) The detailed items under the heading of supplies, for which $50 was asked, consist of bandages, tape, antiseptics, and other materials that seem to be peculiarly adapted to emergency treatment. We are of opinion that the items under this general heading of “Health” are required by said c. 71.
The next item of estimates is entitled “Library,” and includes items for salaries and supplies and books. It appears that the school committee deemed it expedient to teach “library science” in the high school (see § 4 of said c. 71) and, by the provisions of said § 4, the city was required to give instruction in this subject. We are of opinion that the salary item under this heading comes within the purview of said § 34 and that the item of $25
The next item of estimate is entitled “Miscellaneous,” and comprises diplomas, diploma ribbon and graduation speaker. We are of opinion that the item for diplomas and ribbon comes within the scope of said § 48 relative to the purchase of supplies, and that the item for the graduation speaker comes within the broad provisions of § 37 relative to the duties of the school committee. See Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 362.
The remaining item of estimate is entitled “Administration,” and consists of salaries and supplies. In an exhibit in the case, the salaries of the superintendent of schools, the attendance officer and two clerks are listed, and these appear to be the salaries comprehended under the heading of “Administration.” The agreed facts also refer to the superintendent, supervisor of attendance and “clerks in the offices of the School Department.” We think it may be assumed that these clerks were employed during the four years in question, and there seems to be no question but that the superintendent was in office during those years. “It is plain from the provisions of G. L. c. 71, § 59, that the power of the school committee over the salary of the superintendent of schools is the same as over salaries of teachers.” Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 89. O’Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 37. By the provisions of said § 59, a superintendent employed under that section, “shall” be the executive officer of the committee, and, under its general direction, shall have the care and supervision of the schools and shall assist in keeping its records and accounts and in making such reports as are required by law. The question whether clerks in the office of the school department and school nurses stand upon the same footing as school teachers was not considered in the case of Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 89. A related question as to the fixing of the salaries of janitors in excess of available appropriations, “if that should turn out to be the cause of the ‘deficiency’ here claimed,” was referred to in O’Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 37. In Callahan v.
Towns must provide the money necessary for the support of public schools, as required by § 34 of said c. 71. Here it may be observed that the amount of money that must be raised obviously depends upon the size of the municipality and the number of school children. But whatever that size and number may be, the municipality is obligated to provide the necessary money, and if it neglects to do so, it is now subject to a proceeding which still has the aspects of a penalty attached. The Legis
One item remains for consideration. Under the heading “Administration,” there is an item for the salary of an attendance officer. No provision for the appointment of such an officer appears in said c. 71, but by the provisions of c. 77, § 12, every school committee shall appoint and fix the compensation of one or more supervisors of attendance and shall make regulations for their government. The duties of such officers are defined in § 13 of said c. 77. In general, they relate to school children, their conduct and their situation. It seems apparent that an attendance officer is an important adjunct to the public school system. See Huse v. Lowell, 10 Allen, 149. The. first law relative to them appears to have been enacted in 1873.
In Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, it was held that G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 44, § 31 (the municipal finance act), which provides, so far as material, that no department of any city or town, except Boston, shall incur liability in excess of the appropriation made for the use of such department, did not affect the duty resting upon the school committees to make contracts with the teachers and superintendents of schools. (Page 273.) In that case it was also held that teachers, superintendents and employees of the school department could not maintain an action of contract against the municipality because of the provisions of § 34 of said c. 71, as it then appeared, and that the only way that this court could see to make the two statutes there
The estimates for the years other than 1938 are substantially the same, although the amounts differ to some extent. What has been said applies equally to the situation disclosed in these three other years, and the result is that the amount of the deficiency in each year, as found by the judge, must be changed to some extent.
Section 34 of said c. 71, by its terms, contemplates that the existence of any deficiency does not depend upon expenditures having been made. This is apparent from the language of said section as appearing in St. 1939, c. 294, where it is provided that if a municipality is ordered to provide a sum of money equal to a deficiency prior to the fixing of the annual tax rate, the sums shall be required by such order to be provided by taxation in the manner set forth in § 23 of c. 59, and when such an order is made after the annual tax rate has been fixed according to law, such sums shall be required by such order to be provided by borij^wing in the manner provided by said c. 44.
'it is apparent that the Legislature intended to entrust the care and operation of the public schools in this Commonwealth to the school committees.' See Batchelder v. Salem, 4 Cush. 599; Charlestown v. Gardner, 98 Mass. 587, 589, 590; McKenna v. Kimball, 145 Mass. 555; Whittaker v. Salem, 216 Mass. 483; Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 328-330; Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 105-106; Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 362. This intent is gathered from an examination of statutes covering a period from the very beginning of the Commonwealth down to the present time.
It follows from what has been said that it was error to include in the amounts of the deficiencies the several items for transportation and also that the elimination of these items requires a new computation of the twenty-five per cent of the several deficiencies.
The final decrees, modified in accordance with this opinion, are affirmed.
Ordered accordingly.