PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Roger Rinaldi (“Mr. Rinaldi”) and Desa Rinaldi (with Mr. Rinaldi, the “Debtors”) filed this adversary proceeding contending that certain mortgage lenders and their lawyers engaged in a “criminogenic scheme” to defraud investors in a securi-tized trust and seize the Debtors’ residence. (Complaint, ¶ 77). The defendants moved to dismiss the Debtors’ complaint and amended complaint, and the parties filed briefs. After considering the arguments presented, the motions to dismiss are granted. This Memorandum Decision constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court lacks authority to enter a final order on some of the claims, and, accordingly, this decision constitutes proposed findings and conclusions for consideration by the district court on those claims.
I. THE LOAN TRANSACTION AND STATE COURT LITIGATION
Mr. Rinaldi signed an Adjustable Rate Note dated June 10, 2005 (the “Note”) in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Id., Exhibit A). Mr. Rinaldi acknowledged that Wells Fargo could transfer the Note, and he agreed to pay the Note Holder. (Id.). To secure the Note, the Debtors executed a mortgage dated June 10, 2005 (the “Mortgage”), on their residence located in Bristol, Wisconsin (the “property”). (Id., Exhibit B). The mortgagee is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The copy of the Note filed in the bankruptcy case is stamped with an undated endorsement signed by Joan M. Mills, as Vice President of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.: ‘Without Recourse Pay to the Order of (blank).” (Id., Exhibit G).
The Debtors defaulted on the Note, and on February 3, 2009, HSBC Bank USA, National Association (“HSBC”), as Trustee for Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-2, started an action against the Debtors in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County to foreclose the property. (Affidavit of Stephanie L. Dykeman in support of HSBC’s motion to dismiss, Docket No. 41 (“Dykeman Aff.”), Exhibit J). In their answer to the foreclosure complaint, among other defenses, the Debtors disputed HSBC’s standing to enforce or collect on the Note, “unless it can be proved that the proper assignments and allonges are present with the original note....” (Id., Exhibit E, ¶ 1). The Debtors also claimed that there were irregularities in the initiation of the Mortgage transaction, including alteration of the Debtors’ loan application. (Id., Exhibit E, ¶¶ 17-20). After considering the Debtors’ claims and defenses, the state court granted HSBC’s motion for summary judgment and entered a foreclosure judgment in HSBC’s favor on January 26, 2010. (Id., Exhibit B). The Debtors did not appeal the judgment of foreclosure. On November 12, 2010, the Debtors filed a motion to obtain relief from the foreclosure judgment, and on November 22, 2010, they filed a brief in support of their motion to vacate the judgment. (Id., Exhibit G).
Despite the contentious proceedings in the Kenosha County Circuit Court, HSBC and the Debtors negotiated and agreed upon a loan modification. As a result, on January 18, 2011, the state court granted HSBC’s petition for dismissal of the foreclosure action and vacated the foreclosure judgment. (Id., Exhibit G). The litigation honeymoon was short-lived. On June 10, 2011, the Debtors filed suit in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County against Wells Fargo Bank, HSBC and their lawyers, Gray & Associates, LLP. The Debtors’ claims mirrored the claims and counterclaims that the Circuit Court had dismissed in the foreclosure action. (Id., Exhibit H.)
II. BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
On October 14, 2011, the Debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in this Court. On March 21, 2012, on the Debtors’ motion, the Court converted the Debtors’ case to Chapter 13. On June 14, 2012, the Debtors filed an objection to HSBC’s proof of claim, and on June 17, 2012, the Debtors filed this adversary proceeding against HSBC, as Trustee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. d/b/a America’s Servicing Company, Litchfield Cavo, LLP, Brad A. Markvart (collectively the “Wells Defendants”), Gray & Associates, LLP, William N. Foshag, Duncan C. Delhey, Jay Pitner and Brian D. Perhach (collectively, the “Gray Defendants”).
On June 28, 2012, HSBC filed a motion for relief from stay, and on August 9, 2012, HSBC filed an objection to confirmation of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, which proposed to treat HSBC’s claim as unsecured. On July 12, 2012, the Debtors filed a motion to disqualify Gray & Associates, LLP and Litchfield Cavo, LLP and any of their attorneys from representing their clients in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Court denied the motion as to Litchfield Cavo, but reserved ruling on the motion as to Gray & Associates.
For purposes of scheduling and disposition, given the identity of the disputes, the' Court combined the proof of claim objection, HSBC’s motion for relief from stay and objection to confirmation, this adversary proceeding, and all related motions involving the Debtors, the Wells Defendants and the Gray Defendants. As a result, this Memorandum Decision will resolve all disputes among these parties pending in the bankruptcy court.
On August 1, 2012, the Gray Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On August 21, 2012, the Wells Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On August 23, 2012, the Debtors filed a motion to amend the complaint. The Court denied the motion as untimely as to the Gray Defendants, but granted it as to the Wells Defendants. After two unsuccessful motions for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to amend the complaint, the Debtors appealed. The Gray Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, but the district court has not issued a decision. No stay pending appeal has been sought, and Bankruptcy Rule 8005 permits this Court to proceed with the merits of this adversary proceeding.
On October 1, 2012, the Wells Defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Debtors responded to the motions to dismiss, and the defendants replied. The Debtors also filed motions to strike certain exhibits attached to the defendants’ briefs. The defendants replied to those motions. One
III. RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Initially, the Debtors ask the Court to determine the validity and enforceability of HSBC’s proof of claim. The Debtors’ objections to the claim include that the Note lacks consideration; two mortgage assignments are null and void; another mortgage assignment is a forgery or unenforceable because it was not recorded or perfected prior to bankruptcy; HSBC is not the owner or holder of the Note; and the Note image attached to the claim was fabricated to deceive the Court. Along with disallowance of the claim and the security represented by the Mortgage, the Debtors seek a determination that the proof of claim is false, fraudulent and unlawful. The Debtors ask the Court to determine that none of the Wells Defendants has standing or the status of real party in interest to maintain a claim for relief from stay.
The Debtors also accuse the Gray Defendants of common law fraud, abuse of legal process and violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The Debtors accuse the Wells Defendants of the same, and the amended complaint added a claim for damages for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Specifically against Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., the Debtors assert claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective economic opportunity.
IV. JURISDICTION
A. General Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases as well as proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code and arising in or related to bankruptcy cases resides in the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1384(b). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the district court may refer these cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for the district, and the District Court for Eastern District Wisconsin entered a standing order of reference dated July 10, 1984 to accomplish this referral. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), bankruptcy judges may hear, determine and enter final orders in all “core proceedings” arising in a bankruptcy case or arising under the Bankruptcy Code. If a matter is not a core proceeding, but is related to a bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge may hear the proceeding, but must submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for entry of the final order. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). A list of core proceedings is found in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). In Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -,
Allowance of proofs of claim falls within the core matters that the bankruptcy court may hear and determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Unlike the entry of a final order on a state law counterclaim, allowance of claims was not deemed unconstitutional in Stern,
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) the Court can hear and determine whether HSBC has standing to seek relief from the automatic stay, a creature of the Bankruptcy Code and fundamental pillar of bankruptcy law. Stern,
The remaining claims do not fall within the core authority of this Court to hear and determine. Although not couched as counterclaims to HSBC’s proof of claim, the Debtors’ common law fraud and federal FDCPA and RICO claims are analogous to the claims made in Stem. They are not claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code and could be brought (and in fact some were brought) outside the bankruptcy court.
The Debtors contend that all of their claims are core as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), but they fail to explain how. For example, the Debtors contend that the Gray Defendants filed a fraudulent mortgage assignment in the state court foreclosure case, and allege that this is a core proceeding because it involves the administration of the bankruptcy ease. But this claim does not stem from the bankruptcy itself nor will it necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process. See Burns v. Dennis (In re Southeastern Materials, Die.),
As noted above, bankruptcy judges can hear non-core proceedings that are “otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). In such instances, “any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.” Id. Notwithstanding this provision, the parties can consent to the bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter a final order in a non-core proceeding. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agen
When faced with a combination of core and non-core claims, “the better approach in a mixed core and non-core proceeding is for the bankruptcy court to determine the extent of its jurisdiction with respect to each claim. It should then enter a final judgment with respect to only those claims that are truly core matters and should forward a report and recommendation to the district court on the non-core but ‘related to’ claims.” Massey v. Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc.,
B. Jurisdictional Issues Created by Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” from inviting federal court review and rejection of such judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284,
The Rooker-Feldman analysis applies in bankruptcy court adversary proceedings. Knapper v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Knapper),
The Debtors’ claims in this adversary proceeding are virtually the same claims they advanced in the state court foreclosure action. To the extent the claims are not the same, they appear to be “inextricably intertwined” with those claims. However, after the state court rejected the Debtors’ claims and entered a judgment of foreclosure, the Debtors and HSBC entered into a loan modification agreement, and the foreclosure judgment was vacated.
The defendants argue that the judgment remains viable for preclusion purposes, citing Kowske v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co.,
[T]he order dismissing the action based on Kowske’s payment of the mortgage was a final judgment on the merits in the foreclosure action. Ameriquest’s actions to clear the title were based on Kowske’s acceptance of the rights Amer-iquest established in the foreclosure action. The order dismissing the judgment of foreclosure was not based on an error in the original judgment of foreclosure, but rather on the successful attainment of the judgment of foreclosure and the subsequent payment of the mortgage by Kowske. That trial court order ended litigation between the parties concerning the mortgage and foreclosure, and neither party appealed from that order.
Id. at ¶ 24.
This case is different. Rather than a payment and satisfaction of the mortgage, the Debtors and HSBC entered into a loan modification agreement, effectuating a settlement of the claims and counterclaims raised in the foreclosure ease. The foreclosure judgment was not vacated because the Debtors had paid and satisfied the mortgage, but rather because HSBC agreed to reinstate the mortgage debt and accept modified payment terms. The Debtors had moved for relief from the foreclosure judgment, and the appeal period on the denial of that motion had not expired when the parties entered into the loan modification agreement. The order dismissing the foreclosure action thus did not represent the “successful attainment of the judgment of foreclosure,” but rather a settlement under which that judgment was vacated. Although it is arguable that the foreclosure judgment that was later settled and vacated is a final judgment for claim preclusion purposes, this Court will assume that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under these unique circumstances.
Motions to dismiss bankruptcy adversary proceedings are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 7012, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Federal courts are familiar with Rule 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Brooks v. Ross,
Additionally, since the Debtors allege that the defendants committed fraud, Bankruptcy Rule 7009, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires the Debtors to “state with particularity the circumstances” constituting the fraud. And, in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A,
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Proof of Claim and Standing of the Wells Defendants to Seek Relief From Stay
The Debtors’ amended complaint seeks disallowance of HSBC’s proof of claim on various theories that can be crystallized as (1) the Note is invalid; and (2) various assignments of the Mortgage are invalid. Starting with the Note, some of the Debtors’ arguments border on frivolous, others have more substance, but, in the end, they all fail.
1. The Note is Valid and Enforceable by HSBC.
In the frivolous category, the Debtors contend that neither Wells Fargo nor HSBC loaned the Debtors any money, but rather that the Debtors’ mortgage transaction was part of an elaborate scheme to defraud investors in a securitized trust. Due to this duplicitous design, the Debtors conclude that the Note fails for lack of consideration. But Mr. Rinaldi executed the Note under seal, which is conclusive proof of consideration. See Edwards v. Petrone,
Claiming that the Note’s endorsement is either invalid or fraudulent, the Debtors also argue that HSBC is neither an owner nor holder of the Note. Similar defects in a promissory note were alleged in Edwards v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Edwards),
In Edwards, the debtor argued that the pre-payment provisions rendered the note non-negotiable, but the court rejected the argument. In the end, the court authorized the creditor, as a holder of the note, to enforce it, despite the debtor’s challenges to the creditor’s signature and endorsements. Apparently the promissory note in Edwards had a fixed interest rate, while the Note in this case has an adjustable interest rate. But Wis. Stat. § 403.112 provides that interest may be stated as a fixed or variable rate, and that determination of the interest rate may include reference to information not contained in the instrument. Accordingly, the adjustable interest rate does not prevent the Note from qualifying as a negotiable instrument. The other requirements of negotiability are met, and, like in Edwards, the Note is a negotiable instrument, entitled to all the benefits of that status under Wisconsin law.
The Debtors accuse the defendants of producing “the forged endorsement to the mortgage note robo-stamped bearing the signature of Joan M. Mills to mislead this court into believing that the note had been timely, properly and authentically endorsed in blank after the commencement of [the foreclosure action].” (Complaint, ¶ 91(b)(6)). First, Mr. Rinaldi executed the Note, and he does not dispute that his signature on the Note is genuine. Ms. Mills’ signature on the endorsement is deemed authentic and not subject to challenge by the Debtors. Edwards, at *6-7, 2011 Bankr.LEXIS 5065, at *21, citing Wis. Stat. § 403.308(1).
Second, the Debtors’ insinuation that Wells Fargo endorsed the Note after the foreclosure proceeding is irrelevant to the determination of the validity of the proof of claim. The copy of the Note attached to the proof of claim contains the endorsement in blank. There is no requirement that an endorsement be dated. Edwards, at *6-7, 2011 Bankr.LEXIS 5065, at *21-22, citing Wis. Stat. § 403.204(1). As the bearer of a note endorsed in blank, HSBC is a holder of the Note, and HSBC is entitled to enforce the Note against Mr. Rinaldi. See Wis. Stat. §§ 403.205; 403.301. The Debtors complain about the apparent lack of the endorsement in the state court foreclosure; but the state court was the forum to raise that argument. The issue in this adversary proceeding is the validity of the proof of claim. The Note attached to the claim is endorsed in blank and the Debtors lack standing to challenge the validity or timing of the endorsement. Therefore HSBC has standing to file the claim to enforce the Note.
Since Mr. Rinaldi executed the Note, a negotiable instrument under Wisconsin law, and the Note was endorsed in blank, HSBC, as bearer of the Note, is entitled to enforce it against Mr. Rinaldi. The Court rejects the Debtors’ arguments about the invalidity of the Note, and will not disallow, deem fraudulent or otherwise invalidate HSBC’s proof of claim based on those arguments.
2. The Mortgage Assignments do not Invalidate the Proof of Claim.
The Debtors also attack the mortgage based on faulty assignments and invalid and incomplete transfers to a securitized trust. Arguments based on questionable mortgage assignments also were considered and rejected in Edwards, based on the doctrine of “equitable assignment.” Under this common law doctrine, the holder of the Note is entitled to
This doctrine recognizes that “[t]he note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” Carpenter v. Longan [16 Wall. 271 ,83 U.S. 271 ], 274 [21 L.Ed. 313 ] (1873). The debt is the principal thing, to which the security instrument is an incident thereof. Cf Doyon & Rayne Lumber Co. v. Nichols,196 Wis. 387 , 390,220 N.W. 181 (1928); Mitchell Bank v. Schanke,2004 WI 13 ,268 Wis.2d 571 , 597,676 N.W.2d 849 , 858. Under this view, long established in Wisconsin law, the Mortgage is equitably assigned when the Note is endorsed and negotiated to its current holder.
Edwards, at *7, 2011 Bankr.LEXIS 5065, at *22-23.
Quoting Tidiowte Savings Bank v. Lib-bey,
Wells Fargo assigned the Mortgage to HSBC. Three assignment documents exist: September 14, 2005 (unrecorded); March 1, 2010 (recorded April 5, 2010); and October 31, 2011 (recorded November 1, 2011) (Complaint, Exhibits C, D, E). The Debtors vehemently protest the fact that no assignment was recorded until after the foreclosure proceeding commenced. First, the timing with respect to the foreclosure case is irrelevant to the validity of HSBC’s proof of claim in this bankruptcy case. The assignment was executed prior to the bankruptcy petition, and one of the assignments was recorded prior to the petition. The Debtors had the opportunity and indeed raised HSBC’s standing in the foreclosure action. If the state court had agreed with the Debtors on this issue, the result might have been different and the Debtors could have questioned the proof of claim. But the state court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of HSBC, and now HSBC has filed a proof of claim asserting its rights to a security interest in the property. HSBC is the holder of the Note, and is the named assignee of the Mortgage according to an attachment to the proof of claim. As holder of the Note, HSBC is entitled to enforce the Mortgage. The Court rejects the Debtors’ arguments that the claim is fraudulent or should be disallowed based on the assignments.
Moreover, defects in the transfer of the Note to the Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation Home Equity Asset-backed Certificates Series 2005-2 Trust (or any similarly named entity) (the “Trust”) do not render the Mortgage unenforceable, the Note invalid or the proof of claim fraudulent. It is well-settled that a borrower lacks standing to challenge the validity of a loan assignment based on issues related to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”), because a borrower is neither a party to the PSA nor a third party beneficiary. See, e.g., In re Sand-ford,
Whether due to HSBC’s status of holder of the Note, the doctrine of equitable merger, or the Debtors’ lack of standing to challenge the Mortgage due to alleged irregularities in the PSA, the Court concludes that the Mortgage is valid and en
3. HSBC has Standing to Seek Relief from Stay.
The threshold for standing to seek relief from stay is that the moving creditor has a “colorable claim” to property of the estate. Grella v. Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank,
The Debtors’ requests for relief in paragraph 2a, 2b, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h, 2i, 2j, and 2k of the amended complaint all seek disal-lowance of HSBC’s proof of claim under various theories, and damages and sanctions for perceived injuries arising from the allegedly false proof of claim. Paragraph 2c seeks a determination that none of the financial institution defendants have standing or status as a real party in interest to seek relief from stay. For the reasons stated, the Debtors’ requests for disallowance, determinations of fraud, damages and other relief related to the proof of claim are denied. The Court accepts the defendants’ arguments that the Debtors’ allegations related to the proof of claim and standing of HSBC to obtain relief from stay fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. The Court will enter a final order allowing HSBC’s claim and confirming HSBC’s standing to file a motion for relief from stay.
B. Violation of RICO
The amended complaint seeks damages against the Wells Defendants for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) act. (The Court did not allow the amendment of the complaint to raise these allegations against the Gray Defendants, but given the deficiencies in the Debtors’ RICO claims, in all likelihood those claims would not have survived the Gray Defendants’ motion to dismiss.) “RICO makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... In addition to an impact on interstate or foreign commerce, a civil RICO claim is required to set forth the four requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and the two requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Additionally, the statute of lim
The Debtors do not cite a single case in which a residential mortgage lender or its attorneys have been found to have violated RICO by engaging in the lending and enforcement actions that occurred here. On the other hand, the Wells Defendants point to several cases in which courts rejected RICO claims by homeowners facing foreclosure.
The Debtors’ first alleged racketeering enterprise is detailed in paragraph 65 of the amended complaint: “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. acted in concert with its alter-ego Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation and under the name of HSBC Bank USA, N.A. to defraud homeowners into signing documents which were the basis for obtaining financing from the sale of certificates of beneficial interest in the purported REMIC Trust under false pretenses to both the investors and the homeowners.” But Mr. Rinaldi signed the Note in 2005, and if the racketeering enterprise consisted of enticing him to sign a Note to defraud investors in the Trust, the statute of limitations has expired.
Even assuming that the claim is timely, there are other considerable flaws in the Debtors’ claim. The Debtors and the defendants were involved in only one loan transaction; a single transaction does not constitute a pattern and cannot constitute a violation of RICO. Tucker v. Bank One, N.A.,
The Debtors’ other RICO claims fail for similar reasons. These include that the defendant financial institutions and their attorneys conspired to create forged documents and transmit them through the mail and by wire for the purpose of seizing the Debtors’ home. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 94). The Debtors allege that “forged and fabricated documents” were filed by mail and wire in state and federal courts. (Id., ¶ 95). Even if the Debtors identified with particularity which defendants performed the particular acts of alleged forgery, the Court has previously addressed
In, paragraph 96 of their amended complaint, the Debtors attempt to detail the elements of their RICO claim. In paragraph 96(a)(1), the Debtors contend that the Note filed in the state court foreclosure was not endorsed. But the Debtors expressly challenged HSBC’s standing in the foreclosure case, and the state court rebuffed their challenge. After losing the standing argument in state court, it is beyond frivolous for the Debtors to file bankruptcy, reiterate the same losing arguments and now claim, not only that the Note is invalid, but that the foreclosing creditor and its attorneys are liable for RICO violations for filing the Note as an exhibit to the foreclosure complaint.
Paragraph 96(a)(2) alleges that the defendants violated RICO by filing a copy of the endorsed Note in the bankruptcy case after filing a copy without the endorsement in the state foreclosure case. In the context of this adversary proceeding, the argument is nonsensical. Under Wisconsin law, an endorsement can be undated. Since the dating of the endorsement is not required, it does not matter for purposes of this bankruptcy case when Wells Fargo endorsed the Note. And it apparently did not matter for purposes of the state court foreclosure, because that court entered a judgment against the Debtors, and refused to modify that judgment, even after the Debtors claimed that the Wells Defendants used fraudulent affidavits.
In paragraph 96(b), the Debtors allege that the Wells Defendants used forged and fabricated mortgage assignments “to make it appear that mortgage had been assigned to HSBC.” The Debtors’ claims are groundless. As the holder of the Note, HSBC could enforce the Mortgage. Moreover, all three assignments assign the Mortgage from Wells Fargo to HSBC. There is nothing fabricated or fraudulent about them. Mr. Rinaldi agreed to pay the Note, and acknowledged that Wells Fargo could transfer the Note. The Debtors are not prejudiced by the transfer of the Note or assignment of the Mortgage, and it is not a violation of RICO for Wells Fargo to assign the Mortgage to HSBC.
In paragraph 96(c), the Debtors turn their attention to the lawyers. The Debtors claim that the attorneys who signed pleadings on behalf of HSBC violated RICO, because the Note was not endorsed and the Mortgage assignment was not recorded. An attorney allegedly violated RICO by telling the state court that the Debtors admitted that HSBC had standing. The same attorney violated RICO by arguing to this Court that the Debtors valued their claim against the defendants at $1.00 in their Chapter 7 bankruptcy schedules. (The utter senselessness of this accusation is borne out by the facts that (1) the Debtors indeed used this value in their sworn bankruptcy schedules; and (2) the Chapter 7 trustee filed a report stating that there were no assets available in this case for creditors, evidencing that the trustee agreed with the valuation of the Debtors’ claims.) Another attorney “implied” that res judicata applied to the state court’s foreclosure judgment, even though the underlying foreclosure case was dismissed. The attorneys who pre
In summary, to the extent the alleged RICO enterprise is the enticement of Mr. Rinaldi into a loan transaction in order to defraud investors in the securitized trust, the statute of limitations may well have expired. Even assuming the RICO claim is timely, the Debtors have failed to specifically identify the individuals who orchestrated this alleged fraudulent scheme and have not identified with particularity the predicate acts constituting the racketeering activity. There is only one mortgage transaction leading to one foreclosure case and one proof of claim. Thus the Debtors have failed to allege a pattern that could constitute a RICO violation. The allegedly fraudulent Note is valid and enforceable, and the Mortgage assignments are legally sufficient. The statements of attorneys in representing their clients in enforcing the Note and Mortgage, including by attaching the Note, Mortgage and Assignments to the foreclosure complaint and proof of claim, do not violate RICO. The allegedly fraudulent scheme has not caused the Debtors any damages: they are still living in their residence. The Court concludes that all of the Debtors’ RICO claims should be dismissed, and recommends that the district court enter a final order dismissing those claims.
C. Abuse of Process
Related to their RICO claims, the Debtors contend that the defendants abused legal process in creating and using forged documents to further the fraudulent securitization scheme. Abuse of process occurs when a person “uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.” Brownsell v. Klawitter,
The Debtors have failed to allege any “definite act or threat” not authorized by the process. For example, the Debtors accuse one of the attorneys of stating that the Debtors did not contest HSBC’s standing in the foreclosure action, and they accuse the defendants of “ultimately extorting]” a loan modification agreement after the entry of the foreclosure judgment. (Complaint, ¶ 79; Amended Complaint, ¶ 88). Those allegations lack any suggestion of a definite act or threat to accomplish the alleged extortion.
[P]arties and counsel are immune from liability for relevant statements in pleadings and otherwise in the course of judicial proceedings. This absolute privilege as to statements made during judicial proceedings has been summarized to be: Parties to judicial proceedings are absolutely exempt from responsibility for libel on the ground of privilege for any defamatory matter published in the course of judicial proceedings, subject to the possible qualification that such defamatory matter is pertinent or relevant to the case.
In short, whether for their failure to identify a definite act or threat constituting abuse of process or because any statements that allegedly constituted such a threat would be protected by the litigation privilege, the Debtors’ complaint and amended complaint fail to state a claim for abuse of process. The Court recommends that the district court enter a final order dismissing the Debtors’ claims.
D. Violation of FDCPA
The purpose of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 — 1692p, is to protect debtors from certain abusive debt collection practices. The Debtors claim that the defendant law firms and attorneys are debt collectors as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and that they filed false, deceptive, misleading and perjured documents in connection with the collection of the Debtors’ debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The defendants contend that they are not “debt collectors” for purposes of the FDCPA. This Court agrees.
Section 1692a(6) defines debt collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.... For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” Courts have interpreted the latter sentence to mean that a person enforcing security interests
In Kaltenbach v. Richards,
In this case there are no allegations that the law firms or individual attorneys engaged in any debt collection activities other than non-deficiency foreclosure of the Debtors’ residence, and therefore they do not qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA. Since they are not debt collectors, they are not liable for any alleged breaches of the FDCPA. The Court recommends that the district court enter a final order dismissing the Debtors’ claims against the defendants for violations of the FDCPA.
E. Common Law Fraud
The Debtors accuse the defendants of fraud. While the complaint and amended complaint are difficult to follow, the Court has identified four potential fraud claims. First, a loan broker connected to Wells Fargo fraudulently induced Mr. Rinaldi to enter the loan transaction using an inflated appraisal and adding a bank account to the loan application after Mr. Rinaldi signed it. Second, the purpose of the loan transaction was to defraud the investors in the Trust. Third, HSBC filed its foreclosure complaint when it lacked standing to do so. And fourth, the law firm and attorney defendants filed false pleadings in the foreclosure action (the Note that lacked the endorsement) and bankruptcy case (the proof of claim alleging HSBC’s standing and the Mortgage assignments).
The fraud claims against the law firm and attorney defendants should be dismissed for reasons already discussed. The litigation privilege protects pertinent, relevant statements made by counsel in the course of litigation, and all of the statements alleged to have been made by these attorneys were pertinent and relevant. For example, it is not fraud for an attorney to state on the record in open court that the Debtors have valued an asset at $1 in their bankruptcy schedules, even if the attorney knows that the Debtors allegedly made a mistake in that valuation and meant to say “unknown.” Similarly, an attorney reported to the Court that he did not believe the bankruptcy of Residential Capital, LLC and its affiliates acted to stay the Debtors’ claims against the defendants. This is not fraud. Moreover, the Debtors have not stated that they relied on any of the attorneys’ statements to their detriment. WTiether because they have not shown facts sufficient to state a claim for fraud or because all of the statements
The claims for fraudulent inducement into the loan transaction also fail. The Debtors must allege fraud with particularity. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7009(b). The Debtors have not done so, and in fact a critical allegation is made “on information and belief.” Paragraph 80 of the amended complaint states: “Upon information and belief, the Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. loan broker knew that the appraisal would be ‘fixed’ in order to make it appear that there was equity in the property which the Plaintiffs ultimately acquired due to the Wells Fargo/HSBC securitization scheme and, therefore, no cash was required for a down payment on the property.” In Capital One Bank v. Bungert (In re Bungert),
Moreover, Capital One has pled certain allegations, including that the debtors purchased luxury goods with the credit card and knew that their representations were false, “upon information and belief.” Such statements are totally insufficient to sustain a prima facie case of fraud. Judge Posner called such allegations “clearly improper locution under the current federal rules, which impose (in the amended Rule 11) a duty of reasonable precomplaint inquiry not satisfied by rumor or hunch ... [T]he duty to plead the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity could not be fulfilled by pleading those circumstances on ‘information and belief unless they were facts inaccessible to the plaintiff in which event he had to plead the grounds for his suspicions.” Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co.,959 F.2d 677 , 683-84 (7th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).
Just as the creditor in Bungert was required to plead more than a hunch that the debtors had fraudulently purchased items on credit, the Debtors here must provide more than speculation that the mortgage broker (or someone else) inflated the appraisal. The Debtors do not specify who made a false representation with the intent to defraud them. They allege that when Mr. Rinaldi said that he did not have funds available for a down payment and had just completed a settlement with the IRS, “the soliciting loan broker insisted that the concerns ... were not a problem.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 79). Apparently, this representation was true, because the Debtors received the loan. The Debtors fail to explain or detail the alleged fraudulent statement on which they relied to their detriment.
After proclaiming fraud because Wells Fargo made the Debtors a mortgage loan with no down payment, the Debtors leap to the conclusion that the Wells Defendants designed the entire transaction so that the loan pool would fail and the “losses would be borne and their loan would be paid by third parties not involved in the contract between Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and the Plaintiffs.” (Id., ¶ 82). The Debtors’ preposterous claims are not supported by detailed allegations, nor could they be. The simple facts are that Mr. Rinaldi signed a Note that expressly stated it could be transferred. He agreed to pay the transferee. The Note is valid and legally enforceable by HSBC, its holder. Under Wisconsin law, the Mortgage follows the Note, and it too, is enforceable by HSBC.
Another defect with the Debtors’ fraud claim is that the Debtors made the same allegations in the state court, where they were soundly rejected. In their answer and counterclaim in the foreclosure proceeding, the Debtors’ allegations included:
Under Wisconsin law, the judgment of foreclosure and sale determines the parties’ legal rights in the mortgaged property. Shuput v. Lauer,
In this case, the parties (or their privies) to the foreclosure case and this adversary proceeding are the same. After considering both the Debtors’ challenges to HSBCs’ standing to foreclose and the Debtors’ fraud claims concerning the inception of the loan and the transfer of the Note to the Trust, the Circuit Court for Kenosha County dismissed the Debtors’ counterclaims and entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of HSBC. The Debtors did not appeal that judgment, and it became final for purposes of claim preclusion. The later dismissal of the foreclosure case, without prejudice, did not invalidate the judgment or resuscitate the Debtors’ fraud claims. See Kowske v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., supra, (claim preclusion applied notwithstanding that foreclosure case dismissed when mortgage was paid). The fraud causes of action are virtually identical.
In summary, the Debtors’ fraud claims are not pled with sufficient particularity; arise from privileged statements in litigation; lack allegations of an intentional misrepresentation that the Debtors relied on to their detriment; and were considered and rejected in a final state court judgment. These claims should be dismissed, and the Court recommends that the dis
F. Tortious Interference and Breach of Contract
The Debtors’ final two claims allege tor-tious interference with economic opportunity and prospective economic advantage and breach of contract. These claims are easily disposed of as time-barred.
According to paragraph 83 of their amended complaint, “Had Plaintiffs not been ‘marks’ for a securitization fraud scheme, they would have continued to build their credit-worthiness (after the IRS resolution) and would eventually have been able to obtain a legitimate mortgage from an honest source of true mortgage funding.” Even assuming this allegation states a claim for tortious interference, the statute of limitations applicable to this intentional tort is two years. Mirbeau of Geneva Lake, LLC v. City of Lake Geneva,
The Debtors advanced a claim against Wells Fargo for breach of contract. The statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years from the date the cause of action accrues. Wis. Stat. § 893.43. The allegations concerning Wells Fargo stem from the time of the origination or the assignment to HSBC in September 2005, and not some subsequent breach. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run either on June 10, 2005 (the date the Debtors executed the Note and Mortgage) or September 14, 2005, the date of the assignment. The Court concludes that the statute of limitations expired by September 14, 2011 fully a month prior to the Debtors’ bankruptcy petition.
The Debtors’ breach of contract and tortious interference claims are time-barred and should be dismissed. The Court recommends that the district court enter a final order dismissing them.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Debtors’ claims are baseless, and this adversary proceeding should be dismissed. The Debtors’ objection to HSBC’s proof of claim is overruled, and the proof of claim is allowed as filed. The Debtors’ contention that HSBC lacks standing or party in interest status to seek relief from the automatic stay is rejected. The Debtors’ motion to disqualify Gray & Associates is denied. The Court sustains HSBC’s objection to confirmation of the Debtors’ plan. The Debtors must file a modified feasible plan within 30 days. If the Debtors fail to file a modified feasible plan within this deadline, the Court will grant HSBC’s motion for relief from stay.
With respect to the claims made in this adversary proceeding, the Court has authority to enter a final order on the allowance of the proof of claim, lien avoidance and stay relief standing issues. The Court will enter separate orders in this adversary proceeding and in the Debtors’ bankruptcy case disposing of the pending motions and objections filed in the main case.
Since the defendants have not consented to this Court’s entry of a final order on the non-core proceedings, the Court recommends that the district court enter a final order dismissing the Debtors’ RICO, FDCPA, abuse of process, fraud, tortious