45 S.E. 149 | S.C. | 1903
July 10, 1903. The opinion of the Court was delivered by This is an appeal from the refusal of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, to grant an interlocutory order of injunction. The action was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas to enjoin the defendant perpetually from further action in the condemnation proceedings, instituted under the act of the General Assembly, entitled "An act to incorporate `the Charleston Union Station Company,'" approved 20th February, 1902 (page 1168). The grounds upon which the plaintiffs seek the aid of the Court in the *92 exercise of its equitable powers are set forth in the complaint, which will be reported. The right of the defendants to institute the said condemnation proceedings is brought in question by the plaintiffs, and the sole object of the plaintiffs' action is a perpetual injunction against such proceedings. His Honor, the Circuit Judge, made the following order:
"This case comes on to be heard before me upon the return to the rule to show cause heretofore issued, and the papers and affidavits filed in the cause. The case has been duly argued before me, and I am of the opinion that the constitutional questions which are raised by the complaint should not, at this stage of the proceedings, be passed upon by the Court. The only question which is for the consideration of the Court, under the present motion, is as to whether or not the Court should continue the injunction heretofere granted, in order to preserve the status quo until the final hearing on the merits.
"Upon a careful consideration of the case, I feel satisfied, and so find, that there can be no injury to the plaintiffs in this cause by the proposed proceedings in condemnation, which could not be adequately compensated under the statute providing for condemnation, and the plaintiffs, in my judgment, have failed to show, even prima facie, that the lands proposed to be condemned are not necessary and essential to the construction and operation of the proposed union station. In view of the facts and findings, and of the great public interest involved, I have decided to set aside the restraining order heretofore granted, and, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the restraining order heretofore granted be, and is hereby, set aside and vacated, and the rule to show cause herein discharged."
The plaintiffs appealed from said order upon exceptions which need not be considered in detail, especially as some of them raise questions that are only proper for consideration when the case is heard upon the merits.
The only question that can be considered at this stage of the case is whether the plaintiffs have made prima facie *93
showing for the equitable relief by way of injunction.Alston v. Limehouse,
There is another reason why the temporary order of injunction should not have been refused. The plaintiffs' action was brought solely for obtaining an injunction, and the refusal to grant the temporary injunction practically disposed of the case without a hearing upon the merits. InCudd v. Calvert,
The Circuit Judge in his order says: "I feel satisfied, and so find, that there can be no injury to the plaintiffs in this cause by the proposed proceeding in condemnation, which could not be adequately compensated under the statute providing for condemnation." If the plaintiffs were compelled to look solely to the condemnation proceedings for relief, this would destroy their right to show that the condemnation proceedings could not be instituted, and that is the question in the case to be finally determined when it is heard upon the merits. The ruling of the Circuit Judge presupposed that the condemnation proceedings will be adjudged to be valid. If the condemnation proceedings are illegal, the defendants should not be allowed to take the property of the plaintiffs and force them against their will to accept the compensation provided by the statute.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the order of the Circuit Court be reversed. *95