MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A few things are inevitable when it comes to spring baseball at Wrigley Field: the ivy won’t be green, the weather won’t be warm, there will be many who say, “This is the year,” and there will be a battle between the Chicago Cubs and the rooftop businesses that surround Wrigley Field. This spring is no different. The
The Rooftops, however, have not simply relied on the License Agreement to battle the Cubs this season. This time, they allege, the Cubs have gone too far and have engaged in anti-competitive practices to put them out of business. The Rooftops claim that the Cubs tried to bully them to price-fix (essentially to increase the price of their tickets) and when they refused, the Cubs retaliated against them by taking steps to erect the massive video board directly in front of their businesses. This antitrust claim may be new to the battle between the Cubs and the Rooftops, but it is not novel to Major League Baseball which, according to the Cubs, enjoys the benefit of being exempt from any antitrust claims. Relying on Supreme Court case law starting back in 1922, the Cubs say that the antitrust claims must fall.
The ultimate dispute hinges on both contract and antitrust claims. Because the Court finds that the Cubs did not breach the 2004 License Agreement and are exempt from being accused of antitrust violations under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and even if they were not, the Cubs did not engage in anti-competitive behavior, the Court denies the Rooftops’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction primarily because the Rooftops have no likelihood of success on the merits. ■ All of the other factors also weigh in favor of the Cubs as set forth below.
On January 20, 2015, Plaintiffs, Right Field Rooftops, LLC, Right Field Properties, LLC, 3633 Rooftop Management, LLC, and Rooftop Acquisition, LLC, brought a nine-count Complaint against Defendants, Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, Wrigley Field Holdings, LLC, Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC, and Thomas Ricketts, alleging a host of claims stemming from the Cubs’ intention to install a “jumbotron” video board and billboard signage over the right field bleachers at Wrigley Field. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Rooftops sit on Sheffield Street in Chicago, Illinois, directly across the street from Wrigley Field. They sell tickets to patrons wishing to watch Cubs baseball games and other events, like concerts, occurring in Wrigley Field. The Rooftops contend that the construction will deprive them of their business.
Around three weeks after the Rooftops filed their Complaint, they sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction enjoining the Cubs from installing the video board and any other signage. The Court held a TRO hearing on February 18, 2015 and denied the Rooftops’ motion for TRO the next day because the Rooftops had failed to establish: (1) a likelihood of success on their antitrust claim, (2) irreparable harm, and (3) an inadequate remedy at law. (See Dkt. No. 35.) The Court set a briefing schedule for the Rooftops’ preliminary injunction motion and listened to over seven hours of oral argument from the parties on March 23, 2015. The preliminary injunction pertains to Counts I, II, and VIII of the Rooftops’ Complaint. Counts I and II allege that the Cubs’ conduct constitutes attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 26, while Count VIII alleges anticipatory breach of contract based on the 2004 License Agreement guaranteeing the Rooftops views into Wrigley Field through the 2023 Major League Baseball season. With the benefit of the parties’ thorough briefs and argument, the Court now denies the Rooftops’ motion for a preliminary injunction for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
Instead of an evidentiary hearing, the parties presented oral argument on their respective filings which comprise over 1,500 pages. For the purposes of the preliminary injunction, the facts are largely undisputed. Accordingly, the Court takes the following facts from the Complaint, briefs, and exhibits filed with the Court.
The Rooftops control two buildings and businesses that sell tickets to view Cubs baseball games and other events taking place within Wrigley Field. Right Field Rooftops does business as the “Skybox on Sheffield” and operates at 3627 N. Sheffield. (Dkt. 1, Compl. at ¶ 1.) 3633 Rooftops Management does business as “Lakeview Baseball Club” and, as its name suggests, operates at 3633 N. Sheffield. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Since Wrigley Field’s construction in 1914, spectators on the roofs of the buildings across the street on Sheffield enjoyed a view into Wrigley Field. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Starting in the 1980s, owners of the buildings began to turn their roofs into grandstands for spectators and in 1998, the City of Chicago enacted an ordinance formally allowing the rooftop businesses to operate for profit. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.) By 2002, there were eleven rooftop businesses operating for profit by selling tickets to patrons who wanted to watch Cubs games and other events from the roofs. (Id.) The City designated Wrigley Field as a landmark on February 11, 2004, adopting the prepared Landmark Designation Report and limiting future alterations to Wrigley
Before the beginning of the 2002 Major League Baseball season, the Cubs installed a large green windscreen above the outfield bleachers. (Id. at ¶ 34.) The windscreen negatively impacted views from the rooftop businesses across Sheffield. (Id.) The Cubs proceeded to file suit against a number of the rooftop businesses on December 16, 2002, claiming that the rooftop businesses were misappropriating the Cubs’ property by charging admission fees to watch Cubs games from the roofs. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Before the start of the 2004 baseball season, the parties to the 2002 litigation reached a settlement leading to a contract (the “License Agreement”) in which the rooftop businesses agreed to pay the Cubs a royalty of seventeen percent of their gross revenues in exchange'for views into Wrigley Field until December 31, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 38; Dkt. 21-3, Ex. C2-A, License Agmt. § 3.1.) The License Agreement contains a number of provisions establishing protocol for the expansion of Wrigley Field, its potential effect on any rooftop business, and consequences:
6. Wrigley Field bleacher expansion.
6.1 If the Cubs expand the Wrigley Field bleacher seating and such expansion so impairs the view from any Rooftop into Wrigley Field such that the Rooftop’s business is no longer viable unless it increases the height of its available seating, then such Rooftop may in its discretion elect to undertake construction to raise the height of its seating to allow views into Wrigley Field and the Cubs shall reimburse the Rooftop for 17% of the actual cost of such construction.
6.2 If the Cubs expand the Wrigley Field bleacher seating and such expansion so impairs the View from any Rooftop into Wrigley Field such that the Rooftop’s business is no longer viable even if it were to increase its available seating to the maximum height permitted by law, and if such bleacher expansion is completed within eight years from the Effective Date, then if such Rooftop elects to cease operations ... the Cubs shall reimburse that Rooftop for 50% of the royalties paid by that Rooftop to the Cubs ...
6.4 If the Cubs expand the Wrigley Field bleacher seating and such expansion impairs the view from any Rooftop into Wrigley Field such that the Rooftop’s Gross Revenue in the year of expansion is more than 10% below the average Gross Revenue for that Rooftop in the two years prior to expansion ... then the affected Rooftop can seek a reduction in the Royalty rate for all subsequent years of the Term ...
6.5 Nothing in this Agreement limits the Cubs’ right to seek approval of the right to expand Wrigley Field or the Rooftops’ right to oppose any request for expansion of Wrigley Field.
6.6 The Cubs shall not erect windscreens or other barriers to obstruct the views of the Rooftops, provided however that temporary items such as banners, flags, and decorations for special occasions, shall not be considered as having been erected to obstruct views of the Rooftops. Any expansion of Wrigley Field approved by governmental authorities shall not be a violation of this Agreement, including this section.
The integral time period for the instant lawsuit is from 2009 onward. In the Fall of 2009, the Ricketts family and controlled entities purchased 95% of the Cubs and acquired Wrigley Field from the Tribune Company, subject to the preexisting Rooftop License Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Soon after, the Cubs began to acquire ownership interests in a number of the rooftop businesses.
In late 2011 and early 2012, the Cubs began to lobby the City for approval of a number of Wrigley Field renovations, including bleacher seating expansion, an outfield sign package, and two video boards. (Comply 51.) On April 15, 2013, the Cubs announced the renovation plan would include a 6,000 square foot video board in left field and a 1,000 square foot billboard in right field. (Dkt. 21-1, Ex. A-8-2, Apr. 15 Trib. Article.) The Cubs released an illustration of the intended construction on May 28, 2013 to all the rooftop business owners and the illustration showed that the rooftop businesses would be largely blocked by the construction.
Throughout the approval process, the Rooftops maintain that representatives of the Cubs made a number of statements acknowledging their obligations to the Rooftops and demonstrating their intent to drive the Rooftops out of business. Specifically, the Rooftops claim that Ricketts and other Cubs executives found the License Agreement to be a “bad deal” for the Cubs and that the business relationship led to a “price war” on Cubs tickets. (Dkt. 21-2, Ex. B, Anguiano Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.) The Rooftops allege that the Cubs demanded the Rooftops set minimum ticket prices and that failure to do so would lead to getting blocked. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The Rooftops refused to agree to set minimum ticket prices.
The Cubs began the construction and restoration process in September 2014. (Rice Decl. ¶ 12.) The Cubs have removed the outfield outer walls, purchased approximately fifteen feet of sidewalk and street on Waveland and Sheffield Avenues, purchased and installed steel beams, and poured a concrete foundation for the bleachers. {Id. at ¶ 12.) In total, the construction entails new seats in the outfield bleachers, a new “fan deck” in the bleachers, increased concessions, signs and video boards, and new light systems. {Id. at ¶ 13.) The steel beams used in the construction support both the bleachers and signs, and the Cubs contracted with An-heuser-Busch for sponsorship rights above the right field video board. {Id. at ¶ 27.) The right field video board additionally serves as an overhead cover for the enlarged concessions area. {Id. at ¶ 17.) The total estimated cost of construction materials is $32 million. {Id. at ¶ 21.) As it currently stands, the Cubs are placing the right field video board directly in front of the Rooftops, while the Cubs-owned rooftop businesses are left unobstructed.
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
DISCUSSION
As the Court stated in its opinion denying the Rooftops’ motion for TRO, “it may be possible that with further briefing and analysis under the preliminary injunction hearing ... one interpretation of that contract will prevail. (Dkt. No. 35 at 6.) Such is the case. Armed with the License Agreement, briefs, and arguments from the parties, the Court concludes that the Rooftops have not established a likelihood of success on the merits on their breach of contract claims. See Adkins,
I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A. Antitrust Claims
Counts I and II of the Rooftops’ Complaint allege attempted monopolization. The Rooftops argue that the Cubs’ conduct in attempting to set a minimum price for tickets, attempting to purchase all rooftop businesses, actually purchasing three rooftop businesses, threatening to block any rooftop business with signage if they do not sell to the Cubs, and commencing the construction at Wrigley Field that will block the Rooftops constitutes anticompeti-tive, monopolistic behavior in violation of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act prohibits attempts to monopolize interstate commerce and authorizes the Court to issue injunctive relief to prevent monopolization. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 26. Because the Rooftops’ allegations fall within the Major League Baseball antitrust exemption, and, even if they did not, the Rooftops are unable to demonstrate a plausible relevant market emanating from Cubs games, the Court concludes that the Rooftops have not demonstrated any likelihood of success on their antitrust claims.
1. Major League Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Long before the Rooftops began selling tickets to watch Cubs games, the
Most likely recognizing that there is established law that Congress has not altered legislatively in spite of numerous commentators arguing it should, see D. Logan Kutcher, Note, Overcoming an “Aberration”: San Jose Challenges Major League Baseball’s Longstanding Antitrust Exemption, 40 J. Corp. L. 233 (2014); Michael J. Mozes, et ah, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 265 (2011), the Rooftops attempt to circumvent the exemption by distinguishing it. The Rooftops contend that the baseball exemption only applies to the league and to league rules, not to individual franchises. They further argue that the exemption has not been expanded past matters pertinent to putting on the game, and does not apply to issues collateral to it. Not only because both the Supreme Court and the 'Seventh Circuit have taken a broad reading of the baseball exemption, but also because the Cubs’ business and conduct is central to “the business of providing public baseball games for profit,” Toolson,
The Rooftops’ first contention that the baseball exemption is inapplicable to individual team franchises is unsupported by the relevant case law. The Toolson defendants themselves included the New York Yankees, the Cincinnati Baseball Club, and both the owner and general manager of the Cincinnati club. See Corbett v. Chandler,
The Cubs’ business of manufacturing Cubs baseball and presenting that product to the public is not an “incidental matter” to the business of baseball and falls within the baseball exemption. See San Jose,
2. Relevant Market
Even if the baseball exemption did not apply, the Court would nevertheless conclude that the Rooftops have not demonstrated any likelihood of success on the merits of their antitrust claims because they have failed to establish a plausible relevant market. To prove attempted monopolization, the Rooftops must show the Cubs’ “(1) specific intent to achieve monopoly power in a relevant market; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing this purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability that the attempt at monopolization will succeed.” Mercatus Group, LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp.,
In order to establish the “dangerous probability” prong, the Rooftops must demonstrate that the Cubs had sufficient market power to threaten actual monopolization within the relevant market. See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.,
Although “market definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry,” Todd v. Exxon Corp.,
The use or uses to which a product is put controls the boundaries of the relevant market. United States v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co.,
The Rooftops’ proposed relevant market cannot stand because it is comprises a single brand product. See, e.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,
Although, “[i]n rare circumstances, a single brand of a product or service can constitute a relevant market for antitrust purposes,” PSKS,
While the Court accepts that there are some die-hard Cubs fans that would never attend a White Sox game, that does not mean that Cubs games constitute their own market. The Rooftops’ contend that there are no reasonable substitutes for live Cubs games because watching the games on television “involves a limited number of cameras” and because fans who want to see a live Cubs game are “unlikely to patronize another team’s live games.” (Compl.¶¶ 119-20.) Such arguments of consumer preferences, however, “fall short of rendering it plausible that there exist no interchangeable substitutes for” live Cubs games. House of Brides I,
The Rooftops’ arguments in favor of a live Cubs game market are belied not only
The purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competition, not competitors. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
3. Monopoly Power in Own Product
The Court additionally notes that the Rooftops antitrust claims are doomed because their claims turn on the Cubs controlling the exhibition of their own product. Both proposed markets revolve around the Cubs’ product in producing “Cubs games to be commercially exploited.” (Comply 111.) Throughout the proceedings, the Rooftops have unfailingly maintained that their business relies on the Cubs manufacturing and producing Cubs games. The Rooftops “can’t have a rooftop business without a view into Wrigley Field” with which to watch Cubs games. (Dkt. No. 37, TRO Tr. 20:24-25.) The problem with the Rooftops’ position is that the Cubs are not limited by the antitrust laws with respect to what they do with and how they distribute their own product, in this case, live Cubs games. See Elliott,
B. Anticipatory Breach of Contract
Because the antitrust arguments are both exempted by law and fail on the merits, the Rooftops’ remaining opportunity to win this round lies in their breach of contract claim. The Rooftops argue that the Cubs anticipatorily breached the License Agreement when they began construction on the video board. Because the parties entered into a twenty-year License Agreement and there are eight years left under that agreement, the Rooftops allege that the Cubs have breached the License Agreement because once the video board in right field goes up this Spring, the Cubs will have erected a barrier that they promised they would not for at least the duration of the License Agreement.
Under Illinois law, “[a]n anticipatory breach, also called anticipatory repudiation, is a manifestation by one party to a contract of an intent not to perform its contractual duty when the time comes for it to do so even if the other party has rendered full and complete performance.” Tower Investors, LLC v. 111 E. Chestnut Consultants, Inc.,
Subsection 6.6 of the License Agreement provides that “any expansion of Wrigley field approved by governmental authorities shall not be a violation of this Agreement.” (License Agmt. § 6.6.) The Rooftops concede that the proposed video board has been approved by a governmental authority, namely, the Landmark Commission. (Dkt. No. 21 at 35.) Therefore, the Rooftops’ position hinges on whether or not the video board constitutes “any expansion” for which governmental approval is a bulwark against breach.
The “cardinal rule” of contract construction is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the contract. See Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York,
Reading Section 6 as a whole, as the Court must, the Court concludes that “any” means “every or all.” See, e.g., Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery,
The Court may also look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “expansion.” See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Elecs., Inc.,
The final clause of Section 6.6 further confirms the Cubs’ construction. Again, the relevant sentence as a whole reads: “Any expansion of Wrigley Field approved by governmental authorities shall not be a violation of this Agreement, including this section.” (Dkt. No. 27 Ex. 3) (emphasis added). The preceding sentences of Subsection 6.6 discuss “windscreens or other barriers.” Windscreens and barriers, needless to say, are not bleachers and do not increase the seating capacity or bleacher area of Wrigley Field. If “any expansion” were limited to construction projects that increased Wrigley Field’s seating capacity, or even structural expansions, it would be unnecessary to specify that windscreens and other barriers were subject to the governmental approval exception. The Rooftops’ construction, therefore, renders the final clause of Subsection 6.6 mere surplusage. See Land of Lincoln Goodwill Indus., Inc. v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc.,
At oral argument, the Rooftops for the first time asked the Court to read ambiguity into the word “any expansion.” The Rooftops argue that the Court should consider extrinsic evidence of intent in order to define the term “expansion.” The Court declines to read ambiguity into a clause where there is none. See In re Airadigm Comms., Inc.,
Extrinsic evidence, though, confirms that the Court’s construction does not lead to an absurd result. See BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC Franchise Trust 2000-1,
Before this dispute, the Rooftops, experienced business and real estate owners, were most likely comforted by the landmark status that had been imposed on Wrigley Field which limited future alterations without governmental approval. Even if they can somehow assert now that the governmental process was not as onerous as they had anticipated, such an understanding does not give reason to read ambiguity into the License Agreement. See Badette v. Rodriguez,
II. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedy at Law
Since the Court’s ruling on the TRO motion, the Rooftops have failed to remedy the. deficiencies in their irreparable harm analysis and have once again not shown they will suffer irreparable harm if the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief is denied. See, e.g., Long v. Bd. of Educ., Dist. 128,
The Rooftops argue that their businesses will become “insolvent immediately” upon construction of the video board because without a view of the game, ticket sales will cease and the businesses will be unable to make mortgage payments and pay their real estate taxes. (Dkt. 47, Pl. Reply at 4); see Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
Bue claims that Skybox and Lakeview’s “only significant source of revenue is derived from the sale of ‘tickets’ ” and that if the proposed video board is installed, both Rooftops will “have no revenue, and will be unable to pay [their] fixed mortgage and real estate expenses immediately thereafter.” (Dkt. 39, Bue Decl. ¶¶2-4.) Surprisingly, neither party presented evidence that the Rooftops may have a market' as an operating bar with a rooftop ambience in Wrigleyville. Numerous restaurants and bars operate within the area of Wrigley Field without live views of the game; instead they sprinkle large-screen televisions throughout the inside of their establishments and do a lively business before, after, and even during Cubs games. Indeed, there are over forty bars within walking distance of Wrigley Field.
At argument, the Rooftops appear to assume that without a view of the game, there will be an automatic business shutdown. Yet, a business within the Wrigley-ville community with a license to serve alcohol would plausibly have some marketability, and one with outdoor dining would seem to have even more. One might ar
The mortgage and real estate expenses are characterized on the Profit and Loss statements for Lakeview and Skybox provided by Bue as “rent.” (Id. at 10, 21.) McCarthy explained that the Rooftops pay rent to the underlying properties amounting to precisely the mortgage payment and real estate taxes owed on the underlying property. (Dkt. 59, McCarthy Decl. ¶¶ 3-4). Skybox pays its “rent” directly as the mortgage and real estate taxes of the underlying property instead of paying the property management company itself. (Id.) Lakeview, on the other hand, deposits “all revenues into an account held by Rooftop Acquisition (of which McCarthy is a manager), from which Rooftop Acquisition pays its mortgage payments and real estate taxes on the 3633 Property, and from which account Lakeview Club’s other operating expenses are paid, such as inventory and wages.” (Id.)
At oral argument, the Cubs presented evidence of the various entities and at least one of its owners, McCarthy, showing McCarthy’s role as both mortgagor and mortgagee, borrower and lender, landlord and tenant, manager and member, essentially with monies going from one pocket to the other. Leaving the Court with the proverbial “who’s on first” confusion and weakening significantly any argument that tomorrow the businesses will be shut down. The Court finds this property relationship and payment scheme at best curious. First, it is unclear what legitimate business incentive would inspire a property owner to charge its business tenant merely the amount of its mortgage payment and real estate taxes as rent, thus denying itself any profit from the relationship. The Rooftops do not claim to be in a family business or a small business relationship with closely-knit friends, as might justify such an arrangement, and if shown also justify some impending harm to one or more of its members. Rather, the Rooftops appear from the financial records before the Court to be businesspersons of substantial acumen. Regardless, the Court need not inquire into the motivation of the Rooftops in structuring their business as they see fit, because the more curious part of this arrangement is the conspicuously absent evidence of the joint bank account between the property owners and at least one of the rooftop businesses or any other compelling evidence of the financial situation of the four plaintiffs. Given this unique structure — where bank statements, mortgage agreements, and loan repayment information are presumably readily available — the Rooftops should have provided more than mere informal record keeping of the two rooftop businesses to carry their burden of demonstrating that loss of all four businesses is imminent. See, e.g., Winter,
Compounding the lack of evidence provided by the Rooftops is the evidence brought forth by the Cubs minimizing the likelihood that the Rooftops will not be able to sustain their businesses until the resolution of this litigation before the 2016 Major League Baseball season. See Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of United States of America, Inc.,
Whether to consider these circumstances gives rise to a clash of two principles. On the one hand, corporations exist to protect individual investors and their individual wealth is unrelated to the liabilities of the corporation. But, on the other hand, the Rooftops have the burden of making a clear showing of irreparable harm, which in this case would consist of permanent destruction of their businesses. On the specific circumstances in this case — where the Rooftops recently paid substantially larger sums of money than they claimed to have on-hand; have a rental agreement under which the property owners appear not to profit financially; and have generally provided the Court an incomplete picture of their finances — the Court does not ignore that the Rooftops have a history of coming up with money and that the same individual is on both sides of two out of their three mortgages. Under these unique circumstances, the Court gives less weight to that corporate structure as it appears it could be used here to shield from the Court information about potential assets to help the Rooftops weather the storm. See, e.g., Holiday CVS, L.L.C. v. Holder,
The Cubs have maintained throughout these proceedings that they will be ready, willing, and able to try this case to verdict prior to the 2016 season. (Prel.Inj. Tr. 257.) The Rooftops’ argument that they will suffer “immediate foreclosure” and will be unable to weather the financial storm for a year is still too conclusory to establish irreparable harm in this case. (Dkt. 47, PI. Reply at 4) (contending they would be unable to “close down for a year, and then come back in 2016 or 2017 if they win the trial”). Foreclosures are not “instantaneous” and mere inconvenience does not show that harm would be irreparable. See, e.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie,
Nor, as this Court held at the TRO, are the Rooftops faced with an inadequate remedy at law. On the contrary, any harm the Rooftops may suffer between now and a final verdict on the merits is entirely financial in nature, ascertainable, and calculable. This conclusion is bolstered not only by the fact that the dispute concerns a fixed-length contract, see Marketing Werks, Inc. v. Fox, No. 13 C 7256,
Additionally, although the Rooftops have not demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on their contract claim, the License Agreement only guarantees a view into Wrigley Field until December 31, 2023, pursuant to limitations. The Rooftops are in the business of selling tickets to watch Cubs games and other events taking place at Wrigley Field and they can assert no expectation that they will be able to maintain a business of selling views into Wrig
III. Other Considerations
The Rooftops have failed to establish any of the threshold requirements for a preliminary injunction and the Court need not reach the balance of the harms. Even if they had, however, other considerations would not warrant the imposition of in-junctive relief. See Merritte v. Kessel,
Here, the Rooftops contend that the balance of hardships is distinctly in their favor because without an injunction, “[the Rooftops are] out of business. [They are] dead.” (Prel.Inj. Tr. 304.) But as previously stated, the Rooftops have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating irreparable harm “by a clear showing.” Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. and Prof'l Regulation,
Additionally, the Court will not ignore the Rooftops’ delay in filing suit and seeking injunctive relief against the Cubs. The Rooftops’ counsel’s argument that any delay was his fault in filing the Complaint and that the “world changed” on December 4, 2014, when the Cubs revised their plans to move the video board in right field (Prel.Inj. Tr. 315), does not sufficiently explain why the Rooftops did not seek legal relief earlier in the proceedings. The Rooftops concede that on May 28, 2013, it was “clear from the mock-up event that the [Rooftops’] views would be substantially blocked.” (Dkt. 21 at 17.) Yet the Rooftops waited to attempt to stop the construction. The Rooftops further conceded that by May 2014, it “became clear that ..'. [the signs] in the outfield would effectively destroy the Rooftops’ business altogether.” (Dkt. 21 at 21.) Still, they waited to file suit. The Rooftops’ current argument that they did not think they would be blocked until December 4, 2014 is therefore belied by their own filings. The Rooftops’ delay in seeking legal relief weighs against an injunction. See Marketing Works,
CONCLUSION
Because the Rooftops have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Chicago Cubs breached the License Agreement and engaged in anticompetitive practices, and that the Cubs are somehow excluded from the antitrust exemption that applies to Major League Baseball, the Rooftops’ motion for preliminary injunction is denied.
Notes
. See Charles Shifley, Who Owns The View? Chicago Cubs v. Rooftop Owners, Or Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Sky Box on Waveland, L.L.C., 1 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 6 (2003); Gary Weshburn, Cubs Start to Play Hardball; Wrigley Draws the Curtain on Nearby Rooftops, Chi. Trib., Dec. 6, 2001, at 3.
. The case was captioned Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Sky Box on Waveland, LLC, et al., No. 2 C 9105, and claimed misappropriation of property, copyright infringement, deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment;
. The Cubs first acquired "Down the Line,” a rooftop business located at 3621 N. Sheffield. In total, six rooftop businesses changed hands: three to the Cubs and three to unrelated investors. (Dkt. 27 at 9.)
. A July 2014 rendering similarly showed that the signage approved for right field would substantially block the Rooftops. (Dkt.21-1, Ex. A-10-1.)
.At oral argument, for example, the Cubs expressed concerns that the Rooftops were lowering the value of their tickets by selling Rooftops tickets on Groupon and other discount vendor sites.
. The Rooftops contend that as the Cubs have acquired certain rooftop businesses, they have altered their construction plans in an effort to block the remaining competing rooftop businesses. (Dkt. 21-1 at 25.)
. The Supreme Court has made clear that the baseball exemption from antitrust law is limited solely to baseball. See generally Radovich v. Nat’l Football League,
. Congress explicitly stated that the antitrust laws do not "create, permit, or imply a cause of action by which to challenge ... the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional baseball.” 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(3).
. The Rooftops alter this market definition in Count II to be “the market for the Live Rooftop Games Product, which consists of individuals and groups of consumers who pay money to watch live-action Cubs Games from Rooftop Businesses, in person, as the games take place on the field at Wrigley Field.” (CompU 157.)
. Although a recognized submarket doctrine exists, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
. Additionally, the "essential facility” issue does not arise without establishing a proper relevant market. Elliott v. United Center, No. 95 C 5440,