Mary Riggins brought suit against the City of St. Marys 1 to recover damages for injuries incurred by her son and ward, Caleb Riggins, who was seriously injured in an automobile collision in the city. She alleged in her complaint that the intersection at which the collision occurred was a dangerous nuisance that caused Caleb’s injuries. Riggins amended the complaint to add a negligence claim based upon the city’s failure to install a traffic light at the intersection. The city moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and Riggins appeals. We agree with the trial court that the negligence claim cannot stand because whether to install a traffic signal at the intersection was a discretionary act, entitling the city to sovereign immunity. We agree with Riggins, however, that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that the city’s acts or omissions regarding the intersection could not have been a proximate cause of Caleb’s injuries. We conclude that summary judgment in favor of the city on Riggins’s nuisance claim was error. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment below.
The record shows that the collision occurred at the intersection of Kings Bay and Colerain Roads in the city. Kings Bay Road is a four-lane road divided by a median; it leads to the Kings Bay submarine facility and is heavily traveled. Colerain Road is a two-lane road connecting Interstate 95 to St. Marys. The intersection was originally outside the city limits, but in 1985, the city annexed the intersection and surrounding land. Because of increasing traffic and a concomitant increase in accidents involving failure to yield the right of way, the city attempted to control traffic at the intersection in 1988 by installing a blinking light. The light blinked yellow on Kings Bay Road and red on Colerain Road. The frequency of accidents thereafter increased 70 percent.
In response to a request from the Navy for additional traffic control devices, the city requested that the Georgia Department of Transportation (the DOT) take over the intersection. The DOT declined the city’s request but did conduct a study of the intersection, finding that the increase in accidents was caused by drivers failing to pay proper heed to the blinking signal and “pulling into the path of approaching vehicles.” The DOT also found that the turn arrows and stop lines on the roads’ surfaces were worn and needed replacement and that overgrown vegetation in the median area obscured drivers’ visibility. It recommended installation of a traffic light to replace the blinking light.
Thereafter, the city’s police chief informed the city manager and the city council that the intersection was “already one of the most dangerous and deadly intersections in the county” and that “full signalization, enhanced traffic control, and other intersection improvements” were needed, especially because a new high school was scheduled to open shortly on Colerain Road. Shortly after the new high school opened in August 1994, the police chief reported to the city manager that an accident with injuries had occurred at the intersection, which was “[n]o surprise[ ].”
About this time, the city agreed with Camden County to propose a Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST), which would be presented to the voters of the county at the November 1994 election. The governing statute, OCGA § 48-8-111, requires identification of the projects for which the tax revenue will be spent, and the first project listed by the city was installation of a traffic signal at the intersection of Kings Bay and Colerain Roads. The SPLOST was approved by the voters, and the tax went into effect on January 1, 1995. The city began collecting revenue in March 1995.
In November 20, 1996, some two months before the blinking light was replaced with a traffic signal, seventeen-year-old high school senior Caleb Riggins was driving home from school in his father’s car. His neighbor, Andrew Sylve, was a passenger. They entered Colerain Road from the high school, and as they approached its intersection with Kings Bay Road, Caleb stopped at the blinking red light. He then proceeded into the intersection, where his car was struck squarely on the driver’s side door by a one-ton truck driven by Robert Connell, driving south on Kings Bay Road.
Connell testified on his deposition that he was driving at about the speed limit, which was 55 mph, and that he did not see Caleb enter the intersection until “two seconds” before impact, when it was too late to stop. Several eyewitnesses to the collision gave deposition testimony, as did Connell, Caleb, and Sylve. Some conflicts exist in their deposition testimony, particularly with regard to whether the sight line of either driver was blocked by another vehicle. 2 No dispute exists, however, that Caleb suffered severe injuries, including damage to his spinal cord, numerous fractured bones, and permanent brain damage. He is quadriplegic and will need care and medical attention for the remainder of his life.
1. Riggins contends in several enumerations of error that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city on her nuisance claim. She argues that the city did not carry its burden of piercing a material allegation of the complaint, that evidence showed that the collision was a foreseeable consequence of the city’s maintenance of a dangerous condition at the intersection, and that the drivers’ negligence was not an intervening proximate cause of the collision. We agree.
(a) To be awarded summary judgment, a defendant/movant must show an absence of evidence to support at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s case.
Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins,
The city properly points out that “[t]o establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show a legally attributable causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged injury. Conversely, no matter how negligent a party may be, if his act stands in no causal relation to the injury it is not actionable.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Bacon v. Mayor &c. of Savannah,
In both Bacon and Booker, summary judgment was granted to municipalities sued on theories of nuisance stemming from defective or dangerous conditions on streets. In Booker, a five-year-old child riding a bicycle was seriously injured when struck by a motor vehicle at a busy intersection that was alleged to be a nuisance either because overgrown vegetation blocked the view of oncoming cars or because a power pole obstructed the view of the stop sign. Id. at 567. In Bacon, a six-year-old child ran into the street and was struck by a passing car, and the complaint alleged that the city had maintained a nuisance when it failed to remove several large trees along the street that prevented the child from seeing the car as she ran into the street. But in both cases, evidence showed that whether or not the city was negligent, the children ignored traffic laws of which they were aware when they ran or cycled into the street. In both cases, therefore, it was undisputed that the children’s own negligence was clearly the proximate cause of their injuries.
Here, in contrast, no evidence in the record shows that Caleb was negligent. Indeed, the record shows without dispute that he heeded the traffic control signal that was present. He came to a com píete stop at the blinking red light and waited for traffic on Kings Bay Road to clear before entering the intersection. Nor does the record show without dispute that Connell was negligent. He was obeying the speed limit and braked when he saw Caleb’s car, but it was too late to avoid the collision. It was therefore entirely possible that the city’s maintenance of a dangerous condition at the intersection contributed to the collision.
“In order to pierce allegations of material fact contained in the plaintiff’s petition, the evidence offered by defendant on motion for summary judgment must unequivocally refute those allegations and must clearly show what is the truth of the matter alleged.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Lamb v. Ga.-Pacific Corp.,
(b) Moreover, unlike either Booker, supra, or Bacon, supra, some evidence showed that the city was aware of a dangerous condition at the intersection and that it failed to correct it for an unreasonably lengthy time, which may have constituted a nuisance.
The Supreme Court has set out three guidelines to define a nuisance for which a city may be held liable. First, the defect or degree of misfeasance must be to such a degree as would exceed the concept of mere negligence. Second, the act must be of some duration, and the maintenance of the act or defect must be continuous or regularly repetitious. Third, the city must have failed to act within a reasonable time after knowledge of the defect or dangerous condition.
(Footnote omitted.)
Thompson v. City of Fitzgerald,
(c) The trial court found that the negligence of the drivers involved was the intervening proximate cause of Caleb’s injuries. It may well be that evidence could be produced at trial showing that one or the other of the drivers should not have proceeded through the intersection at that time. But even so, any such “negligence” on their part should certainly have been foreseen by the city given the many past collisions at this intersection and the lack of proper guidance given to drivers by the signals installed regarding when they might safely proceed through the intersection. It is well established that
a causal connection between an original act of negligence and injury to another is not broken by the intervening act of a third person, if the nature of such intervening act was such that it could reasonably have been . . . foreseen by the original wrong-doer. Thus, if the intervening cause is . . . one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failing to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. And the risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.)
Wade v. Polytech Indus.,
In general, causation is a jury issue. It should not be determined by the trial court as a matter of law except in plain and undisputed situations.
Flanagan v. Riverside Military Academy,
2. Under a nuisance claim, the nature of a city’s act is irrelevant, because a municipality may be liable for maintaining a nuisance regardless of whether the act or omission creating the nuisance was ministerial or discretionary in nature. City of Social Circle, supra at 583 (1). But we must reach this question to determine whether the city is immune from suit with respect to Riggins’s negligence claim.
The Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may waive the immunity of counties, municipalities, and school districts by statute. OCGA § 36-33-1 states that a municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by purchasing liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51. OCGA § 33-24-51 gives cities and counties the discretion to purchase liability insurance to cover damages arising from the use of any motor vehicle, providing a limited waiver of their governmental immunity to the amount of the insurance purchased.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Cameron v. Lang,
Generally, a city’s decision regarding whether to install a particular traffic control device at a particular location is discretionary, which renders the city immune from liability for its failure to act, “in the absence of a law or ordinance requiring the city to
In support of this argument, Riggins relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dept. of Transp. v. Brown,
Nor did passage of the SPLOST referendum create a mandatory time frame for completing the projects listed or require that the projects be completed in the same order in which they were listed. The city was obligated by the SPLOST budget to complete all the projects it listed, unless they became unfeasible. But it still retained discretion with regard to the order of the projects and also could make adjustments to them, even when operating within the context of a SPLOST project.
Dickey v. Storey,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
Riggins sued other governmental entities as well, but she later dismissed these parties. Only the city remains as a party to this appeal.
For instance, Connell testified on his deposition that a large truck stopped in the through lane on Colerain Road blocked his view of Caleb’s car, but neither Caleb nor Sylve mentioned such a truck. Sylve testified that a truck waiting to make a right turn from Rings Bay Road onto Colerain Road blocked Caleb’s view of traffic on Rings Bay Road, but Warren Bennett, a motorist whose Cadillac was parallel to Connell’s traveling south on Rings Bay Road, was preparing to turn right onto Colerain Road. He testified that no other vehicle was in front of his on Rings Bay Road. Caleb testified that no traffic was stopped on Kings Bay Road.
In McKinley, the plaintiff, who was injured in a vehicular collision and brought suit against the city in negligence, also claimed the city had maintained a nuisance by failing to erect stop signs in both directions at the intersection. The trial court’s rejection of the nuisance claim was affirmed by this court because of facts unique to that case: the collision was not caused by the absence of a four-way stop sign, as alleged by the plaintiff, but by an unknown person’s turning the stop sign to face the wrong direction, a fact of which the city was unaware. Id. at 660.