67 W. Va. 75 | W. Va. | 1910
Lead Opinion
In this action of ejectment, the plaintiff, by the verdict of a jury, has judgment for a fee simple estate in 153 acres of land. In seeking to overthrow the judgment defendant insists that
Plaintiff relies upon a deed from Camden and Arnold, made to him in 1875, and complete possession thereunder since that time. Defendant relies upon a deed from another source, made to him in 1890. Bach deed clearly calls for a tract adjacent to that called for in the other. They each call for the line of an old survey which, properly located, is the division line between them. Upon the faces of the two deeds there is no conflict. Looking to the deeds, there is no overlap or interlock. But in actual contest there is a disputed strip. The dispute has arisen because of different claims as to the proper location of the line of the old survey separating the tracts. Plaintiff insists that defendant has crossed over this division line and encroached upon his land. To oust him therefrom this suit was instituted.
Neither party relies upon perfect chain of paper title; both rely upon possession. Plaintiff says that his possession of land under his deed has extended to the true boundaries called for by that deed and has embraced the land in controversy, and that defendant has not had such possession of the disputed strip as would bar plaintiff from its recovery. Defendant says that his deed calls for the strip; and that, in any event, he now owns it by reason of more than ten years adverse possession.
The jury found that plaintiff’s claims were supported by the . evidence. The evidence as to the true location of the line, possession bjr defendant, the character, of that possession, and other material matters relating to the issue, is conflicting. It is oral testimony of witnesses in the presence of the jury. In such case we have no power to invade the province of the jury by disturbing the verdict on the alleged ground that it is contrary to the evidence.
Has the plaintiff shown a title sufficient■ for recovery? The jury has affirmed by its verdict his claim that he has been in possession for 27 years, under color of title, adverse to all others. Is that' finding of fact such a showing of title as will enable plaintiff to recover in ejectment? The plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title alone. In ejectment this proposition is fundamental. But what are the essentials of strength of title
The expression that a title against all the world must be shown by a plaintiff in ejectment has evidently led to a belief by some that it is always incumbent on the part of such plaintiff to show that title has been granted by the commonwealth. The rule that title must be traced to the commonwealth 'has been carried to an extent that is not justified by reason nor by the purpose for which such tracing is ever required. In ejectment, it is required that the plaintiff trace title to the commonwealth if he relies alone on paper title. But, the rule of tracing title to its original fountain, the sovereignty of the soil, properly pertains only to a showing of paper title — a reliance on paper title alone. Even in such case, presumptions may be established which sometimes suffice to do away with the showing of a complete chain of documents. It must be so, otherwise valid titles and vested rights will be lost by long lapse of time incurring changes which produce the loss of records and evidence. So where a plaintiff in ejectment relies wholly upon paper title, upon deed without possession, he must show the chain taking
In the case under consideration, it is maintained that one may not recover in ejectment upon proof of adverse possession, unless he shows that at some time the state granted the land or that there has been that which would cause a transfer of the state’s title under'Art. XIII of the Constitution — ten years adverse possession and payment of the taxes for five years. In support of this contention we are cited to Witten v. St. Clair, 27 W. Va. 762, which we admit sanctions it. But such view seems unreasonable, unwarranted, and unsound. Shall a plaintiff in ejectment be required to show more than the affirmative of the legal title upon which he relies ? Shall he be required to provide in proof against the mere contingency that the state may not have granted the land or that the state may have title by forfeiture? What if there has been an actual grant, the title resting on which has never been forfeited? Why cause the plaintiff to prove all the essentials of a transfer to him under, the Constitution when there could be no transfer- if the state had no title? More reasonable would it be to require him to show
It is elementary law that where there is possession there is usually presumption of title. 3 Washburn on Real Property, section 1945. That presumption is a legal one; it suffices for proof and avoids the necessity of evidence until it is rebutted.
The presumption of title that arises from adverse possession of land under claim or color of title, embodying as it'must a presupposition that the title has left the state, is either over
Does not the presumption of a grant from the sovereignty prevail in that rule of ejectment law, SO' well observed by us, that a.plaintiff need only trace his title to a source common to that under which the defendant claims? In such case it is never required that plaintiff show that the state or sovereignty parted with the title in some way. Defendant is estopped to deny the title, since he also claims under it. Does not that estoppel rest on a presumption — that the title has left the state ? Yet the decision in Witten v. St. Clair, supra, does not seem even to except such case. Under that decision, if strictly construed, a plaintiff, relying on a source of title common with that of defendant, must nevertheless show that sometime the state granted the land or provided against the mere possibility that it did not grant it by showing that, if not granted, title passed by transfer under the Constitution. It would seem to require every plaintiff in ejectment, at all hazard, to show affirmatively that the title is out of the state, or to guard against the remote possibilty that it may be still in the state. A requirement of that kind is not consistent with reason. It, also, must be based on a presumption — that the -state may have title. That presumption rests on a-thing improbable. Why not recognize the more probable presumption, arising from long adverse possession and the infrequency of state titles in this day, that the state has no title? The latter presumption is sanctioned by law. Mathews v. Burton, 17 Grat. 312; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (15th Ed.), section 17; 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 1289; Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534. In Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, throughout chapter XVIII, there is an enlightening exposition of the subject of presumptions in the law of real property.
Adverse possession of land for.the period of the statutory bar to real actions is a source of title upon which one may recover in ejectment. Plaintiff need only trace his title to such source. If that adverse possession has not been effective as against the state, by reason of a failure of the holder to pay taxes, whereby his claim was forfeited, or otherwise, the defendant must show it. The presumption that there has been a grant and that taxes have been paid, in other words that there is unforfeited .title,
In this case, the establishment by evidence of all the essentials of adverse possession for a period of 27 years, under color of title by the deed which plaintiff produced, and the presumption of title arising therefrom, made a case upon which plaintiff could recover, since it was not successfully met by defendant. There is no error in the judgment; it will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I concur in the decision and I approve the opinion written by Judge BobinsoN. But this case having involved much discussion in conference, and the counsel for the defendant relying with great confidence upon the fact that Riffle did not show title back to the state, I was led to examination of that point and some others upon which I desire to express an opinion, and therefore file this note. Before discussing these points I remark that the case turns on them, because as to boundary and possession the verdict covers them. The jury has fixed the line of the Camden 1,200 acre grant as claimed by Riffle, and in so doing has fixed the line between Riffle and Skinner, because their deeds both call for the Camden line. Riffle’s land is on one side, Skinner’s on the other side of that line. The verdict upon a large amount of oral evidence thus denies that Skinner’s deed covers an inch of the contested land. As their tracts by their deeds are coterminus, there is no interlock. Robinson v. Sheets, 63 W. Va. 394. The verdict also negatives adverse possession in Skinner. Skinner’s deed not covering the disputed land, he has a mere “claim” to it' without color. He must then have actual occupation or enclosure. Ther-e is much and conflicting evidence on that point. The jury found the fact to be that Skinner could not claim the disputed land by possession.
Skinner’s counsel rely for reversal with great confidence on the fact that Riffle does not trace title back to the state, and claims that as plaintiff in ejectment he must therefore fail. Must a plaintiff in ejectment trace his title back to the state? -The general impression is that he must. How it originated as applicable to all cases I do not understand. It is clear upon reason and authority that one in possession can retain it until
I also concur on the ground on which the opinion written by Judge RobiNSON rests it, presumption of grant at some past time, after twenty-eight years of possession. I think the tendency, if not the settled law, at this day is to raise such presumption at some time in the past, maybe before the present constitution, to quiet possession after the longest time fixed by limitation to recover land; but can safely say it is so after twenty years possession. Authorities on this subject: Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, 475; Archer v. Saddler, 2 H. & M. 370; Mathews v. Burton, 17 Grat. 312; Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534; 39 Amer. Dec. 658, 686; 70 Amer. Dec. 529, 540; 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 1290. U. S. v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, is strong to support such presumption after twenty years possession/ No matter whether the subject be corporeal or incorporeal. Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710. This was held as far back as 1822 by the United State Supreme Court. Ricards v. Williams, 7 Wheaton 59. See notes on this case. U. S. Sup. Ct. R., 5 Law. Ed. p. 127-8. In Bolling v. Mayor, 3 Rand. p. 577, Judge Carr, a great lawyer, concedes that when the years assigned by the statute have passed a grant is presumed. This is a fiction of law, true; but it is one which is made by law. for quiet of title. I am disposed to think it conclusive, though some say it is only prima facie. Nothing is shown to the contrary in this case, if it could be shown. No grant to another, no sale or forfeiture for taxes.
But I go further. When it is demanded that a person suing in ejectment who has had possession actual for the statutory period under color of title, claiming the land as his own, shall
Some time after writing the above I add some additional matter in support of .the contention that the statute passes the title of the state. I will cite the South Carolina case of Busby
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
While there are authorities, holding a grant of land by the state cannot be presumed, if such grant is inhibited by a statute, I think Judge RobiNSON's 'opinion correctly states, and properly applies, a general principle of law. The constitution of this state inhibits entry by warrant on lands, Art. XIII., section 2, and there is no statute, authorizing the issuance of patents; but sections 3 and 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution and chapter 105 of the Code provide for disposition of the state’s title to all lands, forfeited, escheated, waste and unappropriated and purchased at sales made for non-payment of taxes and become irredeemable; and the dispositions so1 made are equivalent to express grants. Logically and by parity of reasoning, therefore, a presumption of title arises in litigation between individuals from adverse possession on the part of one of them for a period of time long enough to bar an action against him under the statute of limitations. The unnecessary burden it would impose upon such party, to require him to deduce paper title from the state, or show it to be outstanding in a third party, abundantly justifies the interposition of the legal fiction of a grant or the equivalent thereof, and thus casts upon his opponent the burden of showing loss of this presumptiye title by forfeiture or sale for non-payment of taxes. It is an eminently just and fair rule of procedure.
My real purpose in writing this note, however, is not to strengthen the position taken in the opinion, adopted by the majority of the Court, but to direct attention to the specific ground upon which the decision is based. As is intimated in the opinion, it was suggested in this case that the statute of limitations runs against the state in respect to forfeited, escheated and waste and unappropriated lands. Having investí-, gated that question to some extent, I wish to preserve here certain impressions and suggestions applicable to. the subject. At present, I am of the contrary opinion. Impliedly the provisions of section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution invite
The position I take does not nullify section 20 of chapter 35 of the Code. There are mlany other instances in which rights of action accrue to the state and are barred by time.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
This action grows out of a disputed boundary- line which, when correctly located, is the dividing line between plaintiff and defendant; there is no interlock. Plaintiff claims under a deed from G. D. Camden, and another, dated March 1, 1885, as color of title, and proved possession thereunder for a period of more than 10 years, but did not prove that he had paid taxes thereon for 5 years. Defendant claims under .a deed made by George J. Arnold, dated February 4, 1890, as color of. title, and is now in possession of the disputed land. No grant from the commonwealth to any one for the land was shown; neither do the parties claim title from a common source.
I assume the following legal propositions to be so well established in Virginia and in West Virginia by judicial determination that their correctness will not be denied, viz:
(1). That plaintiff must prove, prima facie, good title to the estate which he claims in the land before he can recover.
(2). That the plea of “not guilty” casts the whole burden upon plaintiff to prove his title.
(3). That, 'when defendant is in peaceable possession, no defense is necessary to defeat recovery until plaintiff has proven title in himself, prima facie good.
(4). That, in Virginia and West Virginia, since the establishment of the United States Government, all titles to land, not theretofore granted, have their origin in the state, the only source of title.
An application of these fundamental principles to the facts in the present case would reverse the judgment of the lower
If the statute of limitations applied in favor of one in possession of the state’s land, who failed to pay taxes, it would not only be inconsistent 'with section 3, Art. XIII of the West Yirginia Constitution, but would also defeat the operation of the forfeiture laws .made in pursuance thereof. For example, suppose D. has been in possession under color for 15 years or more, but has paid no taxes for any five of those years, End is sued in ejectment by P. who has never been in possession, but who claims under a deed from the commissioner of school lands, obtained after D. had been on the land for 10 years, and who has paid all the taxes since the date of his deed, can there be any doubt of P’s right to recover? If D’s possession alone could defeat P’s recovery it would nullify section 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution and prevent the transfer of the state’s title to the one who had complied with the constitutional requirements, and would invest title in a person who had not complied with the constitution. Would the law aid D’s possession by presuming a grant to have issued to him' older than P’s title? I think clearly not; and even if such presumption were allowed it could not help D’s situation, unless he also proved that he had paid taxes. Because possession without payment of taxes will not prevent forfeiture; and if possession alone will not prevent forfeiture, pray, how can it create title ? Title thus attempted to be created would die before its birth. Now, if D’s possession, without payment of taxes, is not a good defense against P’s action, how could D maintain an action of ejectment upon-such possession? If it is not a good defense, surely it can not be a good title; and to hold it such would, in the case supposed, be so revolutionary as to make his
If plaintiff claims by paper title he must trace it back to the state’s grant, to the source of title; and if he claims under
If the statute of limitations does- not run against the state, it necessarily follows that it does not run in favor of the claimant until the state has parted with its title. The first point of the syllabus in Hall v. Webb, 21 W. Va. 318, is as follows: “The statute of limitations does not commence to run in favor of an occupant of land, while the title thereto is vested in the State. But the statute does commence to run in favor of such occupant against the grantee of the State from the date of the grant-of
An examination of our decisions will show that, in those cases wherein a plaintiff has been permitted to recover upon a pos-sessory title, without proof of payment of taxes, it appeared, either that the state had parted with its title to the land in controversy, or that the parties claimed title from a common source, in which latter event the defendant was estopped to deny plaintiffs title, for by denying plaintiff’s title' he would be denying his own.
It is admitted that defendant could have defeated plaintiff’s action by proving that the land had been omitted from the land books and had not been taxed for five successive years. But why the necessity of proving this, when it does not appear that the state had ever parted with its title?- Such defense is only necessary to show a forfeiture of plaintiff’s title to the state, and/how can there be a forfeiture of a title never acquired? ■ To hold that it is necessary for defendant to establish, as a'defense, that plaintiff’s title has been forfeited to the state, before plaintiff has proved that the state had parted with the title, is a contradiction in terms.
The well established rule of law, subject to the exceptions above pointed out, prevailing in'this state and in Virginia, which requires plaintiff to prove a good and sufficient title and a' right
I do not suppose any one will contend that, if the state had instituted proceedings to sell the land in controversy, as school land, it would not have been necessary for Eiffie to prove payment of taxes in order to defeat the state. By what rule of practice then is he.required to prove more in one instance as defendant, in- order to show title against the state, than in the other, as plaintiff, to show title against this defendant? In such a proceeding by the state, if he failed to prove payment of taxes, he would not have so much as a right to redeem, because the land had never been his, and there could be no redemption of a thing never owned. The state could sell the land and would be entitled to all the proceeds, and the purchaser would become entitled of the land. If the claimant is not entitled of the land in the one case, how can it be reasonably said that he is entitled in. the other ? If it is necessary to pay taxes in order to get a title to the land, it would certainly seem to follow that' it is necessary to prove payment of taxes in order to establish title.
The majority of the Court are of opinion that proof that the state had parted with its title is dispensed with, by a presump"tion that the state had granted the land, arising from lapse of time. I think this view is erroneous for two reasons: (.1) it would reverse the rule of practice in this state, which requires plaintiff to prove title; (2) it assumes that possession under color, or claim, of title, is adversary possession, whereas, as I have endeavored to show that, agreeable to the repeated decisions of this Court, and of the courts of Virginia, possession, however long continued, can not be adversary possession, either in favor of the claimant, or against the state unless, and until, the state has parted with its title; therefore, it becomes necessary to prove that the state has parted with its title in order to mark
But, whatever may be tbe law in other jurisdictions concerning the presumption of a state grant in favor of one who has had possession of land for a long period of time, such law has no application in our jurisprudence in favor of a plaintiff in ejectment, for the following reasons, viz: (1) The burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove his title; no material fact essential to prove it can be presumed. (2) A material fact will not generally be presumed which can be easily proved. (3) The law requires the best evidence, when it can be had. (4) A fact will not be presumed in favor of a party who is in possession of other facts which are better evidence of his claim, and which, if proved, would render the presumption unnecessary.
Now, applying these principles to the present ease, the title to the land was the matter, in question; it was not necessary to presume a grant in order to support plaintiff’s title, because it would, at most, have shown him to have a title, only prima facie good; it was easy for plaintiff to prove payment of taxes, if he had in fact paid them; this was a mlatter within his own knowledge, and if he had proved payment of taxes it would have rendered the presumption of a grant unnecessary and, at the same time, would have established in plaintiff an indefeasible title under section 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution. On the other hand, if plaintiff did not in fact pay the taxes for five years, the land was not his, the title was not in him, and he should not recover it. Again, if it be proper to presume a material fact to make out plaintiff’s title, why not presume that he paid the taxes, that a man who owed to his state this duty had discharged it? This presumption would seem to me to be just as reasonable as the other, and quite as good law, if it had not been heretofore decided by this court that, “there is no presumption of payment of taxes arising simply from the duty of payment.” State v. Jackson, 56 W. Va. 560.
All of the West Virginia cases which appear to hold that possession of land under color, or claim, of title for a period of ten years, will vest title in the claimant upon which he may recover in ejectment, are easily to be distinguished front Witten v. St. Clair, supra, and from the case now before us; they do not
In the case of Archer v. Saddler, 2 H. & M. 371, wherein Judge Tucker uses the language quoted by Judge RobiNSON in support of the doctrine of presuming that a state grant has issued, that distinguished jurist, at the beginning of the same opinion, uses the following language, viz: “The principal questions in this case are: 1. Whether upwards of sixty years peaceable and uninterrupted possession in the caveator, and those under whom he claims, together with payment of quit rents antecedent to', the revolution, and of taxes since that ■period, afford a sufficient ground to presume a grant from the crown,' for the lands in question.” (The italics are mine). What would have been the opinion of that eminent judge, as to presuming a grant in favor of a claimant who had paid no quit-rents or taxes? We can only guess. Furthermore; his opinion shows that such a rule as a presumption of grant was not then established, but that it was likely to become necessary in consequence of the operation of the law of descent, and that such rule, if ever established, would be born of necessity. But what would have been Judge Tucker’s view concerning ■ the “necessity” of
If plaintiff has not, in fact, paid taxes on the land for which he sues, it would be against the policy of the organic law.to permit him to recover it; if he has, in fact, paid his taxes he is invested with an indefeasible title, and being able easily to prove whether or not he has paid taxes, I can see no reason in law for presuming that he had obtained a grant. I have always understood that the law gave the defendant in ejectment the benefit of a presumption that he was entitled to his possession at least, and burdened the plaintiff with proving title. This Court went even further than this, and held that the defendant in possession was presumed to be the owner, in the case of Teass v. City of St. Albans, 38 W. Va. 1, cited by Judge BobiNSON in the majority opinion. This burden of proving title can not, in my opinion, be relieved by presuming any fact essential to show title. It was to invest persons with good title to land who are in this plaintiff’s situation and who paid taxes, and thus to quiet titles, protect actual settlers and en
I would reverse the judgment of the lower court for failure of plaintiff to prove title.