Riesbeck v. Industrial Paint & StripRiesbeck v. Industrial Paint & Strip
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Teddy Riesbeck, Pro se 102 Wood Terrace Woodsfield, Ohio 43793
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Gary W. Smith 316 South Main Street P.O. Box 599 Woodsfield, Ohio 43793-0599
{¶1} Appellant, Industrial Paint and Strip, appeals a decision of the County Court of Monroe County, Small Claims Division, awarding Appellee Teddy Riesbеck (hereinafter “Riesbeck“) payment for two weeks of unused vacation pay. Appellant claims that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence and that a new trial should have been granted. The record, including Appellant‘s own written vacation policy and employment records, fully supports the verdict and the trial court‘s judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} Riesbeck was hired on October 10, 2000. On September 5, 2008, eleven of Apрellant‘s employees were terminated in preparation for the upcoming closure of the business. According to Appellant‘s vacation policy, Riesbeck had earned three weeks of vacation time on October 10, 2007, and she expected to be paid for any unused vacation time when her job was terminated. She did not receive payment for unused vacation time, and filed a small claims actiоn on September 18, 2008. A bench trial was held on October 22, 2008. Appellant was represented by counsel. Riesbeck appeared pro se. Two joint exhibits were submitted at trial. The first was Appellant‘s written vacatiоn policy. The second was Appellant‘s record of the eleven employees who were fired on September 5, 2008, including the amount of vacation time for each that had accrued, had been usеd, and had been paid at separation. Riesbeck testified at trial. Richard Libby, the president of Industrial Paint and Strip, also testified. The court filed a two-page judgment entry on October 30, 2008, and awarded Riesbeck two weeks of unused vacation time, valued at $616 plus interest.
{¶4} On November 4, 2008, Appellant filed a document titled: “DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO MODIFY OR VACATE JUDGMENT OF COURT, FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF COURT, OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.” The motion refers to both
{¶5} Appellant filed this appeal on December 1, 2008.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
{¶6} “The trial court erred by finding for the Plaintiff-Appellee, which was clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶7} Appellant argues that the judgment was against the manifest weight of the еvidence. “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the еvidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280, 376 N.E.2d 578.
{¶8} According to Appellant‘s records, Riesbeck was hired on October 11, 2000, and reached her seventh anniversary date on October 11, 2007. The vacation policy as contained in Joint Exhibit 1 states that terminated employees shall be paid for unused vacation days, that vacation is eаrned on the employee‘s anniversary date of hire, and that employees are awarded fifteen days of vacation after seven years of service. Thus, on Riesbeck‘s seventh anniversary hire date, October 11, 2007, she automatically earned 15 days of vacation.
{¶9} Riesbeck‘s employment was terminated on September 5, 2008. On that date, according to Appellant‘s documents, she was due to be paid for any unusеd vacation time. Again, according to Appellant‘s own Exhibit 2 that was submitted at trial, Riesbeck had accrued three weeks of vacation prior to being fired, and as of the termination date she had used one week of vacation time. Riesbeck‘s testimony at trial was somewhat confusing because she apparently believed she had only accrued two weeks of vacation time on October 11, 2007, and she was not surе if she was entitled to one or two weeks of paid vacation time on the date her employment was terminated. She testified that she used one week of vacation in January of 2008, and that was all the vacаtion time she had used since her last date of vacation accrual. (Tr., pp. 4-5.)
{¶11} Neither party appeared to understand the actual written terms of Appellant‘s vacаtion policy. Both witnesses seemed to be unclear as to whether vacation accrued on the anniversary of hire date or at the beginning of the calendar year. The policy as written was simple and clear. Employees earned a lump-sum vacation on their anniversary date of employment. Vacation days could not be carried over or accrued “year to year“. If an employee was fired, he or she was entitled to be paid for the unused vacation days that had been awarded at the previous anniversary of the employee‘s hire date. Riesbeck‘s testimony and Appellant‘s documents as submitted on the record reflect that Riesbeck was owed two weeks of vacation pay. The manifest weight of the evidence supports this verdict. Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} “The trial court erred by not modifying or vacating its judgment of October 30, 2008; by not granting the Defendant-Appellant relief from its judgment of October 30, 2008; or in the alternative, by not granting Defendant-Appellant‘s request for a new trial.”
{¶13} Appellant arguеs that a small claims action may be modified or vacated in the same manner as other civil actions, pursuant to
{¶14}
{¶15} A trial court‘s decision to overrule a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Mannion v. Sandel (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 318, 321, 744 N.E.2d 759.
{¶16} Appellant does not set forth any basis for its request to grant a new trial other than that one of its representatives believes the trial judge made the wrong decision and that some representаtive would like to present new evidence on its behalf. Although a
{¶17} In order to prevail on a
{¶18} Once again, Appellant‘s claim for relief is that it has a documеnt that would have allowed it to prevail at trial. Relief from judgment may be granted based on newly discovered evidence, but similar to
{¶19} Appellant alleges that Riesbeck committed a fraud on the court by lying about her vacation time. As stated earlier, whether or not Riesbeck was lying, i.e., whether she was credible, was a matter for the trier of fact to decide and does not constitute a basis for relief from judgment. Although
{¶21} Based on the record in this matter, Appellant has not demonstrated any error in the court‘s judgment, and the small claims judgment in favor of Riesbeck is affirmed in full.
Vukovich, P.J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.