27 Ind. 288 | Ind. | 1866
The appellants filed their complaint in the Vigo Common Pleas, alleging, substantially, that they were, and had been for several years, provision dealers in and residents of Baltimore, Maryland, and doing their entire business there, except so far as afterwards stated; that their capital and personal property, including stock in trade, merchandise, provisions, produce and money were assessed for taxation in the said city of Baltimore, and State of Maryland, for the years 1864 and 1865, under the generic name of personal property, and that such taxes had been paid; that as such provision dealers, they have a packing house in Terre TIaute, Indiana, and are in the habit, during December, January and February of each year, of purchasing, slaughtering and packing hogs, at the said packing house;, for shipment from Indiana, and sale in their business at Baltimore; that in December, 1864, they bought and slaughtered at Terre Haute, for their said trade in Baltimore; &57,380 worth of hogs, of which $37,480 worth were bought in and brought from Illinois; that said money was procured from their said house in Baltimore, and was taxed as aforesaid; that during December, January and February of 1864 and 1865, they packed their said hogs at Terre Haute, and shipped them from Indiana and sold them in 1865, in the prosecution of their said business, in Baltimore; that the value of said hogs did not exceed $57,380; that at the same time, at Terre Haute, they bought and packed for Henry Fieman & Son, resident provision dealers of Baltimoi-e, with money received from them, $25,000 worth of hogs, for their said business in Baltimore, and shipped the hogs so packed to said Henry Fieman & Son, at Baltimore, where they were sold in 1865, in the prosecution of their said business; that the capital and personal property of Henry Fieman § Son, including their stock in trade, merchandise, provisions, produce and money,.
The affidavit of one of the plaintiffs was also filed with • the complaint, setting out the same facts as in the affidavit filed with the said auditor; also the copy of the assessment from the tax duplicate.
The defendants appeared and filed their demurrer to the complaint, and assigned as cause of demurrer that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer, to which decision plaintiffs excepted; and the plaintiffs failing to amend, final judgment was rendered for the defendants, and plaintiffs appeal to this court.
The first question presented by this record is, whether the property in question was properly taxable in the State of Indiana. "We regard this question as fully settled in the case of Powell et al. v. The City of Madison, 21 Ind. 335. In that case, this language was used by Judge Worden: '“It may be true that for the purposes of taxation the situs of such property as debts, corporation stocks and such intangibilities may be regarded as the domicil of the owner. The City of Evansville v. Hall, 14 Ind. 27. But it does not follow that such' is the rule in reference to property that has tangible, corporeal qualities, and must have an actual situs, and we think both on principle and authority it may be taxed wherever found, without reference to the domicil of the owner. This subject underwent a very full examination in the case of Hoyt v. The Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 244, and the decision there fully sustains the views above expressed.” In the case under consideration, the property was not in transit through the county of Vigo. It was brought there, not for immediate reshipment, but that money, labor and skill might be there expended upon it, to enhance its value and change its condition as a merchantable commodity. While there, and undergoing this change^ in its condition, it, as property, had a situs
Again, it is insisted that the statute does not authorize the taxing of the personal property of Henry Rieman & Son to the appellants. Section 10 of the act for the assessment of taxes, (1 G. & H. 70,) provides that “the property of every' ward shall be listed by his guardian,” &c., “ of every company, firm, body politic or corporate, by the principal accounting officer, partner or agent thereof.” The averments of the complaint show that the appellants were the agents of Rieman & Son, and that it was their duty to list the property for taxation. The assessment was therefore properly made against the appellants. Powell v. The City of Madison, supra.
It is insisted, however, that it was the duty of the auditor to release the property from taxation upon the affidavit filed, under the ninety-second section of the act for the assessment of taxes. 1 G. & H. 97. That section .provides that “if any person who has been assessed with personal property out of the State, shall satisfy the auditor of the county where such assessment is made, by his own affidavit, and such other evidence as such auditor may require, that he has paid a tax on such property for the current year, in any other State in the Union, such auditor shall release such property from taxation.” It will be observed that the law requires, first, the affidavit of the person assessed, “that he has paid a tax on such property for the
It- is objected that the assessment of this property was made by the auditor, instead of being made by the treasurer of the county, as required by the “ act to authorize county treasurers to assess property which may be omitted by assessors, and to legalize assessments heretofore made by treasurers,” approved March 3,1859. 1 G.& H.74. That act provides that such assessment by the treasurer need not be made upon actual view, and we think the averments in the complaint show an adoption by the treasurer of the act of the county auditor in making the assessment. The demurrer was properly sustained to the complaint.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.