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Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Steve-Doring Co.
378 P.2d 647
Alaska
1963
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*1 (4) all of' the four requirements has meets the fy the board that he character ” * * * proviso clause determined qualifications named the Board. (Emphasis ours.) 9(a). subsection states: section wording The first proviso This modifies the preceding requires and shall he “Any person apply that an may examination shall be given Alaska applicant eligible admission is found to be not qualified Bar, by reciprocity any as one of upon examination the four condi * * (Em- tions. If the finds provided applicant Act board as in this qualified phasis all ours.) conditions he shall be admitted without examination and other provides two clearly wording above upon wise substantially the same terms and admission methods which different conditions as jurisdiction are fixed in his accomplished upon Bar Alaska be — the admission of attorneys. Alaska reciprocity. examination petitioner Since was found to have satisfied 9(a) subsection wording of The first qualification all requirements of the pertinent part: states proviso clause he could not be Attorneys good “Reciprocity. take an examination. another state standing in Bar of The Clerk of this court will therefore * * * members of the which admits prepare a certificate admission for de- * * * admitted shall be Bar Alaska livery petitioner upon his taking the up- otherwise without examination required oath. same terms substantially respec- in their conditions as are fixed the admission jurisdictions tive * *

attorneys (Em- from Alaska

phasis ours.) clear and emphasized portion seems shall be

unambiguous. Admission without admission shall Otherwise examination. Raymond RIDGEWAY, Individually and as substantially terms and condi- upon the same Danny Ridgeway, next friend for respective juris- in their minor, Appellant, as are fixed tions a attorneys from for the admission of dictions “without examination”

Alaska. words NORTH STAR TERMINAL & STEVE- COMPANY, Appellee. the board’s ignored to accommodate DORING must applicants treated in theory should be 181. No. their state would same manner Supreme Court Alaska. applicants. Alaska treat Feb. proviso brings us to the clause This part: 9(a) which states

subsection

“Provided, however, prereq- that as a to admission to the Alaska Bar

uisite any require attor- Board shall such examination,

neys pass an to take and applicant passed (1)

unless the examination, (2) engaged bar

state practice of law at least

the active years previous out of the six

five * * * filing (3) fore graduate school accredited law * * American Bar Association *2 Irvine, M. Savage, of Clark & Sav- John

age, Anchorage, appellant. for Manders, appel- Anchorage, E. John lee. NESBETT, J., Before and DIMOND C. AREND, JJ. NESBETT, Chief Justice. This appeal from a verdict and judgment the defendant a suit by plaintiff brought individually and Danny, minor, half his son for dam- ages alleged resulting negligent from the injury employee of the lad of de- fendant-appellee. As an affirmative defense answer, in its amended application compensa- for workmen’s tion benefits had been made that some paid already Danny. benefits question presented The first is whether repeated questions and argument by coun- appellee pertaining sel for to the fact that plaintiff-appellant had made compensation preju- benefits plaintiff’s diced case that a new trial should granted. pre-trial conference was ordered held on 1961. Plaintiff filed the June memorandum, pre-trial appar- ently August no conference was held until pre- 26, 1961, days three before No prepared. In an trial order affidavit support of his motion for a new filed trial, counsel stated that at the for explana- long then delivered a ruled The conference nothing tion to the on workmen’s 'compensation had that workmen’s coverage, explaining anything concern- counsel issues and to do with the *3 compensation ing strictly was immaterial to by the abide reluctantly to agreed defendant case, only the gone the that he had into mat- motion hearing on the judge’s At the view. because,' he ter the that had that to extent he stated judge for new trial the trial going con- as far as we with- “having affidavit entirely agree the did not with [si'c] any objection question, out to the happened the at the cerning what you Jury had that will-- he should have the facts so was that ference. His recollection judge position coun- know what was done.” The then thought stated that he the un- on specifically the defense based plaintiff that overruled sel for was taken and well keep compensation, mind, workmen’s that there he stated changed he would less election, had no and compensation that concerning the anything out proceed The' entitled to with the action. case. jury to specifically was not instructed disre- After the trial jury the had been selected gard testimony. the that judge advised counsel defendant for 'occasions, du.ring Oh at the re- least two as to jury the he did not intend advise 'subject.of work-1 mainder of the trial the recess, During a this affirmative defense. 'by' compensation brought up men’s approximately com- when trial was half the posed questions by' defendant counsel for approached pleted,- counsel for defendant by plain- objection for and made counsel , judge the alone in chambers and obtained argument jury, During closing the tiff.' permission Danny Ridge- ask the witness ' brought' the' again for coünsel way question com- concerning workmen’s ' ; up by argúing: matter this, pensation. Upon learning of counsel' ' n “Now, peculiar position I’m in a here—(cid:127) judge.during then contacted the ' very peculiar, because the Court obj was ad- the and ected. He same recess regard originally .instructed in to the. vised that the would the compensation, bring matter of I permitted pertained to an' it because' up.” . . it defense, if counsel' affirmative but that (cid:127) plaintiff objected, he be-sustained: would to., permitted objection, Over counsel-was argue doing the evidence so insisted. he had witness was then asked if paid: that the- doctor bills had been 'This compensation elected to receive workmen’s disputed for; -immediately counsel' replied in benefits and the affirmative. plaintiff. The court then took over and- plaintiff'obj Counsel ected. The follow- - point jury that stated the the immar transpired. ing then them, terial to issues before but that if' Having going "THE COURT: [sic] been, paid, riot doctor bills had if I into this far want to finish mat- Compensation Alaska Workmen’s Board- Now, probably, stipulation ter out. boy injured scope; that found agree can counsel employment, paid., bills would be you agree pending. is still Will —- of the again At the close you. both of .jury orally length instructed the at some on Yes, “MR. sir. CLARK: operation of the the mechanics Alas- you stated, “THE COURT: And will tell Compensation Act and ka Workmen’s much, any, Jury, how has been he intended overrule by way received Workman’s Com- raising compensation, -had; ' pensation? it when summarizing not'mentioned really beginning at the of'fhe trial.' “MR. CLARK: I don’t know. ; $300.00, it, about I think it’s isn’t study lengthy John? leads instruction jury may very the conclusion “MR. MANDERS: us $380.00.” ject interpreted judge’s objection by well remarks plaintiff. being The judge assurance since ruling stated that his was based injured job, concededly his doctor the fact that defendant had compensation bills that his workmen’s would be taken care of and in an affirmative wages though previ- for loss of even he had twice ously no con- ruled determined board was of that the defense was not avail- cern of able to before them. point in the case defendant. From on- ward specifically the judge’s was not instructed control over the situation disregard point. seems testimony all at this no point have .relaxed to the control. Counsel defendant was even *4 is that im general rule The permitted argue to the inadmissible jury proper information bring to before the dence to jury the although judge by the that plaintiff’s right injured to regarding the time had unequivocally de- overruled the benefits. To do workmen’s fense in explanations one of jury. his to the error, generally to be reversible held requiring judge The trial have a new trial. should given a ruling definite on the be principle on The rule is based the fore trial, preferably in the writing after that a tort-feasor entitled have his is not to pre-trial conference. He should then have liability merely reduced because ruling adhered to the himself and enough was fortunate have received com to compliance by strict counsel. Deliberate expenses pensation injuries for his or from breach of the .rule counsel would source,1 assumption a collateral and on the grounds disciplinary action the court likely knowledge that that fact will more of imposition of costs in the event mis of jury against not than influence the unequivocally trial. Failure to announce liability on the issues and dama of in requires and enforce the rule this case ges.2 and a new reversal trial at considerable trial appears recog- to have additional cost to state.3 pre-trial general nized rule at the It alleged is next the trial court erred again summarizing ference and when instructing jury on contributory neg- at the commence- ligence when no evidence had been adduced ment of the written order during the trial which would giv- warrant settled the matter. Counsel ing the instruction. definitely defendant was advised at the beginning of the trial that the not' employed Danny an Anchorage be advised on to the affirmative defense market. Late food afternoon of compensation. workmen’s based on For day injury his he was ordered apparent reason not from some the record employer to drive a truck to defendant’s appears changed re- pick up warehouse number of cases during his views laxed course of the - goods. According Danny’s of canned permit when he decided testimony he at the arrived warehouse about question to ask a pertaining before closing fifteen minutes He time. compensation coverage, trips previous sub- made five to the ware- Lines, Hargis, applying Texas; v. Bus Inc. 204 1. Denco law of see also An 339, 560, (1951). 1154, (1961). not., 229 P.2d 564 A.L.R.2d Okl. 77 Hernandez, Hernandez, (9th v. 2. Burnett 263 F.2d 212 Burnett 263 3.See F.2d 212 1959) Cir., applying Oregon; Cir., 1959), (9th the law of where the first breach Co., rapid Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil in a F.2d similar resulted deterioration Cir., (5th 1950), denied, rule, cert. U.S. of the effectiveness result- 734, (1951), ing 71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 1350 in reversal.

65J manager day. We are of the it was The warehouse view house day to give error preparing close for the instruction. The defend having service ant had the quite disgruntled proving at burden its pair by preponderance quitting near time. truck so accustomed began truck in their evidence to load the evidence. introduced no passing pitch- manager support manner with the whatsoever defense. boy’s truck ing goods testimony only proved from forklift own that he the cases Danny platform employer’s down was exercising warehouse contractual right and stack goods who stood the truck receive remove from defendant’s However, warehouse; anger of his them. because inten manager tionally occasion warehouse kicked goods several off the cases goods narrowly Danny; kicked three cases of off forklift forklift which missed Danny engaged stacking at once. that he again was warned not to do this The cases fell onto because the danger that moment. but that he do it missing narrowly bed him. again, causing injury. truck serious This testi manager mony warned the warehouse who did not raise a of contribu *5 having tory work at swearing negligence still over jury. lad The had passed every The then two manager late hour. right that after he had assume in manner. or three cases the accustomed manager warned the -of danger in Danny a “thunk” as testified that he heard volved the incident would not be deliberate a and a leaning stacking ly repeated. he over case tendency The a natural of split goods him in youth second later a case of hit of sixteen would be to an trust that back, injuries causing responsible the middle of position adult defend of manager The complained warehouse of. manager ant’s warehouse would not con any kicking cases off the forklift in- dangerous practice denied tinue though even on direct examination but ad- may the truck angered. duty have he been His may cross-examination that he employer’s mitted to service his No customers. Danny a which struck thrown box have demands been had made on unreasonable Danny assumed, the back. obviously him. and had assume, every right that he could con contributory pleaded defendant had The loading operation tinue free from the A full affirmative defense. negligence bodily infliction intentional of harm. complete instruction on and contributory negligence of even Exception in- the court. given had a if there been such this plain- was taken struction case, a intentionally is not tort exception was taken the time At the tiff. committed.4 admittedly there was stated trial colleague concurring Our feels that we contributory negli- evidence of no direct injected the issue intentional tort pleaded had that defendant but gence, it.and appeal. case on We into the have not in- properly Danny might infer 'the .that trial do so. The tended to stated contributorily negligent. During opinion inwas his enough that there motion plaintiff’s for a new hearing intention to of an dence commit a tort to that the judge commented instruc- giving the instruction on warrant in that the warranted could tion tributory negligence. hold We that even contributorily found evidence, was such contributory if there continuing work under the negligent not be a valid defense. circumstances, knowing that the warehouse judgment is actually try- reversed and mad him is manager was case a new remanded for hurt him. ing to Harris, Opinion Restatement, (1934); No. cf. McLemore 374 P.2d 410 § Torts 1962). (Alaska AREND, (concurring). contributory negligence should not have Justice been given. However, I do believe that I concur in in this the result reached majority wrong are in- saying that case, opinion but I am the court this struction should not be- given have been inject right the case the no into they cause find that the defendant’s issue of intentional tort.1 The guilty of an aggravated kind tort tort, plead not on the intentional greater which was ordinary negligence than only part agent, and to contributory which negligence can- ordinary negligence. Nor was the case not be as a defense. Even on the tried on tort, of intentional either issue trial, motion for plaintiff clung a new by express implied part or consent of the theory ordinary negligence. ies.2 any consent, express If there had been or party rule of law that where a implied, try case on in- the issue of relies in the trial ground court on certain wrong tentional negligence, or wanton it theory or of action or defense he bound should apparent somewhere in the in- thereby and will ap- not allowed in structions to jury. have searched I pellate court adopt any posi- to assume or length those instructions at find fail to tion or attitude which is inconsistent there- any theory therein reference to tort or with, shift, change, or abandon ordinary negligence other than that of theory contentions; appellate and the negligence. case was submitted to the court not on its own motion new create jury solely ordinary neg- on the issues of held, issues.4 Thus has been I ligence neg- and the defense so, rightly ground liability lieve that the ligence. *6 appeal cannot be shifted on or review from ordinary defendant did not sus- negligence be that the that of to that reck- proving less negligence, tain his burden of or wanton nor from wan- an instruction on ordinary and therefore ton to negligence.5 majority express implied par- the conduct of refer 1. The consent of the agent, ties, they respects claimed which is shall be treated in all they plead- to have caused son as if had been raised in negli injury, ings.” Danny’s However, points “intentional Professor Moore majority fairly gence.” mean Unless the out that “it cannot be said that ' negli- negligence” any implied try wanton there is “intentional consent ' inept, parties squarely gence, use of the term is issue where the their do not recognize between intent is a distinction it as an there issue the trial.” See Prosser, Moore, 8, negligence. Practice, para. 15.13, 3 § See Torts Federal (cid:127) 1955). (2d 30, (2d 1948). 30, ed. There at 847 ed. at 120 § direct evidence record was no Hoevet, 3. Edwards v. 284, 185 Or. 200 P. injure Danny, intended to 955, 960-961, (1948). 2d 6 A.L.R.2d 104 might though a trier of the. facts Glassley, Ind.App. v. See Johnson 118 from such intent other inferred . 704, 488, (1949). 83 N.E.2d wrong had been made dence intentional Trotto, case. Maria 442, issue in the 5.. Santa v. 297 Mass. 540, (1937); 9 N.E.2d 111 A.D.R. 1253 15(b) provides Heffelfinger, “[w]hen is- 535, Consentino 2.Civ.R. 360 Mo. (1950). raised are tried sues not S.W.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Steve-Doring Co.
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 11, 1963
Citation: 378 P.2d 647
Docket Number: 181
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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