382 S.E.2d 409 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1989
The appellee, William. O. Brunson, sued to obtain a judicial declaration that he is entitled to access to certain medical records in the possession of the appellant, Ridgeview Institute, Inc. The complaint alleged that a former psychiatric patient at Ridgeview, Harold P. Cronic, shot and wounded the appellee, shot and killed the appellee’s wife, and then shot and killed himself shortly after receiving treatment there; that the appellee “firmly believes” under the circum
In its answer, Ridgeview asserted that the records in question were absolutely privileged under state law and that it was not authorized to release them even with the consent of Cronic’s administrator. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee on this issue, concluding, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, that under the particular facts of this case the release of the records would not be precluded by the psychiatrist-patient privilege, see OCGA § 24-9-21, or by the psychologist-patient privilege. See OCGA § 43-39-16. Ridgeview appeals. Held:
Although the issue was not raised by either party in the court below, it is evident that the allegations contained in the complaint do not state a justiciable claim for declaratory relief. Simply stated, the appellee’s problem is that although he “firmly believes” he has a cause of action against Ridgeview and possibly others as a result of their failure to foresee and prevent Cronic’s conduct, he cannot be certain about this until Ridgeview’s medical records have been made available to him. However, the appellee’s problem in this regard will not be resolved merely by an adjudication that Ridgeview is authorized to release the records to him, for Ridgeview would still be under no legal duty to do so. What the appellee needs is a procedure by which Ridgeview can be required to release the records to him; and his remedy in this regard is simply to file an action against Ridgeview
“This court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly held that although the Declaratory Judgments Act as amended [OCGA § 9-4-2 (c)] provides that relief by declaratory judgment is available notwithstanding other adequate legal or equitable remedies, the necessity therefor must appear, and that a petition will not lie where all rights of the parties have already accrued and where no facts or circumstances are alleged showing a necessity for adjudication in order to relieve the plaintiff from the risk of taking future undirected action, which, without such action, would jeopardize the plaintiffs interest. [Cit.]” United States Fid. &c. Co. v. Bishop, 121 Ga. App. 75, 77 (172 SE2d 855) (1970). See also Rowan v. Herring, 214 Ga. 370, 374 (105 SE2d 29) (1958). It being apparent that the judicial declaration sought by the appellee will not relieve him of any risk or uncertainty with regard to the legal consequences of future conduct on his part, so as to enable him to avoid repudiating obligations or losing rights, we hold that the trial court erred in entertaining the action. Accord Peeples Indus. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 189 Ga. App. 857, 859 (377 SE2d 691) (1989). The judgment below is accordingly vacated with direction that the complaint be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judgment vacated with direction.