Ridge v. Rademacher, 402 So. 2d 1312

402 So. 2d 1312 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1981

402 So. 2d 1312 (1981)

Ronald RIDGE, Appellant,
v.
Norman RADEMACHER and Hazel Rademacher, Appellees.

No. 81-108.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

August 18, 1981. Rehearing Denied September 21, 1981.

Ress, Gomez, Rosenberg & Howland and Miguel A. Orta, North Miami, for appellant.

Michael Lechtman, North Miami Beach, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We hold that an unsworn statement^[1] to a municipal police officer in regard to an alleged crime is not accorded an absolute privilege which will bar, as a matter of law, a subsequent action for slander based on such a statement, particularly when it is alleged to have been maliciously made. Such a statement partakes of a qualified privilege and is a mixed question of law and fact, depending on the actual malice established. Hartley & Parker v. Copeland, 51 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1951); Axelrod v. Califano, 357 So. 2d 1048 (Fla.1st DCA 1968); Glynn v. City of Kissimmee, 383 So. 2d 774 (Fla.5th DCA 1980).

Therefore, the final order dismissing the last amended complaint is reversed, with directions to require an answer by the defendants within an appropriate time.^[2]

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

NOTES

[1] Pleadings or sworn statements in judicial proceedings may be "absolute". Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 21 So. 109 (1897); Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So. 2d 99 (Fla.2d DCA 1962); McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966); Farish v. Wakeman, 385 So. 2d 2 (Fla.4th DCA 1980). Unsworn statements in legislative and executive proceedings may also be "absolute". Robertson v. Industrial Insurance Company, 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954); McNayr v. Kelly, Supra; Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Kribs v. City of Boynton Beach, 372 So. 2d 195 (Fla.4th DCA 1979); Mueller v. The Florida Bar, 390 So. 2d 449 (Fla.4th DCA 1980); Kohn v. Davis, 390 So. 2d 1246 (Fla.1st DCA 1980).

[2] This opinion and decision will not foreclose the trial court, upon an appropriate motion, from considering either the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants or a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case, in the event that the record in either of such instance will not permit the plaintiff to go forward.