Walker, J.,

after stating the case: The counsel of defendant, in their argument before us, and also in their brief, laid great stress upon the position that there was no evidence that the car from which the plaintiff fell was defective, and for this reason the instructions of the court, to which they had excepted, were unwarranted and erroneous, and not that they did not state correctly the legal principle applicable to the case, if there had been such evidence. Defendant also moved to nonsuit for the same reason. We agree with them that it is necessary, in all cases, that there should be evidence from which the jury might reasonably and properly infer that there was negligence (Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 71 N. C., 451; Byrd v. Express Co., 139 N. C., 273; Crenshaw v. Street Railway Co., 144 N. C., 320), but we do not concur in the statement that there is no such evidence of negligence in this case. If we were permitted to restrict our inquiry to the evidence introduced by the defendant, we might assent to the conclusion of the learned counsel; but we are required to examine both sides of the case — to hear and consider what each has said about the tragedy. They stoutly resist the plaintiff’s assertion that the doctrine, res ipsa loquitur, applies to the case; but we think it does.

The undisputed facts, in this connection, are these: There were at least fifteen box cars in the train, and a caboose, from which the men started when ordered to make themselves ready for loading and unloading at Cardenas, the next stopping place. There is no evidence that the roof of any of those fifteen cars was blown off by the wind except the one in question, on which plaintiff was standing at the time he was carried away, with the roof of the car, by the wind, to the ground, the roof *518 falling from left to right. It was the roof that struck the plaintiff, after being torn by the wind from its fastenings, and forced him to the ground.

Plaintiff testified that the velocity of the wind at the time he was blown off was so slight that he could stand on top of the car without difficulty. When the top of a box car blows off under these circumstances, the conclusion is quite irresistible that the top was defectively constructed. The eaves of a box car project only a few inches from the body of the car, and the pressure of the wind against the eaves would not be as great as against a man standing on top of the car.

These facts alone make a stronger case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa, loquitur than any of the eases in which our Court has recognized the doctrine.

This maxim of the law, res ipsa loquitur, extends no further in its application to cases of negligence than to require the case to be submitted to the jury upon the face of the evidence as affording some proof of the fact in issue. The jury are not bound to decide accordingly; but if they think proper to do so, when applying their reason and common sense to the case, they may reject the conclusion that there was negligence and ascribe the injury to some other cause. It merely carries the case to the jury for their consideration, and is bottomed upon this logical principle, as decided in many cases: When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under' the management of the defendant, .and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the control of it use the proper care, it furnishes evidence, 'in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Ellis v. R. R., 24 N. C., 138; Aycock v. R. R., 89 N. C., 321; Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C., 60, and Womble v. Grocery Co., 135 N. C., 474 (elevator cases); Ross v. Cotton Mill, 140 N. C., 115, and Morrisett v. Mills, 151 N. C., 31 (sudden and unexpected starting of machines); Haynes v. Gas Co., 114 N. C., 203, and Turner v. Power Co., 154 N. C., 131 (loose or unguarded wires charged with electricity); Fitzgerald v. R. R., 141 N. C., 530 (where a piece of coal fell from the tender); Knott v. R. R., 142 N. C., 242 (where sparks flew from the engine, as in the Aycoch case) ; and numerous other like cases which the present Chief Justice has collected in a note to the Aycoch case, 89 N. C. (Anno. Ed.), at marg. p. 331.

The doctrine and its limitations are well settled by our own decisions, and they have been recently approved by the highest of the Federal courts in Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S., 233, where the Court substantially states the rule as follows:

“In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where *519 direct evidence of it may be lacking; but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they may make a case to be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict. Bes ipsa loquitur, where it applies, does not convert the defendant’s general issue into an affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is, whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff. Such, we think, is the view generally taken of the matter in well considered judicial opinions”; and the Court, after citing many authorities, then quotes this passage from Stewart v. Carpet Co., supra: “The rule of res ipsa loquitur does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of showing negligence, nor does it raise any presumption in his favor. Whether the defendant introduces evidence or not, the plaintiff in this case will not be entitled to a verdict unless he satisfies the jury by the preponderance of the evidence that his injuries were caused by a defect in the elevator, attributable to the defendant’s negligence. The law attaches no special weight, as proof, to the fact of an accident, but simply holds it to be sufficient for the consideration of the-jury, even in the absence of any additional evidence.”

There is a most exhaustive and valuable note upon this question to be found at the foot of Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 113 Am. St. Rep., at p. 980 et seq.

In WThitaker’s Smith on Negligence, at p. 422, which is quoted with approval in the Haynes case, at p. 208, it is said: “If the accident is connected with the defendant, the question whether the phrase, Wes ipsa loquitur/ applies or not becomes a simple one of common sense.” Ray on Neglect of Imposed Duties, 423; Wood on Railroad Law, 1079.

Now, let us apply the principle, as thus recognized by the courts, to the facts of this case. The car in question was certainly under the management of defendant. As was said of the coal dropping in Fitzgerald’s case, so it may be said in this case, that the top of a box car, properly constructed, does not blow off “in the ordinary course of things,” when the velocity of the wind is not so great that a conductor and a brakeman can walk across without serious difficulty. In Freeland v. R. R., 146 N. C., 266, it was held to be negligence for a railroad company not to provide a walkway on top of a box car. Does a railroad company fulfill this legal duty by furnishing a walkway so rotten or otherwise defective that a slight wind will blow it off ? Assuredly not. The doctrine of res ipsa'loquitur is, to some extent, founded upon the fact that the chief evidence as to the true cause of the injury, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the party charged and perhaps inaccessible to the party injured. Can a case be supposed in which the evidence of the “true cause” of the injury would be more exclusively within the knowl *520 edge of the defendant than in this one ? The doctrine is not confined to injuries caused by the failure of mechanical appliances or machines, as is decided in Fitzgerald's case, supra, and several of the cases heretofore cited are authority for the proposition that the doctrine applies to a servant’s action against his master for negligent injury.

Some text-writers state that the Supreme Court of the United States does not recognize this doctrine in actions between master and servant, and the case of Patton v. T. P. and R. Co., 179 U. S., 658, is cited as authority for this contention. The reference in the opinion to this doctrine is obiter, as will be seen by a careful consideration of the facts in that case. But even if the Court did so hold in that case, the reason for depriving a plaintiff of the benefit of the doctrine, when the plaintiff happens to be a servant of the defendant, no longer exists. Those cases which deny the applicability of the doctrine in an action by a servant against his master proceed upon the theory that the injury may be referred to the negligence of a fellow-servant, or to contributory negligence of the plaintiff, with just as much reason as to the negligence of the master. Under the employers’ liability act the defense of the fellow-servant doctrine is excluded, as is that of contributory negligence to some extent; hence the reason for the law, as thus stated, having ceased, the rule ceases.

In the recent case of Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S., 233, already cited by us, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in an action for dañiages for personal injuries brought by a patient against a physician in the use of the X-ray, and the question of contributory negligence might become involved in such a case.

The fact that the plaintiff was along for the purpose of learning the road would place upon the defendant the duty of observing a higher degree of care with regard to plaintiff than with respect to a regular servant. He had no duties to perform on this return trip that would in any wise acquaint him with the condition of the cars, because he had none to perform at all, except when ordered to perform some specific duty by the conductor, as he was “subject to the orders of the conductor.” Every argument that can be advanced for applying the doctrine, when plaintiff is a passenger, applies with equal force for the recognition of the doctrine in this case.

But in this case it is not necessary for plaintiff to invoke the aid of this doctrine. There is ample proof of positive negligence from both plaintiff’s and defendant’s witnesses. The motion to nonsuit was made ■ at the close of all the evidence; hence all the evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Parlier v. R. R., 129 N. C., 262. We cannot decide upon the nonsuit by selecting portions of the evidence *521 wbicb appear to favor tbe defendant. Poe v. Tel. Co., 160 N. C., 315; Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C., 289; Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 156 N. C., 523.

Plaintiff testifies that before be was thrown off he observed the planks of the roof “jumping up and down.” This proves that the planks were not nailed to the rafters as clearly as if he had sworn directly to that fact. If they were not nailed, this fact would have been readily disclosed by inspection. If this were all the evidence, the plaintiff, it would appear, has established negligence by direct and positive proof; but the evidence is still stronger. It had been ten days since this car had been inspected. Defendants do not explain where the car was; they merely show its arrival in Raleigh on 10 October, loaded with hay for Fayette-ville, and its inspection, and that is all. Is it not a question for the jury to say whether or not the car should have been inspected within less than ten days before its departure for Fayetteville? Again, the defendant had a car inspector at Fayetteville, named Cameron, and the car was carried on to Fayetteville after the injury. Cameron was not introduced as a witness. He could have described the condition of the car after the injury and thus have aided the jury in fixing the cause of the injury, as defendant attempted to do by others. The jury was justified in drawing-inferences unfavorable to defendant from its failure to use him as a witness. This car was P. and R., No. 2930. P. and R. means Philadelphia and Reading — one of the oldest railroads in the country — and the low number, 2930, may indicate that it was an old car. Conductor Jones says that it was. not new. The defendant was' under a duty to inspect this car with reasonable care and such frequency, owing to its age, as to keep posted regarding its condition. The testimony of Jones is inconsistent with defendant’s theory that the injury was due to a wind of extraordinary violence. He testified that there were fifteen car's in the train; that the top of the one in question was the only one to blow off; that underneath the pine plank forming the roof there was a -tin lining which did not project out even with the eaves, but was folded back so that the wind could not get under it; yet this tin lining was blown off, showing that it was not fastened, because the most violent wind could hardly have moved the tin lining if properly fastened.

There is another aspect of the case which justified its submission to the jury. Defendant’s pleadings and proof were both to the effect that plaintiff was along on the freight run for the purpose merely of learning the road. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent, inter alia, in that it “allowed and ordered plaintiff to walk over the top of said car while in motion.” If plaintiff was along for the sole purpose of learning the road, it was grossly negligent in the conductor to order him to walk over the car at a time when the conductor himself testifies it was dangerous to do so. The conductor was only a few feet in front of the *522 plaintiff, and it would bave been a reasonable inference by tbe jury tbat be observed tbe plank of tbe roof “jumping up and down,” yet be did not warn plaintiff. Defendant is not bound by bis statement tbat be did not, as be bad tbe opportunity of doing so. He testified tbat tbe wind was so violent tbat be bad to bold to tbe running-board to prevent being blown off; yet be orders plaintiff, an inexperienced youtb, wbo was there to learn tbe road, to cross over under these circumstances. Plaintiff testifies tbat be was expressly ordered by tbe conductor to go across tbe top of tbe car.

It was tbe plain duty of tbe defendant to bave made a reasonable inspection of this car, even though it was a foreign car or one belonging to another road. Any other rule would expose its employees to great hazards. We bave held tbat tbe failure to properly inspect such a car is negligence, and if damage ensue therefrom, it is culpable or actionable negligence (Leak v. R. R., 124 N. C., 455) ; and tbe same principle was recognized and applied in B. and O. R. R. v. Mackey, 157 U. S., 72. Tbe inspection must not only be made, but it must be done with due care. Leah v. R. R., supra; Sheedy v. C. M. and St. Paul R. R., 55 Minn., 357.

There were facts in evidence from which tbe jury might reasonably bave found tbat either no inspection bad been made, or, if made, tbat it was .carelessly done, and tbe defective condition of this car was, therefore, overlooked. Tbe car in question was re'ceived by defendant at Raleigh on 10 October; it remained in its charge until tbe day of tbe injury, 20 October. Why it held this loaded ear on its yard for ten days is unexplained; but, at all events, defendant bad abundant opportunity for inspection. Defendant kept an inspector at Raleigh. Tbe roof of this car is seen “jumping up and down,” i. e., loose, unnailed, only 16 miles from Raleigh, less than an hour’s run. Is tbe conclusion not reasonable tbat tbe roof was in this condition when it left Raleigh? Nothing bad happened, so far as tbe evidence discloses, between Raleigh and tbe place of injury, tbat should bave caused tbe roof to get into this condition. A róof would not become defective in this way instantaneously from ordinary wear and tear. This case is not like tbe one of a latent defect in a ear wheel or an iron brake, or an undiscoverable flaw in material, on account of which tbe defendant might be held blameless.

In Mich. Central Ry. v. Townsend, 114 Fed., 741, a brakeman fell from tbe top of a box car by reason of a defective running-board. Tbe Court held tbat tbe jury was warranted in inferring tbat tbe master knew of tbe defect (a loose brace), from tbe fact tbat it was seen banging loose after tbe injury. Tbe facts of tbe case at bar create a much stronger presumption of tbe master’s knowledge, as will be seen by a-comparison of tbe two eases, because tbe defective roof was seen by plaintiff and could bave been seen by defendant before tbe accident.

*523 There are only two possible explanations for this injury, towit:, (1) That the roof was defective, causing it, under the impact of an ordinary wind, to be thrown against plaintiff, thereby knocking him off the car, or (2) that the roof was not defective, and that a whirlwind of extraordinary violence blew the top off the ear and carried plaintiff along with it. The plaintiff was entitled to recover in either event. If the roof was defective, it was a defect that should and would have been discovered by inspection before the car left Raleigh, as heretofore explained. If the roof was not defective, then the proximate cause of the injury was the violent wind, and the conductor having ordered plaintiff to cross over the car at a time when a wind of this violence was blowing, was guilty of negligence, or, to speak more accurately, the jury might have so found. If this explanation be accepted as correct, it cannot be said that this injury was due to the act of Grod, or 'to the vis major, which defendant could not successfully resist or overcome, because the wind did not arise after they had started across the car, but was blowing before they started, with equal violence. So we have, according to this view of the case, an order given plaintiff by one whom he was bound to obey, that he should expose himself to the peril of this violent whirlwind, and as a proximate result of his obedience of' this order it blows both the ear top and the plaintiff off the car. It was actionable negligence to give such an order under these circumstances. Shadd v. R. R., 116 N. C., 968. Did the conductor give the order ? Ridge’s testimony is capable of no other construction. Conductor Jones states that he saw Ridge coming on behind him. Brown repeats the order in the presence of the conductor.

As to the general doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in its application between master and servant, the following cases may profitably be consulted: Parussi v. Railway, 155 Fed. Rep., 654 (affirmed in 161 Fed. Rep., 66) ; Byers v. Carnegie Steel Co., 159 Fed. Rep., 347.

The fact that the accident is of such a kind that it does not ordinarily occur if proper care is used, raises a prima facie case of negligence, nothing, else appearing, and we can see no valid reason why it should not apply to master and servant, as to other relations. If there are special circumstances that take the case out of the operation of the rule, they are easily susceptible of proof by the defendant, who is in control of the situation. But we are proceeding under the Federal 'employers’ liability act, which has abolished the defense of “fellow-servant,” as our statute has done (Revisal, sec. 2646, and Laws of 1913, ch. 6), and also the defense of contributory negligence, which now goes to the proportionate diminution of the damages, if it is present in the particular case. At any rate, and however the law may be with respect to other circumstances of a kind differing from those appearing in this record, *524 we bold it applies here, and that, in addition, there is ample evidence of culpable negligence, apart from tbe applicability of that doctrine.

When a string of fifteen cars pass through a windstorm and only one of them is unroofed, it naturally leads us to inquire, What was the cause for this exception? And, too, we naturally answer: Well, there must have been something wrong with that particular car; its roof was weak or poorly fastened or braced to its sides, or there was some other defect in the roof, which caused it to give way to the force and pressure of the wind and fall to the ground, taking the plaintiff with it. There was a like query in Haynes v. Gas. Co., supra, and a similar answer, holding the company liable for the death of the child from handling a loose wire, highly charged with electricity, and dangling from one of its poles in the street.

This case, in principle, is not unlike that of Means v. R. R., 124 N. C., 574. The negligence alleged there was that the train had several box cars, and one or two flat cars which were next to the engine, and a coach or caboose. The train had no conductor, but the engineer served in the double capacity of conductor and engineer, and in order to discharge his duties as such, he was accustomed to order the intestate, one of the train hands, to collect the tickets in the coach or caboose from the passengers and bring them to him, over the moving train. While doing so on one occasion, intestate fell from a flat car — how or why did not clearly appear- — and was killed. The Court held that the defendant should not have required such perilous service to be performed by the intestate, for the sake of economy in operating its train, but that it should have had a conductor, and whether its failure to have one was the proximate cause of the death was a question for the jury. The only difference between that case and this is not unfavorable to the plaintiff. There the failure to have a conductor was the negligent act, and here the failure to have a car with a sound or proper roof is the negligence charged; but this dissimilarity of quality in the particular negligence charged against defendant should not be allowed to differentiate the two cases in principle. But this case is stronger for the plaintiff upon its facts than was that case for the plaintiff there. Here the plaintiff was required to do a dangerous service by walking over a moving train, as in Means’ case, but the peril was greatly increased by the defective condition of the foreign car, over which he had to pass, and the then known fact that a high wind was prevailing, which even with a perfect car, as the conductor said, made it risky to venture thereon during the prevalence ‘ of the wind. He had to catch hold of the running-board to steady and save himself. In any view we can take of the case upon the conceded facts, the negligence of defendant is unquestionable. „

*525 Where there are two causes cooperating to produce an injury, one of' which is attributable to defendant’s negligence, the latter becomes liable, if together they are the proximate cause of the injury, or if defendant’s negligence is such proximate cause. We discussed this question fully and exhaustively in the recent case (at this term) of Steele v. Grant, 166 N. C., 635. Where the master’s negligence contributes to the result, although there may be a cooperating cause not due to the servant’s act, the law will not undertake to apportion the liability, but will hold him responsible to the servant in the same degree and with the same consequences as if his negligence had been the sole cause of the injury. Steele v. Grant, supra; Wade v. Contracting Co., 149 N. C., 177. As said in the oft-cited case of Kellogg v. R. R., 94 U. S., 469, 475, “The inquiry must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury.” In this case there was no intermediate, or intervening, independent and efficient cause, which, operating alone, was sufficient of itself to break the connection between defendant’s negligence and the injury, and the primary wrong must be considered as reaching from the beginning to the effect, and, therefore, as proximate to it. Hardy v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., at pp. 124, 125; Kellogg v. R. R., supra; Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S., 619. The windstorm would not, of itself, have caused the injury, as the testimony shows, when viewed favorably for the plaintiff ; but it required the concurrence and cooperation of the defendant’s negligence in having a defective car to produce the disastrous result. Judge Cooley thus states the rule, which applies to our facts: “If the original act was wrongful, and would naturally, according to the ordinary course of events, prove injurious to some other person or persons, and does actually result in injury through the intervention of other causes which are not wrongful, the injury shall be referred to the wrongful cause, passing by those which were innocent. But if the original wrong only becomes injurious in consequence of the intervention of some distinct wrongful act or omission by another, the injury shall be imputed to the last wrong as the proximate cause, and not to that which was more remote.” Cooley on Torts (Ed. of 1879), p. 69. And this seems to accord with the Kellogg case, supra.

But we will consider this question further with reférence to the duty of defendant to its employee. The rule deducible from the authorities is that the measure of care against accident which one must take to avoid responsibility is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected and the whole risk were his own. The Nitro-glycerine case, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 524 (21 L. Ed., 206). And ordinary diligence or care is such as a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence will generally use under like circumstances, the *526 standard of comparison being the ordinary man. C. I. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S., 161; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Behmyer, 189 U. S., 468; Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U. S., 405. It is now generally conceded that there is no classification of negligence with respect to the degree of care required in any given case, as being slight, ordinary, and gross, as such a distinction can serve no practical purpose and is often very misleading. Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S.), 469, 475; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; 8 Enc. of U. S. S. C. Reports, pp. 878, 879, and notes. The requisite degree of care to be employed is that which is suited to the particular transaction being investigated, and reasonably commensurate with its circumstances and surroundings, -that being supposed to be the care which any man of ordinary prudence will use, as dictated to him by a natural sense of his own protection and safety, if his personal rights were involved. Under this principle it was a duty owing to the plaintiff by the defendant that the latter furnish him with a reasonably safe working place, which in this case would be a car with a roof so constructed and kept in order or in reasonably safe and good condition for him to perform his duties with safety — not that defendant was required to insure or guarantee his safety, but to exercise due care in seeing that he is not unnecessarily imperiled or subjected to unusual dangers. Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N. C., 287. There was evidence that the defendant did not perform this duty, and the next question is, Was it the proximate cause of the injuries received by the plaintiff? On this question the language of Justice Miller in Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.), at p. 52, is directly pertinent: “That the explosion was in some sense the cause of the fire is not denied, but it is claimed that its relation was too remote to bring the case within the exception of the policy. And we have had cited to us a general review of the doctrine of proximate and remote causes as it has arisen and been decided in the courts in a great variety of cases. It would be an unprofitable labor to enter into an examination of these cases. If we could deduce from them the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain after all to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations. One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by these authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered as too remote. In the present case we think there is no such new cause. The explosión undoubtedly produced or set in operation the fire which burned the plaintiff’s cotton. The fact that it was carried to the cotton by first burning another building supplies no new force or power which caused the burning. Nor can the accidental circumstance *527 that tbe wind was blowing in a direction to favor tbe progress of tbe fire towards tbe warehouse be considered a new cause.” See, also, Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S., 117, and Brady v. Ins. Co., 11 Mich., 42, where proximate cause is defined to be, “That which is tbe actual cause of tbe loss, whether operating directly or by putting intervening agencies, tbe operation of which could not be reasonably avoided, in motion, by which the loss is produced, is the cause to which such loss should be attributed.” The case of Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S., 469 (24 L. Ed., 256, is also directly applicable, as in that case it appeared that the fire had been carried by a wind from the point of its origin to the property which was destroyed, and it was held to be proper that the question should be submitted to the jury to determine if the first act of negligence causing the fire was not the proximate cause of the destruction of the property which was burned. The jury so found, and the judgment upon the verdict was affirmed. The same Court held, in G. T. R. Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S., 700 (27 L. Ed., 266), that “If the negligence of the railroad company (towards its employee, who was injured .while performing his regular duties) contributed to, that is to say, had a share in producing the injury, the company was liable therefor,” even though another cause intervened which united with such negligence in causing the injury, for which cause the company was not responsible. Chief Justice Waite said further: “If the negligence of the company contributed to it, it must necessarily have been an immediate cause of the accident, and it is no defense that another was likewise guilty of wrong.” Ve have referred liberally to the decisions of that honorable Court because this is a case arising under a Federal statute, relating to the liability of employers engaged in interstate commerce. But the same views will be found expressed in our own books and those of our neighbors in the other States, and they seem to be practically of universal acceptance.

The recent decision in Ferebee v. R. R., 163 N. C., 351, at p. 354, seems to cover this case completely. Justice Hoke there says: “It was urged for defendant that the evidence tending to show the prevalence of an unusual windstorm on the .night in question has not been allowed its proper weight; but, on the facts in evidence, the position cannot avail the defendant. The negligent placing of the boxes having been accepted as the proximate cause of the injury, or one of them, the defendant is not relieved, though an unexpected or unusual storm should have contributed also to the result. . . . 'Inevitable accident is a broader term than an act of God. That implies the intervention of some cause not of human origin and not controllable by human power. An accident is inevitable if the person by whom it occurs neither has nor is legally bound to have sufficient power to avoid it or prevent its injuring another. *528 In sucb a case the essential element of a legal duty is wanting, and it cannot, therefore, be a case of negligence.’ . . . ‘When an act of God or an accident combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury, or when any other efficient cause so combines or concurs, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent act or omission’ ”; citing and quoting from Sh. and Redf. on Negligence (6 Ed.), sec. 16.

There are some questions of evidence in the appeal. The opinion of the expert, Dr. Hunter, was not subject to the ground of objection stated by defendant’s counsel. It is restricted in this Oourt to the reason given below for its objection (Presnell v. Garrison, 122 N. C., 595), which was that there was no evidence that plaintiff’s vertebra was crushed. But Dr. Heartt testified that it was, and this was the statement of a fact and not merely the expression of an opinion. It was competent for the doctors to state what effect, if any, in their opinion, the broken vertebra would have upon their patient’s physical and mental condition, as we think. Summerlin v. R. R., 133 N. C., 551; Alley v. Pipe Co., 159 N. C., 327, and especially Mule Co. v. R. R., 160 N. C., 252. The defendant’s own witness, Dr. Burrus, substantially testified to the same thing. Albert v. Ins. Co., 122 N. C., 92. As to defendant’s second assignment of error, it was competent, on the question of damages, for the plaintiff to testify as to his trade or business and his proficiency therein, and how the injury had reduced his earning capacity. Rushing v. R. R., 149 N. C., 158.

We have been greatly aided in this case by the able arguments and briefs of counsel on both sides. • Mr. Kelly has satisfied us, by his clear statement of the facts and the law and the citation of authorities, backed by his strong and lucid oral argument, that the views we have expressed are the correct ones and applicable to this case.

Upon a careful review of the whole case, we have concluded that there was no error committed at the trial of the cause. The rulings of the court upon evidence and the motion to nonsuit were correct, and the principles of law applicable to the facts were stated and explained to the jury by the court, in its charge, with great clearness and precision.

No error.