28 Tex. 622 | Tex. | 1866
—It has been repeatedly decided by this court that the holder of a promissory note, payable to bearer, unless there be evidence to impeach his right, has the legal title to the note, and may maintain an action on it in his own name, though the equitable ownership be in another. (Thompson v. Cartwright, 1 Tex., 87; McMillan v. Croff, 2 Id., 397; Greneaux v. Wheeler, 6 Id., 515; Butler v. Robertson, 11 Id., 142; Claiborne v. Yoeman, 15 Id., 44; Smith v. Ross, 19 Id., 172.)
It is equally clear that the language of the petition upon which the District Court held this suit to have brought by the plaintiff in his representative character should have been regarded as merely descriptio personce, in no way militating against the plaintiff’s right to a judgment in his own name on the cause of action presented in the petition. (Gayle v. Runnels, 1 Tex., 184; Lipscomb & Gillespie v. Ward & Maynard, 2 Id., 277; Groce v. Herndon, 2 Id., 412; Butler v. Robertson, 11 Id., 142; Claiborne v. Yoeman, 15 Id., 44.)
But if this suit should be treated as an action by the plaintiff in his representative character as an administrator, the judgment of the District .Court is nevertheless erroneous. The plaintiff’s right to sue as administrator was not controverted in the defendant’s answer, which must have been done if he sought to deny it or put it in issue. For, as is said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Yeaton v. Lynn, (5 Pet., 223,) “The rule is general, that a plea in bar admits the ability of the plaintiff to sue.” (2 Martin, 274;’ 10 Id., 456; 6 Ala., 399.)
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
Remanded.