130 N.Y.S. 15 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1911
The defendants, Bank of Montreal and United States Banking Company, separately demurred to the complaint upon the grounds: (1) That the court did not have jurisdiction of the sub.ject-matter of the action; and (2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrers were overruled and each appeals.
The complaint, in substance, charges that on the 8th of July, 1910, plaintiff recovered two judgments against the United States Banking Company, amounting to between $47,000 and $48,000, and on the following day executions were issued thereon to the sheriff of the county of New York and the same are still outstanding; that on April 13, 1910, the Bank of 'Montreal entered a judgment by default against the United States Banking Company for $215,000, and on the same day issued an execution thereon to the sheriff in an action in which the summons was personally served on the defendant and in which an attachment was issued on the 14th of February, 1910; that under the attachment issued in that action the sheriff levied upon a debt of $208,000, owing to the United States Banking Company, and when this plaintiff’s warrant of attachment was issued the sheriff had in his possession the proceeds of the debt; that under the plaintiff’s writs of
I am of the opinion the demurrers should have been sustained, for the reason that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The cause of action attempted to he set out is mainly predicated upon the fact that the court did not have jurisdiction of.the subject-matter of the action brought by the Bank of Montreal against the United States Banking Company. The court had jurisdiction because the instrument sued on was that kind'of a bill of exchange which is drawn on a bank, and if payable on demand was a check. (Neg. Inst. Law [Consol. Laws, chap. 38; Laws of 1909, chap. 43], § 321.) It was payablé on demand unless there, was a specific date of payment mentioned. (Id. § 26.) It is not alleged in the complaint that there was a specific date.of payment, and, therefore, it must, be assumed it was payable on demand. It was drawn on a New York bank. It was not paid when presented. "When payment was refused a cause of action arose in the State of New York in favor of the Bank of Montreal against the drawer, the United States Banicing Company. (Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367; Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 id. 252; Bank of Montreal v. United States Banking Co., 139 App. Div. 906.)
The other ground upon which it is claimed the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked is that the attachment, judgment and execution thereon in the action by the Bank of Montreal against the United States Banking Company constituted a fraud upon this plaintiff’s rights as a creditor. It is alleged that “ all such proceedings and papers are void and of no effect, and were made, issued and filed as aforesaid with the intent and for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the
In Eppley v. Kennedy (131 App. Div. 1) this court said: “ The burden of charging as well as proving fraud is on the party alleging it, and facts constituting the alleged fraud must be set forth, in order to entitle a party to introduce evidence of it. Mere conclusions of law are not enough.”
And to the same effect are Wood v. Amory (105 N. Y. 278); Cohn v. Goldman (76 id. 284), and Booth v. Dodge (60 App. Div. 23).
Not a single fact is set forth which shows, or tends to show, or from which it can even be inferred, that the plaintiff or other creditors of the United States Banking Company were hindered, delayed or defrauded; on the contrary, the only inference that can be drawn from the facts pleaded is that the check upon which the Bank of Montreal obtained its judgment was given for full consideration. If this be so then the judgment which it obtained thereon and its payment could not operate to defraud creditors any more than the payment of any just debt. (Beards v. Wheeler, 76 N. Y. 213; Wood v. Amory, supra.) The fact that the Bank óf Montreal enforced its legal rights and obtained a judgment upon a debt, justly due could not defraud any one. A creditor is entitled, even though the debtor be insolvent, to the preference acquired in the ordinary course' of legal procedure. (Lopez v. Campbell, 163 N. Y. 340.) The plaintiff seems to recognize this rule, .because it is trying to do precisely what the Bank of Montreal did — get a preference. The allegation to the effect that the Bank of Montreal and the United States Banking Company had previously agreed that the money paid by the former might be used- by the latter in bringing’ about a reorganization is immaterial. If the money obtained Were used for that purpose it would tend, at least to the amount of it, to make the banking company solvent, which would be to the interest of all its creditors.
The ground upon which the court overruled the demurrers,
Finally it is claimed that, irrespective of the questions considered, the complaint states a cause of action as to the $19,000. What the complaint alleges as to this fund is that the sheriff received warrants of attachment in the actions commenced by the plaintiff and levied upon this fund, which he refuses to pay over because the Bank of Montreal has notified him it has a lien or claim thereon; that the Bank of Montreal has no lien upon this fund, nor has any levy been made thereon. The complaint, however, shows the issuing of the attachment by the Bank of Montreal prior to the plaintiff’s attachments, and it would seem that the sheriff was, therefore, bound to levy in the order in which the attachments were received. (Code Civ.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the interlocutory judgment appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and the demurrers sustained, with costs, with leave to serve an amended complaint upon payment of costs.
Judgment reversed, with costs, demurrers sustained, with-costs, with leave to plaintiff to serve amended complaint upon payment' of costs.