On July 3, 2002, this court issued an opinion in this cause. On September 24, 2002, the Supreme Court of Missouri sustained an application for transfer to that court. On December 24, 2002, the Supreme Court entered an order retransfer-ring the cause to this court. The original opinion of this court, which follows, is now readopted and reissued.
April and Ernest Ridder (“Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiff’ when referring to April Ridder individually) appeal from summary judgment in an action for damages brought against Plaintiffs uncle, Rudolph Hibsch (“Defendant”). The petition was filed on June 26, 2000, three days prior to Plaintiffs twenty-eighth birthday, and alleges that Defendant “intentionally, negligently and unlawfully” subjected Plaintiff to sexual contact from the time she was approximately nine to twelve years old and was living “under the care, custody and control of Defendant.” Specific counts within the petition include those for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, childhood sexual abuse, and loss of consortium. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal followed. 1
Appellate review of the grant of summary judgment is “essentially
de novo.” Barge v. Ransom,
Plaintiffs’ sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant’s motion for summary judgment by failing to apply the appropriate statute of limitations. In particular, Plaintiffs claim that the statute of limitations was tolled for Plaintiffs infancy and had not yet expired on the date the suit was filed. ■ To appropriately address Plaintiffs’ arguments, we must consider various statutes of limitations, including § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, to which Plaintiffs draw our attention. However, other statutes of limitations are important to our discussion as well.
Four counts in the petition allege inappropriate acts by Defendant toward Plaintiff: battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and childhood sexual abuse. The fifth count is a loss of consortium claim brought by Plaintiffs husband, Ernest. For battery, the statute of limitations is two years.
See
§ 516.140, RSMo Supp.1999;
Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City,
For tort causes of action listed under §§ 516.140, RSMo Supp.1999, and 516.120(4), RSMo Supp.1999, if a claimant is under the age of twenty-one at the time the tort cause of action accrues, the statute of limitations is tolled until the person reaches age twenty-one.
See
§ 516.170, RSMo Supp.1999;
K.G.,
If no other statutes of limitations were applicable, Plaintiffs claim for battery would have expired when she reached age twenty-three and the claims for intentional infliction for emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress would have expired, at the latest, when she turned twenty-six. However, there is precedent for allowing such causes of action to be brought within another statute of limitations, § 537.046, RSMo Supp.1999, so long as the statutes of limitations for the tort causes of action had not expired prior to the effective date of § 537.046, RSMo Supp.1999.
See Doe,
The effective date of § 537.046, RSMo Supp.1999, was August 28,1990, and in the case at bar, the statutes of limitations for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress would not yet have expired on that date, given that Plaintiffs date of birth was June 29, 1972.
See Doe,
Section 537.046 is also the appropriate statute of limitations for the specific count of childhood sexual abuse. In the absence of any other tolling statute, and based on the facts in the record, Plaintiffs claim for childhood sexual abuse would have expired when she reached the age of twenty-three. Therefore, given the statutes of limitations considered thus far, all four of Plaintiffs claims would have been barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. As Plaintiffs husband’s loss of consortium claim is only derivative of Plaintiffs claims, his claim automatically would have been rendered invalid if all of Plaintiffs claims were time barred.
See H.R.B. v. Rigali,
However, Plaintiffs argue that none of the statutes of limitations applied in the above discussion are appropriate. They direct our attention to § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999. Similar to § 537.046, RSMo Supp.1999, § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, can only apply to suits not barred before the statute’s effective date, which was August 28,1989.
See Sheehan,
516.371. [RSMo Supp.1999] Limitation on action for sexual contact by certain persons. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, ■ there shall be a ten-year statute of limitation on any action for damages for personal injury caused to an individual by a person within the third degree of affinity or consanguinity who subjects such individual to sexual contact, as defined in section 566.010 [RSMo Supp.1999].
Within their petition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is the uncle of Plaintiff, which is “within the third degree of affinity or consanguinity.” See § 568.020, RSMo Supp.1999. Their petition also alleges that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to sexual contact, which is defined under § 566.010(3), RSMo Supp.1999, as “any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals or anus of another person, or the breast of a female person, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.”
Under § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, the statute of limitations for the actions related to the acts of sexual contact alleged to have been perpetrated by Defendant against Plaintiff is ten years.
See KG.,
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Within KG., the Court noted that, “Even if it is assumed that the ten-year statute began to run only after plaintiff was no longer disabled to sue because of minority, she lost that disability on her eighteenth birthday, January 18, 1983. § 507.115. Thus, under § 516.371, plaintiffs cause of action would be barred not later than January 18, 1993.” Id. at 798. In KG., since the plaintiff had not filed her petition until September of 1993, the cause of action would have been time barred, even if the assumption stated by the Court were correct. See id.
The KG. court also noted that Section 516.170, RSMo Supp.1999, which tolls the statute of limitations for certain causes of action until a claimant is twenty-one, is not applicable to § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, because it only applies to causes of action listed in §§ 516.100, RSMo Supp.1999, to 516.370, RSMo Supp.1999. Id. Therefore, the ten-year statute of limitations under § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, for Plaintiffs claims would not be tolled until she reached age twenty-one. Rather, “that statute [of limitations] begins running at the time of the act ... unless otherwise tolled.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court did not specifically render an opinion on the issue of whether, under § 516.371, RSMo Supp.1999, the statute of limitations is tolled until a plaintiff reaches age eighteen. Plaintiffs point out to us that commentators have attributed such a conclusion to the case. See Sharon Lowenstein, Missouri Limitation Period for Child Sexual Abuse, J. Mo. Bar 288 (1997). Ms. Lowenstein states in her article that “[w]hen the alleged abuse occurred during childhood, the [ten]-year limitation ... runs from the plaintiffs eighteenth birthday.” Id. She cites to the KG. case for the assertion. Id. Defendant argues that the conclusion as stated in the article mistakes the KG. court’s dicta as a holding or conclusion on the issue.
Statutory construction is a question of law.
Burns v. Elk River Ambulance,
Courts must avoid statutory interpretations that are unjust, absurd, or unreasonable.
Benoit,
The Western District examined rationales for extending the limitation period
*475
for childhood sexual abuse cases in
Van-denheuvel v. Sowell,
Because legislatures classify childhood sexual assault as an intentional tort, courts generally do not apply the discovery rule [a more liberal rule allowing the limitations period to run when the injury or damage is discovered] to toll the limitations period. Therefore, until legislatures recognize incestuous abuse as a unique tort and apply an appropriate statute of limitations in such cases, most civil incest claims will be barred forever.... To prevent the discovery rule from nullifying statutes of limitations, courts should not extend the rule to intentional torts. Rather, legislatures should extend the limitations period for incestuous abuse claims statutorily.
Id. at 103 (quoting Zackin, The Discovery Rule and Father-Daughter Incest: A Legislative Response, 29 B.C.L.Rev. 941 (1988)).
Section 537.046, a statute discussed earlier that has been applied to extend the statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse, specifically allows that a civil action for recovery of damages must commence, the later of, five years after Plaintiff reaches age eighteen or “within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by child sexual abuse.” It is apparent that the legislature wanted to create a separate statute of limitations for incest or other sexual conduct involving close family members. It also appears that the legislature felt that this type of contact by a close family member deserved a longer statute of limitations.
“Statutes of limitations are favored in the law.”
H.R.B.,
We are compelled to follow precedent as established by the Missouri Supreme Court in KG., but note that we would decide the ease at bar differently in the absence of KG. Therefore, we are constrained from finding error in the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant and in its determination that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time barred.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. Ernest Ridder is alleged to be the husband of April Ridder. Whether he can state a legal claim of action against Defendant is not an issue presented here and this court expresses no opinion on this question.
. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are dependent upon the same conduct as the battery claim. If correct, under such circumstances, the statute of limitations is two years.
K.G. v. R.T.R.,