Ricky Ashley v. E. Dilworth, Co-1, Maximum Security UnitRicky Ashley v. E. Dilworth, Co-1, Maximum Security Unit
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Fagg
Lead Opinion
Ricky Ashley brought a
In denying leave to proceed IFP, the district court found that Ashley had made the requisite poverty showing under
The in forma pauperis statute,
There is one exception to the “three strikes” rule:
After a careful review of the pleadings, we agree with Ashley that he sufficiently alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury to meet the exception to the “three strikes” rule of
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings with directions that Ashley be permitted to file his complaint pursuant to
Notes
. Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion that will allow a prisoner to utilize
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act with the principal purpose of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation by instituting economic costs for prisoners wishing to file civil claims. Lyon v. Krol, 127 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir.1997). To that end, it created a system of “monetary and procedural disincentives to the filing of meritless cases.” Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. May 29, 1998). That system withstands Constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 658.
The “three strikes” provision directs that prisoners who have had three previous civil suits or appeals dismissed as malicious, frivolous, or for failure to state a claim must prepay the entire filing fee.
By requiring that the prisoner “is,” in imminent danger of being physically harmed, the statute implies that his or her remedy is protection from such harm. In other words, by its plain language, the statute limits the relief we can offer such a prisoner to prospective relief for the actions that have caused the immediate risk of harm. There is no authority for a wholesale consideration of issues unrelated to the threat of imminent danger. But see Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 87 n. 7 (3d Cir.1997). I find no authority under this statutory exception to file a lawsuit on the installment plan seeking an award of damages for alleged actions that have happened in the past. Relevant as such actions may be as evidence of a risk of present danger, they cannot form the basis of a claim for which a prisoner can obtain IFP status under this narrow exception. Such a prisoner is, of course, free to pursue such a claim and pay for it. We are concerned here with the narrow circumstance in which a court can and should allow a prisoner who is in immediate danger of harm to proceed IFP. Accordingly, to the extent that today’s decision will allow Ashley to seek damages for alleged events dating back to 1993, I respectfully dissent.