RICKIE RILEA and TIMOTHY RILEY, Appellees, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.
No. 17-1803
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed October 19, 2018
MANSFIELD, Justice.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza Ovrom Judge.
The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals a district court judgment reversing declaratory orders issued by the department. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David S. Gorham, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Robin G. Formaker and Richard E. Mull, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant Iowa Department of Transportation.
Brandon Brown and Gina Messamer of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellees Rickie Rilea and Timothy Riley.
I. Introduction.
This appeal requires us to decide whether, before May 11, 2017, Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) Motor Vehicle Enforcement (MVE) officers could issue traffic citations unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. Two motorists were separately cited by MVE officers in 2016 for speeding in a construction zone. They sought declaratory orders that MVE officers lacked authority to stop vehicles and issue these citations. In the declaratory order proceedings, the IDOT concluded that its officers possessed this authority. However, on petition for judicial review, the district court found otherwise and reversed.
On appeal, we conclude that MVE officers lacked authority during the relevant time period to stop vehicles and issue speeding tickets or other traffic citations that did not relate to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. Neither
More specifically,
II. Facts and Procedural Background.
At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 12, 2016, Rickie Rilea was traveling southbound on Interstate 35 in Warren County when he was stopped by an IDOT MVE officer. Rilea received a citation for going sixty-six miles per hour in a roadwork zone with a fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit. See
At approximately 8:30 a.m. on September 27, Timothy Riley was proceeding on Interstate 35 in Warren County when he was stopped by an IDOT MVE officer. Riley was cited by the officer for traveling seventy-eight miles per hour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour roadwork zone. See
On March 23, 2017, Rilea and Riley separately sought declaratory orders from the IDOT determining that the IDOT‘s authority was limited to that set forth in
On April 26, the IDOT issued a declaratory order in each proceeding. The orders recognized the “limiting nature of
[S]o long as an offense is committed or attempted in the officer‘s presence, DOT MVE peace officers while acting in the performance of their regular duties may make an arrest for the offense, and the arrest is lawful because of the citizen arrest powers in
Iowa Code section 804.9 .
On May 23, Rilea and Riley filed separate petitions for judicial review with the Polk County District Court. See
On October 24, after hearing argument, the district court reversed the IDOT‘s declaratory orders. The court reasoned,
IDOT admits it lacks authority under Section 321.477 to issue citations for matters other than operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load, yet it argues its officers have citizen arrest authority to do so for violations which occur in their presence. The citizen‘s arrest statute applies to “private persons.” The record shows that IDOT has
100 uniformed officers, who drive marked cars with lights and sirens, and who possess radar guns to catch speeders. They have issued thousands of citations for matters other than operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. They are not acting as private persons, but as state actors. In addition, they do not take people into custody for a formal arrest. Under the plain language of Section 804.9 and the Iowa Supreme Court‘s ruling in . . . Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. State Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 N.W.2d 773 (1948), . . . the citizen‘s arrest statute does not give them authority to do so.
The IDOT appealed, and we retained the appeal.
III. Standard of Review.
We examine district court reviews of agency decisions to determine whether the court applied the law correctly. Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2014). We apply the standards set forth in
The level of deference owed to an agency‘s interpretation of a statute turns on whether the legislature vested the agency with the interpretive authority. See
IV. Analysis.
A. IDOT Authority Under Chapter 321. We first consider whether IDOT MVE officers had authority based on chapter 321 to issue tickets for traffic violations. To do so, we begin by tracing the IDOT‘s statutory authority under that chapter.
In 1913, the general assembly enacted legislation to establish the Iowa State Highway Commission, the predecessor to the IDOT. 1913 Iowa Acts ch. 122, title. In 1941, the legislature conferred authority on the highway commission to stop motor vehicles or trailers “on the highways for the purposes of weighing and inspection, to weigh and inspect the same and to enforce the provisions of the motor vehicle laws relating to the size, weight and load of motor vehicles and trailers.” 1941 Iowa
Sixteen years later, in 1957, the general assembly amended
Then, in 1974, the general assembly established the IDOT. 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1180, preamble. At that time, “the duties and responsibilities of the state highway commission [were] transferred to the state department of transportation.”
Previously, in 1939, the department of public safety (DPS) had been created, thereby centralizing all state peace officers. 1939 Iowa Acts ch. 120, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 80.1 (1946)). In the same 1974 legislation that formed the IDOT, the legislature also specified,
The division of the highway safety patrol of the [DPS] shall enforce the provisions of this chapter relating to traffic on the public highway[s] of the state, including those relating to the safe and legal operation of passenger cars, motorcycles, motor trucks, and buses, and to see that proper safety rules are observed.
1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1180, § 101 (codified at Iowa Code § 321.2 (1975)).
This division of labor between the IDOT and the DPS remained in place until 2017. Thus, when Rilea and Riley received their speeding tickets from the IDOT in 2016,
The [IDOT] may designate by resolution certain of its employees upon each of whom there is hereby conferred the authority of a peace officer to control and direct traffic and weigh vehicles, and to make arrests for violations of the motor vehicle laws relating to the operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load of motor vehicles and trailers and registration of a motor carrier‘s interstate transportation service with the department.
In 2017, after controversy arose about the authority of the IDOT‘s MVE officers, the general assembly amended
- The [IDOT] may designate by resolution certain of its employees upon each of whom there is conferred the authority of a peace officer to enforce all laws of the state including but not limited to the rules and regulations of the department. Employees designated as peace officers pursuant to this section shall have the same powers conferred by law on peace officers for the enforcement of all laws of this state and the apprehension of violators.
- Employees designated as peace officers pursuant to this section who are assigned to the supervision of the highways of this state shall spend the preponderance of their time conducting enforcement
activities that assure the safe and lawful movement and operation of commercial motor vehicles and vehicles transporting loads, including but not limited to the enforcement of motor vehicle laws relating to the operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load of motor vehicles and trailers, and registration of a motor carrier‘s interstate transportation service with the department.
Rilea and Riley contend that this amendment demonstrates the general assembly realized a need in 2017 to fix a gap in the IDOT‘s enforcement authority. The IDOT maintains that the 2017 amendment merely clarified preexisting law.
In Merchants Motor, our court addressed the scope of the highway commission‘s enforcement authority. 239 Iowa at 892–93, 32 N.W.2d at 775–76. A Minnesota corporation operated trucks “over established routes and between fixed terminals both within and without” Iowa. Id. at 889, 32 N.W.2d at 774. Some trucks were licensed in Iowa, others in Minnesota. Id. at 889–90, 32 N.W.2d at 774. The highway commission issued summonses to the trucks with Minnesota registrations, claiming that they were improperly licensed and asserting that the commission could enforce laws relating to registration in addition to those relating to size, weight, and load. Id. at 890, 32 N.W.2d at 774.4
The Minnesota corporation sought and obtained an injunction against the highway commission‘s actions. See id. at 890, 32 N.W.2d at 774–75. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court. Id. at 896, 32 N.W.2d at 777. We found that the highway commission‘s enforcement authority was limited to that expressly conferred in
Our court also emphasized that chapter 80, concerning the DPS, prohibited “other departments and bureaus of the state . . . from employing special peace officers or conferring upon regular employees any police powers to enforce provisions of the statutes, which are specifically reserved by this act to this department.” Id. at 891, 32 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting Iowa Code § 80.22 (1946)). Today,
All other departments and bureaus of the state are hereby prohibited from employing special peace officers or conferring upon regular employees any police powers to enforce provisions of the statutes which are specifically reserved by the 1939 Iowa Acts, ch. 120, to the department of public
safety.5
The conclusion we reached in Merchants Motor as to the highway commission would logically apply to the IDOT, because the IDOT succeeded to the highway commission‘s powers and any limitations on those powers. In State v. A-1 Disposal, 415 N.W.2d 595, 595–96 (Iowa 1987), decided after the IDOT replaced the highway commission, we upheld the legality of stops for weighing purposes that IDOT officers had performed at a temporary checkpoint. 415 N.W.2d at 595–96. In finding that such stops were constitutional because the intrusion on individual drivers was “relatively slight,” we emphasized “DOT officers’ power to intrude on individuals is strictly limited by the Iowa Code to inspecting for registration, weight, size, load and safety violations.” Id. at 599 (citing
Notwithstanding the pre-2017 wording of
and chauffeurs’ licenses; to see that proper safety rules are observed and to give first aid to the injured[.]
1939 Iowa Acts ch. 120, § 8 (codified at Iowa Code § 80.9(2)(b) (1946)).
state.”
In Moore, we upheld, over constitutional objections, a stop performed by an Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) officer of a moving vehicle in a state park. See Moore, 609 N.W.2d at 502–03. However, the DNR officer stopped the vehicle
Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in
The IDOT argues that allowing its officers to ticket speeding vehicles in construction zones enhances public safety. However, general considerations of public policy are not enough here to outweigh clear statutory language or longstanding precedent. Prior to May 11, 2017, IDOT peace officers were conferred only limited authority by chapter 321 to enforce violations relating to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load of motor vehicles and trailers.
B. IDOT Authority to Make Citizen‘s Arrests Under Iowa Code Section 804.9. The IDOT urges that even if it did not have authority to issue the traffic citations under
“When we are asked to interpret a statute, we first consider the plain meaning of its language.” State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017). An IDOT MVE officer performing her or his official duties would not normally be considered a “private person.” Moreover, “we read statutes as a whole rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation.” Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass‘n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015). It is significant that a nearby Iowa Code section covers the subject of arrests “by peace officers.”
Additionally, although automated traffic enforcement has changed the playing field, at the time these statutes were written most traffic violations on public highways would have occurred in the presence of the person issuing the citation (if they were detected at all). It would seem odd, therefore, for the legislature to limit the “peace officer” authority over these violations on public highways to the DPS under
Furthermore, while
[A] peace officer having grounds to make an arrest may issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest without a warrant or, if a warrantless arrest has been made, a citation may be issued in lieu of continued custody.
In Merchants Motor, the highway commission argued that its officers could rely on citizen‘s arrest authority. 239 Iowa at 893, 32 N.W.2d at 776. We disagreed:
[The Highway Commission states t]hat when [a registration violation is] committed in his presence any person may arrest, and the fact that the defendants are clothed with the authority of peace officers, does not prevent them from acting as individuals. This no doubt is true, but is not a question presented here for determination. The record clearly shows that defendants acted, and in the future will act, officially and under orders from the Highway Commission. Furthermore, the appellants do not threaten arrests and have not arrested. They have issued summonses which are not authorized by Section 755.5 [now Iowa Code section 804.9.] There is not merit in this contention.
Id. In short, although peace officers could “act[] as individuals,” for example if they were off-duty, the citizen‘s arrest authority did not apply to peace officers acting “officially and under orders.” Id. In any event, authority to issue summonses did not necessarily follow from arrest authority. Id.
More recently, in State v. Lloyd, 513 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Iowa 1994), we relied on
On appeal, the defendant argued that the South Dakota officer, who used his official vehicle to give chase to the defendant, had “no authority to use the indicia of his office” to make a citizen‘s arrest. Id. He also insisted that “no valid citizen‘s arrest could have occurred because [the officer] only issued [the defendant] a citation and a warning.” Id.
We rejected both arguments without referring to Merchants Motor. We concluded that “[a]n arrest by out-of-state officers is valid as a citizen‘s arrest under section 804.9(1) if made for a public offense committed in the officers’ presence.” Id. at 744. We quoted an earlier case where we said, “When the Omaha officers came to Iowa, they ceased to be officers but they did not cease to be persons.” Id. at 744–45 (quoting State v. O‘Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Iowa 1973)). We also found that
To some extent, Merchants Motor and Lloyd may appear to be at cross-currents, but we think the cases can be reconciled. Lloyd held that an out-of-state officer who ventured into Iowa could make a citizen‘s
Further, Lloyd held that the authority to make a citizen‘s arrest included the authority to detain someone. 513 N.W.2d at 744. Merchants Motor held that the ability to make a citizen‘s arrest did not include the ability to issue a citation in lieu of arrest. 239 Iowa at 893, 32 N.W.2d at 776. There is a distinction between a detention and a citation. Even though the South Dakota officer issued citations in Lloyd, they were South Dakota rather than Iowa citations. See 513 N.W.2d at 743.6 Furthermore, their lawfulness was not at issue; what mattered was the stop. See id. (noting the defendant‘s contention that the South Dakota officer had no authority “to flag him down and detain him in Iowa“). Hence, both cases, in our view, can be aligned with the plain statutory language we have already discussed, which appears to allow only private persons to make citizen‘s arrests and only peace officers to issue citations.7
The IDOT directs our attention to an attorney general opinion regarding the authority of IDOT officers to make OWI arrests. See Op. Iowa Att‘y Gen. No. 90–12–8, 1990 WL 484921 (Dec. 28, 1990). There, the attorney general stated,
Notwithstanding the arrest limitation of section 321.477, the propriety of the implied consent procedures under chapter 321J do not necessarily depend on the law enforcement officer‘s authority to arrest an individual. State v. Wagner, 359 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Iowa 1984);
Iowa Code § 321J.6 (1989) . When a law enforcement officer initiates the implied consent procedures under chapter 321J, they act as a statutory agent of the DOT for purposes of administering the laws of this state pertaining to revocation of a drivers license. Id. at 490.Moreover, DOT peace officers may make arrests for OWI if, in the performance of their regular duties, the offense is committed or attempted in the officer‘s presence, pursuant to the citizen arrest powers of
Iowa Code section 804.9 (1989) . See alsoIowa Code § 804.24 (1989) (arrests by private persons and disposition of prisoner); State v. O‘Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S. Ct. 2652, 41 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1974) (arrest by Nebraska police officer of a person in Iowa treated as an arrest by private person); Merchants Motor Freight v. State Hwy. Com‘n, 239 Iowa 888, 893, 32 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1948); 1988 Op.Att‘yGen. 66 (L) (an arrest by municipal police officer, outside of jurisdiction, treated as an arrest by private person).
Id. at *3.
“Although this court is not bound by an opinion of the attorney general,
We do not part ways with the attorney general regarding the ability of properly trained IDOT officers to make OWI arrests. OWI is governed by a separate chapter, 321J. Hence, with respect to OWI, it is not controlling that Iowa law reserves certain chapter 321 enforcement duties to the DPS. See
Having said that, we are not persuaded by the attorney general that IDOT officers can make citizens’ arrests under
According to the IDOT,
In addition, the IDOT draws our attention to
The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without a warrant for violations of this chapter for offenses committed in their presence, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person.
[t]he peace officer has all the privileges of arrest which, by the rules stated in §§ 119 and 120, are conferred upon one not a peace officer. In such a case, his privilege to arrest is not dependent upon his being a peace officer; and it is immaterial whether he purports to act in his capacity as peace officer or as a private person . . . .
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 121, cmt. d, at 206 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). In Iowa, though, the general assembly has enacted legislation, which prevails to the extent it may conflict with a comment in the Restatement. See
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that IDOT MVE officers, when engaged in their official duties, cannot use citizen‘s arrest authority to issue traffic citations.9
V. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
2. To enforce all laws relating to traffic on the public highways of the state, including those relating to the safe and legal operation of passenger cars, motorcycles, motor trucks and busses; to issue operators’
Officer Sandage gave defendant a warning ticket for driving without his taillights and, after running a check on defendant‘s South Dakota vehicle registration, also cited Lloyd for an expired license plate. Both offenses were low-class misdemeanors under South Dakota law.Lloyd, 513 N.W.2d at 743 (emphasis added).