56 Kan. 463 | Kan. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
: I. It is evident, from the remarks of the trial judge,- that the verdict did not meet with the approval of the court and it should have been set aside and a new trial granted, although there had been three prior disagreements. (K. C. W. & N. W. Rld. Co. v. Ryan, 49 Kan. 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, and cases cited.)
II. Upon Freeman’s examination in chief as a witness in his own behalf, he was asked the following question: ‘' Had you any knowledge or notice that Mr. Canoose was selling this stock of goods with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors? ” and he answered, “No, sir.” This is alleged as error, but the question was competent, under the authority of Gentry v. Kelley, 49 Kan. 82, 88.
III. Complaint is made of instructions given, and the court seems to have erred both to the prejudice of. the plaintiff and the defendant. At the request of the
“ 2. If you are satisfied, from the evidence, that C. W. Canoose sold and transferred to the plaintiff the goods in controversy with the intent to defraud, or to hinder and delay, his creditors, then the burden falls upon the plaintiff; and before he can recover he must satisfy your minds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that he made the purchase without knowledge or notice of such fraudulent intent on the part of the said C. W. Canoose, and that all the facts, circumstances and transactions attending and surrounding such sale and transfer were not of that kind and character as should have led him, as a prudent man, to make inquiry into the intent of his vendor.”
This was error to the prejudice of the plaintiff below. A prima facie case was made out in favor of the plaintiff by showing possession of the stock of goods under a bill of sale from Canoose, who was conceded to be the owner. It then devolved upon the defendant to show that the sale was made by Canoose for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his creditors, and that Freeman knew or had reason to believe that Canoose was acting in bad faith toward his creditors in making the sale. The burden of proof did not shift by the showing of the fraudulent intent of Canoose. (Baughman v. Penn, 33 Kan. 504, 508 ; National Bank v. Beard, 55 id. 773, 42 Pac. Rep. 320, 321.) Where confidential relations exist between the vendor and the vendee, it may sometimes devolve upon the latter to show that the transfer was for a valuable consideration and' in good faith; but that principle is not applicable to this case. The court also charged the jury in instruction No. 1, requested by the defendant below, that the plaintiff was charged with knowledge of all facts that he might have ascertained by examination and inspection of the books
At the request of the plaintiff below the court gave the following instruction :
“1. The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that it is not sufficient to vitiate a sale of personal property, that it was made by the vendor to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. In order to vitiate such sale, as against the purchaser, he must have had knowledge or notice of such intent on the part of the seller.”
And the same principle was substantially declared in instruction 3. This was error prejudicial to the defendant below. The jury may have understood therefrom that, in order to vitiate the sale as to Freeman, he must have had knowledge or notice of the fraudulent intent of Canoose. It is not necessary, however, to show actual knowledge or notice of the fraudulent intent of the vendor. »A knowledge of facts sufficient to put one upon inquiry, which, if duly prosecuted, would have disclosed such fraudulent intent, is equivalent to actual knowledge of the
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.