152 Mass. 359 | Mass. | 1890
This is a suit in equity brought in the Superior Court by Thomas W. Richmond as guardian of Mary C. Stearns, an insane person, against the Adams National Bank, the Boston and Albany Railroad Company, and Parker H. Bosworth and Nathaniel J. Bosworth, both of Pittstown, Rensselaer County, in the State of New York. The plaintiff and his ward were both domiciled within the county of Berkshire in this Commonwealth, and the plaintiff was appointed guardian by the Probate Court of that county. The bank had, and has, its principal place of business within said county, and the railroad company is a corporation chartered by the Commonwealth. Both the bank and the railroad company demurred to the bill, and the demurrers were overruled by the Superior Court, and they appealed. It does not appear that after the demurrers were overruled either the bank or the railroad company answered the bill, or that the bill was taken for confessed against either of them. The Bosworths appeared and filed a joint answer, in which they say that the court “ has no jurisdiction concerning the subject matters complained of, there being no authority conferred upon it by law to take cognizance thereof, and it hath no power to
The Superior Court, before sending the. cause to a master, should have required the bank and the railroad company to file answers, or should have taken the bill for confessed against them, and should also have disposed of the petition of Brayton. We have not, however, deemed it necessary to consider how far these omissions would render the subsequent proceedings ineffectual, if the plaintiff had shown any right to maintain the suit against any of the defendants.
Upon the coming in of the master’s report, the cause was reserved by a justice of the Superior Court for this court, on the pleadings and report, “ saving to defendants all benefits of appeal on demurrer.” It appears by the master’s report, that Mary C. Stearns was adjudged an insane person, and Daniel Stearns wras appointed her guardian by the Probate Court of the county of Berkshire in February, 1866, and that he resigned as guardian in 1884, when his resignation was accepted by that court, and the plaintiff appointed guardian in his place. Mrs. Stearns was the daughter of Nathaniel Bosworth of Pittstown, New York, who died on April 6, 1853, leaving a will. She resided with Henry Stearns, her husband, in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, from her marriage in May, 1830, until his death in March, 1884. After his death she continued to reside within this Common
The principal object of the bill is to have the agreement made by the heirs of Nathaniel Bosworth declared void, so far as it creates a trust for Mary C. Stearns, because she was insane when she signed it, and to obtain a decree that the defendants Bosworth shall transfer the shares of stock standing in their names as trustees to the plaintiff as guardian, because, as the plaintiff contends, it is personal property within the Commonwealth, which absolutely belongs to his ward. The plaintiff also asks that the two defendant corporations be enjoined from paying to the Bosworths, as trustees, any dividends on said shares of stock, and that such dividends shall be paid to him as guardian.
It is obvious that the case suggests many interesting and difficult questions. By the agreement of June 17, 1853, the heirs, who, we infer, were also the distributees of the estate of Nathaniel Bosworth, assigned to each other certain portions of his estate, and if the purpose were wholly to avoid this agreement, so far as Mary C. Stearns is concerned, the persons who signed it should have been made parties. The bill, however, does not seek wholly to avoid the agreement as to her, for it accepts the share of the estate assigned for her, but seeks to avoid the trust, and to have the property assigned in trust declared to be absolutely her property. If the intention were to have the estate of Nathaniel Bosworth readministered, that must be done in New York, although ancillary administration, if necessary, might be granted here. If it be assumed that after this lapse of time the administration of his estate as in fact it was administered cannot be or need not be disturbed, that this is not a testamentary trust, and that Mrs. Stearns by her guardian could have accepted the share assigned for her, but could have avoided the trust, it is plain that since her death, .her husband having previously died, the only persons really interested in the question are the
It has been contended in argument, that by the law of the State of New York the share of Mrs. Stearns in the personal estate of her father, whether it be regarded as a legacy or as a distributive share, was a chose in action, which her husband could reduce to possession and make his property; and that by his execution of the agreement of June 17, 1853, he did reduce this property into his possession, and therefore a valid assignment of it was made by him to a trustee, even if his wife were insane at the time. The representatives of his estate, however, have not been made parties to the suit.
The authority of a guardian ceases upon the death of his ward, and his only duty then is to settle his accounts, and turn over the property of the ward which is in his hands to the persons entitled to.it. The title to the ward’s property does not vest in the guardian by virtue of his appointment, and the general rule is that a guardian must bring suit in the name of his ward when the suit concerns the title of the ward to property. Sée Hicks v. Chapman, 10 Allen, 463; Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass. 29.
It is said, however, that there is an exception to this general rule when a bill is filed by a guardian to set aside an act done by an insane person who has been put under guardianship. See Gorham v. Gorham, 3 Barb. Ch. 24; Warfield v. Fisk, 136 Mass. 219; 1 Dan. Ch. Pract. (5th Am. ed.) 9, 82, et seq.; Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 64, 65. We do not consider it necessary to determine how far, if at all, this rule prevails in this Commonwealth, or whether, if it prevails here, it is altogether applicable to this suit. We assume that it was within the power of the Superior Court to permit an amendment of the bill admitting the ward as a party plaintiff, and that, the ward having died, the administrator of her estate could have been admitted to prosecute
As none of the existing parties have any beneficial interest in the subject matter of the suit, and as the plaintiff has no title to the property of Mrs. Stearns, we are of opinion that the bill should be dismissed. So ordered.