Wе granted an application for review from the trial court’s order denying Richmond Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. The original complaint was brought by the daughters and husband of Julia Loree Dickerson, deceased, seeking recovery of damages for her wrongful death. The complaint alleged that decedent suffered an aneurism and was taken to the emergency room at Richmond Hospital; that she remained there until her death about eight hours after her arrival; that during the time she did not receive competеnt medical attention and treatment; that Richmond Hospital’s employees were grossly negligent and failed to exercise standard professional care while decedent was a patient in the hospital; that Mrs. Dickerson’s death was a result of incompetent treatment and care.
1. Because this issue could be dispositive of the еntire case we first consider enumeration of error two.
(a) In its application for interlocutory review and on appeal to this Court, Richmond Hospital has stressed that even if its employees were negligent, such negligence was not the cause of the death because the deceased and her family declined treatment by the hospital staff. The emergency room physician who attended Mrs. Dickerson related by affidavit that after Mrs. Dickerson’s condition was diagnosed by him she was advised that surgery was nеcessary. Despite this, she and her family refused treatment and sought the services of *602 another physician! This continued over the course of the afternoon and by the time treatment was begun it was too late.
Were this undisputed there would be an issue of law as to proximate cause. However, in actuality there is a factual question since the family of Mrs. Dickerson, by deposition, testified to a quite different situation. According to their account they were not informed as to the necessity of surgery and did not request a specific doctor but were told one would arrive imminently; that no one arrived and no one closely monitored Mrs. Dickerson’s condition while they waited and waited. The contention is that monitoring vital signs and informing the physician was the responsibility of the hospital’s nurses. Because there was a dispute as to what transpired, the trial court propеrly left that matter for the jury’s determination.
(b) Based on expert medical testimony that Mrs. Dickerson’s chances of survival, even with surgery, were less than fifty percent, Richmond Hospital cites foreign authority to the effect that in such circumstances a causal connection between any negligence and Mrs. Dickerson’s death was not established. The cases do not sustain this extreme position.
The sole Georgia case relied upon,
Parrott v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth.,
Proximate cause is not eliminated by merely establishing by expert opinion that the patient had less than a fifty percent chance of survival had the negligence not occurred. If imminent death was inevitable regardless of treatment, lack of treаtment would of course not be the proximate cause of death. But the attending physician here, the hospital’s witness, steadfastly maintained that surgery was indicated right from the оutset, in order to sustain her life. It is obvious from his affidavit that in his opinion death was not inevitable, if surgery were performed without delay. The real question here is, why was it not undertaken? Was it bеcause the patient and/or family refused to consent to treatment other than by or at the direction of the workers’ compensation physician, or because they were not advised of the necessity for immediate surgery and the unavailability of the workers’ compensation physician, or for some other reason? Did the hospital’s nurses fail to adequately monitor and report Mrs. Dicker
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son’s condition so that no emergency action was taken sooner than nearly 6:00 p.m., when death became irrеversible? The record does not establish that the actions or inactions of the hospital staff were not a proximate or contributing cause of Mrs. Dickerson’s death. Thus the movant hospital did not on this record, carry its burden of proof on summary judgment.
Ray v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co.,
2. Richmond Hospital asserts that plaintiffs failed to submit proof by a qualified expert that it failed to еxercise the appropriate standard of care. Plaintiffs did submit an affidavit by a physician who testified that the hospital’s employees and nurses were negligent in failing to properly monitor Mrs. Dickerson during the time she was in the hospital. He stated they failed to meet the requisites of ordinary care. Based on the fact he failed to refer tо the standards for the “locality” in question, Richmond Hospital contends his affidavit is without probative value.
Richmond Hospital misreads the applicable cases. The “loсality” rule applies where the adequacy of the services or facilities of a small hospital is questioned. See
Wade v. John D. Archbold Mem. Hosp.,
The standard of care for a hospital staff generally was set forth in the affidavit. This was a sufficient basis to create an issue for the jury.
3. Richmond Hospital argues that the emergency room was in the charge of physicians who were independent contractors and thus, it was not responsible for any negligence on their part.
More precisely the question is not as to the negligence of the physicians but as to the hospital staff, particularly the nurses. The agreemеnt, which set out that the physicians were acting in the role of independent contractors in providing emergency care, stated that the hospital would provide, at its sоle cost and expense, “services of nurses and other non-physician assistants, as may be needed for the effective operation of the Emergency Depаrtment.” Their status insofar as who would control the nurses or non-physician assistants is not mentioned in the agreement but the implication is that the hospital
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did not relinquish control. Compare
Swindell v. St. Joseph’s Hosp.,
In other situations, a hospital may be liable for injuries negligently inflicted upon its patients by nurses and other employees.
Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson,
The failure to properly monitor Mrs. Dickerson could be found to fit within the bounds of the above cited cases. Moreover, if we accept the scenario posed by witnesses for plaintiffs, any emergency room treatment had been either suspended or terminated аnd the patient was being kept in a holding pattern by the hospital pending the arrival of another physician. Under those circumstances a jury issue was presented regarding whether Mrs. Dickerson’s care was the hospital’s responsibility. Thus, the hospital failed to establish as a matter of law that it owed no duty to Mrs. Dickerson and as we have already noted, it likewise failed to show that it was free from negligence.
The trial court properly denied Richmond Hospital’s motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.