99 Ky. 194 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1896
delivebed the opinion or tiie cotjbt.
The questions presented on this appeal are, first, what is a regular term of the Jefferson County Court? second, what constitutes the first day of such a term? and, third, has the county court the power to probate wills on any day other than the first day of a regualr term? These questions
’ It appears that the paper offered for probate as the last will of William Teiper, deceased, had been signed and published by him in' the presence of Otto C. Minor and Henry Wolks, subscribing witnesses thereto, and that when the paper was offered for probate as'stated, on Tuesday, April 7, 1896, Minor was present and was sworn as a witness, and testified as to'the execution of the will, and also proved the attestation of Henry Wolks, the other subscribing witness; nevertheless the court refused either to probate of reject the paper, and refused to enter any order in the matter because
By an act of the General Assembly, approved February 25, 1854, entitled “An act to establish a levy and county court for Jefferson county” (2 Stanton’s Revised Statutes, edition 1860, 523), it was provided (section 4) that a county court for said county should be held “on the first Monday in every second month in the year, beginning with the first Monday in April, 1854.”
It was also provided (section 10) that the regular terms of said court should begin “on the first' Monday in April and every second month thereafter, and end the Saturday next preceding the first Monday of every second month,” and also that the judge of the court might hold the court “at any time to transact its ordinary business.”
It appears that this act of February 25,' 1854, continued in force, without amendment affecting the terms of the court, until the passage of the act entitled “An act relating to courts of justice,” approved June 10, 1893, which, among qther things, regulates the jurisdiction and terms of the county courts established under the present Constitution.
Section 38 of the last-named act (Kentucky Statutes, section 1058) is as follows:
*198 “Section 38. There shall be a regular term of the county-court held by the county judge in each county once every month on Monday, and, until changed as herein provided, shall be held on the same day it noto is. The time of holding the county court in any county may be changed by an order made by the county judge and entered upon the records of the county court at the last regular term held in the year next preceding the year in which the change is to be made. Special terms of the county court may be held at any time for the transaction of any business, except probating of a will or granting tavern, liquor or druggist license, and the court may adjourn from time to time until the business is disposed of, but no adjournment shall be to a time beyond the commencement of the next regular term.”
It will be observed that this section of the statute provides for both regular and special terms of the county court, established by the Constitution, in each county of the Commonwealth. It also provides a method for changing the time of holding the court (that is, the beginning of the term of the court in each county), excludes certain matters that are within the jurisdiction of the court from being considered and acted on at special terms, and authorizes the adjournment of a court from time to time within the period allowed for any regular term until the business is disposed of. It fixes no juridical days during the term, except the first, which must be Monday, and assigns no kind of business to any particular day, but leaves it to the judge by empowering him “ to adjourn from time to time until the business is disposed of;” to sit on as many juridical days, during any one term, as the business of the court and the public interest may require, and to regulate the order of the business. Manifestly, it was the purpose and intent of this
It follows from the. foregoing construction of- the section of the act which we have quoted at large that the county court of Jefferson county has authority under the statute to consider and act upon any matter within its jurisdiction and properly brought before the court upon any juridical day of any monthly term of the court, and that the court may be kept open for the transaction- of any business within its jurisdiction by adjourning from one day of any term to any other day during the same term, and up to the final adjournment for the term, subject only to the exceptions contained in the section relating to the business of special terms of the court. Hence the fact that the will of William Peiper was not produced and offered for probate before the court on the first Monday in April, 1896, which, under the statute, was the first day of the April term of the court, was no sufficient ground or reason for not proceeding with the probate of the instrument.
This disposes of all the questions properly before us on the record of the case, and, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is affirmed.