4 Pa. 471 | Pa. | 1846
Upon the authority of McDowell v. Shotwell, Whart. 26, and the cases there cited, it may be conceded, that the chattels taken in execution at the suit of the plaintiffs, Richie and Totter, (except the few pieces of furniture, oil-cloth, and the horse and cart,) are tools of trade; but the question is, can they also be regarded as the necessary tools of a tradesman, within the spirit and meaning of the seventh section of the act of 22d April, 1846 ? P. Dig. Ed. of 1847, fo. 468. It is to be regretted that, in framing a statutory provision of so much importance, a term so vague, and admitting of such variety of signification, should have been employed. In England, according to their lexicographers, the word “tradesman” would seem to be principally used as expressive of a person engaged in traffic, as a small shopkeeper; but in this country, in its ordinary acceptation, it embraces a much larger class. With us, it is scarcely ever
But it cannot, with any show of reason, be said that, by its pro
When penning the last act, the framer of it 'had, beyond question, an eye to former laws on the same subject, and must have felt that' the term «< tradesman,”1 as there used, admitted of no other construction than that I have assigned it, and which is, I believe, in accordance with the general sense of the profession. And yet the same language is preserved. It is still “ the necessary tools of a tradesman.” How can it then be thought, without doing great violence to the language, the legislature intended to change the law in a most important particular ? To induce the belief that such was the object, by extending the circle of protection beyond its former limits, and to make it embrace the machinery and other tools of large manufacturers, generally very valuable, and thus to snatch them from the grasp of their creditors, would require an unambiguous and explicit declaration to that effect. To save to the small artisan his means of employment in his proper trade, is suggested by sound policy as well as by feelings of humanity; to interpose beyond this, for' the protection of the wholesale manufacturer, would be a measure fraught with injustice. ■
A further argument in support of this conclusion may be drawn from another act of the 26th of March, 1814, relating to insolvent debtors, which allowed to such insolvent, if a mechanic or manufacturer, his tools, not exceeding in value $50. But this was repealed by the act of 1828, before cited; and since then, the term “ manufacturer” is not to be found in the statutes of relief. This may be a fact' of little weight, in itself, but it certainly tends, in some degree, to convince the mind that this class of debtors have been purposely omitted; and when considered in connection with what has been already said, would seem to be conclusive of the question.
This view of'the lawmakers’ design, puts the defendant in this execution beyond the pale of the act of 1846. Without attempting • to point out minutely the difference between him and the poor handicraftsman, whose case it was intended to provide for, it is sufficient to say the defendant comes strictly under the denomination of a manufacturer whose business necessarily requires the occupancy of large and extensive buildings, the investment of a considerable capital, and the employment of numerous workmen to carry it on successfully. He can, in no proper sense under the statute, be considered a tradesman or mechanic. • The property taken in execution and sold tras, therefore, liable to be distrained for rent, and from this
This view makes it unnecessary to consider the written agreements signed by the defendant, and his deposition relating thereto, and it disposes of the whole case; for there is nothing in the objection, that though the landlord claims but one year’s rent, his claim is not confined to the current year. As matter of fact,- this is not shown by the paper-book, and if it were so, the point is settled adversely to the pretensions of the execution creditors by the case of Ege v. Ege, 5 Watts, 140. Rule absolute. .