1:08-cv-01308 | D. Colo. | Dec 11, 2008
lN THE UN|TED STATES DlSTR|CT COURT
FOR THE D|STR|CT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 08-cv-01308-BNB UNirED s}r_;lrgssl`crsEmD
oswvsie, coton'}\:oroCOURT
TERRY RlCHERT, DEC
1 l 2008
App|icantl GREGORY C_ MNAHAM
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V. ""-~~._W..l.`_“`n__f?_L§l_l!;K
THE COLORADO DEPART|V|ENT OF CORRECT|ONS,
GARF|ELD COUNTY CONIN|UN|TY CORRECT|ONS, and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents.
ORDER OF D|SM|SSAL
Applicant, Terry Richert, currently is housed in a Garfield County community
corrections center in Rifle, Colorado. Nlr. Richert has filed With the Court pro se a
second amended application for a Writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging the validity of his conviction in the Nlesa County, Colorado, district court
case number 03CR1086. He paid the $5.00 filing fee.
ln an orderfiled on August 7, 2008, l\/lagistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland ordered
Respondents to file within twenty days a pre-answer response limited to addressing the
affirmative defenses of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and/or exhaustion of state
court remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). On September 17, 2008, after being
granted an extension of timel Respondents filed their pre-answer response On
October 'l, 20081 Applicant filed a reply to the pre-answer response
The Court must construe liberally the application and the reply filed by lVlr.
Richert because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106" date_filed="1991-06-03" court="10th Cir." case_name="Kenneth Hall v. Henry Bellmon">935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However,
the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d 1106" date_filed="1991-06-03" court="10th Cir." case_name="Kenneth Hall v. Henry Bellmon">935 F.2d at 1110.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the application, and dismiss the
action.
On June 2, 2005, lVlr. Richert pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to
possession of a controlled substance in l\/lesa County District Court case number
OSCR1086. The crime to Which he pleaded guilty was committed on April 25, 2003.
The law then in effect provided that possession of a schedule ll controlled
substance, no matter what amount, was a class four felony. He was sentenced to
six years of imprisonment plus three years of mandatory parole. lVlr. Richert did not
appeal directly from the judgment of oonviction.
On September 12, 2005, Nlr. Richert initiated various postconviction motions
apparently challenging his sentence Two days later, on September 14, 2005, the
l\/lesa County District Court denied the motions, and lVlr. Richert appealed. On April
5, 20071 the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed See People v. Richert, No.
OSCA2065 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007) (not published). On December 3, 2007, the
Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review
On February 8, 2008, l\/lr. Richert initiated an original proceeding in the
Colorado Supreme Court, Which denied the petition on l\/larch 20, 2008. On June
11, 2008, lVlr. Richert submitted his original application, which this Court filed on
June 20, 2008. Respondents concede that the instant action is filed in a timely
manner, i.e., within the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Therefore,
the Court need not address further the one-year limitation period .
lVlr. Richert asserts three claims. As his first claiml he contends that he has
been denied the benefit of a change in state law. He specifically contends that he
should have received the benefit of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-405(2.3)(a)(l), which
changed the class of felony for possession of less than a gram of a controlled
substance from a class four felony to a class six felony and applies to offenses
committed on or after Ju|y 1, 2003.
As his second claim, he contends that the use of state case law, i.e., People
v. McCoy1 764 P.2d 1171" date_filed="1988-11-14" court="Colo." case_name="People v. McCoy">764 P.2d 1171 (Colo. 1988), to deny the benefit of a change in state
statutory law is unconstitutional as a violation of ex post facto requirements McCoy
held that the language “shall apply to acts committed on or after” the effective date,
“ma[de] it clear that the amendatory legislation [wa]s to have prospective application
only" (emphasis added). Id. at 1174. lVlr. Richert appears to argue that he is
entitled to the benefit of the change in the law reducing the felony levet of drug
offenses involving the possession of small amounts of narcotics because the law
became effect prior to the imposition of his sentence, even though the crime to
which he pleaded guilty was committed on Apri| 25, 2003.
As his third claim, he contends that, because of the ambiguous nature of
state case law, i.e. the McCoy decision, as applied to state statutory law, the rule of
lenity should be applied to afford him a more lenient sentence The state statutory
law to which he refers is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-410(1)(f)(|), which authorizes
postconviction relief when “there has been a significant change in the lawl applied to
the applicant’s conviction or sentence allowing in the interests ofjustice retroactive
application of the changed legal standard.” Id.
Respondents contend that lVlr. Richert’s first and third claims present
questions of state law only and, because they fail to present a federal constitutional
claim, they may not be considered by this Court. They further contend that Mr.
Richert failed to raise his second claim as a federal constitutional claim in state
court. ln his reply, lVlr. Richert apparently alleges that he did not raise issues of
constitutional law in state court until after the Court of Appea|s affirmed his
conviction on postconviction review.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), an application for a writ of habeas corpus
may not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted state
remedies or that no adequate state remedies are available or effective to protect the
applicant's rights. See O'Sul!ivan v. Boerckef, 526 U.S. 838" date_filed="1999-06-07" court="SCOTUS" case_name="O'Sullivan v. Boerckel">526 U.S. 838 (1999); Dever v.
Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531" date_filed="1994-10-11" court="10th Cir." case_name="Don Michael Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, the State of Kansas, Attorney General of Kansas">36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion
requirement is satisfied once the federal claim has been presented fairly to the state
courts. See Castr'lle v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 3461 351 (1989). Fair presentation
requires that the federal issue be presented properly “to the highest state court,
either by direct review of the conviction or in a postconviction attack.” Deverl 36
F.3d at 1534. “Federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state |aw."
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62" date_filed="1991-12-04" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Estelle v. McGuire">502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). lt is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state-court
determinations on state-law questions Id. at 67-68.
Furthermore1 the “substance of a federal habeas corpus claim" must have
been presented to the highest state court in order to satisfy the fair presentation
requirement Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270" date_filed="1971-12-20" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Picard v. Connor">404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); see also Nichols v.
Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250" date_filed="1989-02-06" court="10th Cir." case_name="Russell Earl Nichols v. George Sullivan">867 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1989). Although fair presentation does not
require a habeas corpus petitioner to cite “book and verse on the federal
constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. 270" date_filed="1971-12-20" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Picard v. Connor">404 U.S. at 278 (internal quotation marks omitted), “[i]t is not
enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the
state courts.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4" date_filed="1982-11-01" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Anderson v. Harless">459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam). A claim
must be presented as a federal constitutional claim in the state court proceedings in
order to be exhausted See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364" date_filed="1995-01-23" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Duncan v. Henry">513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per
curiam).
Finally, “[t]he exhaustion requirement is not one to be overlooked lightly.”
Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089" date_filed="1995-11-09" court="10th Cir." case_name="Rudy Hernandez v. Gary Starbuck, Superintendent of the Wyoming Honor Farm Attorney General of the State of Wyoming">69 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). A state prisoner
bringing a federal habeas corpus action bears the burden of showing that he has
exhausted all available state remedies. See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392" date_filed="1992-06-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Valerio Ernest Miranda v. Thomas Cooper, Superintendent, and Frank Gunter, (Gunther) Sic, Director, D.O.C.">967 F.2d 392, 398
(10th Cir. 1992).
Having reviewed the state court record currently before the Court, this Court
agrees that claims one and three only present issues of state law and therefore are
not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see
also Estelle, 502 U.S. 62" date_filed="1991-12-04" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Estelle v. McGuire">502 U.S. at 67-68. The Court further finds that lVlr. Richert failed to
raise his second claim as a federal constitutional claim in state court. On
postconviction review in the Colorado Court of Appeals, Mr. Richert failed to cite to a
provision of the United States Constitution, thus failing to present his second claim
as a federal constitutional claim in state courtl see Duncan, 513 U.S. 364" date_filed="1995-01-23" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Duncan v. Henry">513 U.S. at 365-66, or
to characterize or to present the substance of his second claim as a federal claim.
See Picard, 404 U.S. 270" date_filed="1971-12-20" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Picard v. Connor">404 U.S. at 278. Rather, in his state court opening and reply briefs, he
simply relied upon two federal cases, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314" date_filed="1987-01-13" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Griffith v. Kentucky">479 U.S. 314 (1987),
and Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288" date_filed="1989-04-17" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Teague v. Lane">489 U.S. 288 (1989), to support his state law claim that he
should have been given the benefit of amendatory state legislation.
Although lVlr. Richert failed to exhaust state court remedies for his second
claim for relief, the Court may not dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust state
remedies if lVlr. Richert no longer has an adequate and effective state remedy
available to him. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. No further state court remedy
exists because the Colorado Court of Appeals expressly rejected the second claim
on state grounds, see People v. Richert, No. 05CA2065, slip op. at 1-2, and
because any future claim would be denied as successive under Colo. R. Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(V||). ThereforeT the second claim that lVlr. Richert failed to exhaust is
procedurally defaulted
As a general rule, federal courts “do not review issues that have been
defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground,
unless the default is excused through a showing of cause and actual prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.” Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313" date_filed="1998-05-05" court="10th Cir." case_name="Feldon Jackson, Jr. v. John Shanks">143 F.3d 1313, 1317
(10th Cir. 1998). App|ication of this procedural default rule in the habeas corpus
context is based on comity and federalism concerns See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722" date_filed="1991-09-13" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Coleman v. Thompson">501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). lVlr. Richert’s pro se status_does not exempt him from
the requirement of demonstrating either cause and prejudice or a fundamental
miscarriage ofjustice. See Lepiscopo v. Tansy, 38 F.3d 1128" date_filed="1994-10-25" court="10th Cir." case_name="Ralph M. Lepiscopo v. Robert J. Tansy">38 F.3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir.
1994).
To demonstrate cause for his procedural defau|t, lVlr. Richert must show that
some objective factor external to the defense impeded his ability to comply with the
relevant procedurai rule See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478" date_filed="1986-06-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Murray v. Carrier">477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); United
States v. Salazar, 323 F.3d 852" date_filed="2003-03-26" court="10th Cir." case_name="United States v. Salazar">323 F.3d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2003). A fundamental miscarriage
ofjustice occurs when “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477 U.S. 478" date_filed="1986-06-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Murray v. Carrier">477 U.S. at 496; see also
United States v. Cervim', 379 F.3d 987" date_filed="2004-08-11" court="10th Cir." case_name="United States v. Cervini">379 F.3d 987, 991-92 (10th Cir. 2004). A “substantia|
claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is
extremely rare.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298" date_filed="1995-01-23" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Schlup v. Delo">513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). To demonstrate a
fundamental miscarriage ofjustice, l\/lr. Richert first must “support his allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific
evidence trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was
not presented at trial.” ld. l\/lr. Richert then must demonstrate “that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence.” ld. at 327.
Liberally construing the allegations in his reply, lVlr. Richert apparently
attempts to demonstrate cause for his procedural default by alleging that he failed to
raise issues of constitutional law in state court until after the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction on postconviction review. This argument is without merit
because lVlr. Richert’s failure to raise a constitutional issue in state court is not an
objective factor external to the defense impeded his ability to comply with the
relevant procedural rule. ln addition, l\/lr. Richert does not allege that he is actually
innocent Therefore, the Court finds that the second claim Mr. Richert failed to
exhaust is procedurally barred because lVlr. Richert has failed to demonstrate cause
and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that claims one and three are dismissed because they only
present issues of state law and, therefore are not cognizable in a federal habeas
corpus action. lt is
FURTHER ORDERED that the claim two is dismissed as procedurally barred
lt is
FURTHER ORDERED that the application is denied and the action is
dismissed
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this L/_ clay of /@»QC » , 2008.
BY THE COURT:
Zl A L. WE|NSH|ENK, Senior Judge
U ited States District Court
|N THE UN|TED STATES D|STR|CT COURT
FOR THE D|STR|CT OF COLORADO
CERT|F|CATE OF MA|L|NG
Civil Action No. 08-cv-O1308-BNB
Terry Richert
Prisoner No. 105847
Garfield County Community Corrections
PO Box 2017
Rifle, CO 81650
John J. Fuerst lll
Senior Assistant Attorney General
DEL|VERED ELECTRON|CALL¥
l hereby certify that l have mai!§d a copy of the ORDER AND JUDGMENT to the
above-named individuals on l2 il `
GREGQRY-Q. LANGHA|V|, CLERK
/
/
/
By:“:\ BO(/Q/\~ .¢
\._, W'_...-/Deputy Clerk